AN IDLE THREAT: EPIPEENOMENAXIISM E%POSED Paul D. Raymont A thesis submitted i n confo-mity w i t h t h e requirements f o r the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of Philosophy, U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto @ Copyright by Pau l D. Raymont, 1999 National Library Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington OttawaON K I A W Ottawa ON K I A ON4 Canada Cana& The author has granted a nonexclusive licence dowing the National Libmy of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats. The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis ncr substantial extracts fkom it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission. L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfichelfilm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. Paul David Raymont Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Ph,D. 1999 Abstract An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalisrn Exposed This thesis involves a consideration, and rejection, of the clairn that recent varieties of non-reductive physicalism, particularly Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, are committed to a new kind of epiphenornenalism. Non-reductive physicalists identify each mental, event with a physical event, and are thus entitled to the belief that mental events are causes, since the physical events with which they are held to be identical are causes. However, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and others have argued that if we follow the non-reductive physicalist in denying that mental features can be reduced to physical properties, then we must regard mental properties as being causally irrefevant to their bearers' effects, In short, the non-reductive physicalist is said to be committed to the belief that while there are mental causes, they do not cause their effects in virtue of being the types of mental state that they are. It is in this sense that non-reductive physicalists are thought to represent a new form of epiphenomenalism. After a brief survey of the history of epiphenomenalism, and its mutation into the contemporary strain that is believed to afflict non-reductive physicalism, 1 argue against the counterfactual criterion of the sort of causal relevance that we take mental features to enjoy. 1 then criticize the 'trope'' response ta the epiphenomenalist threat, and conclude that much of the current debate on this topic is premissed on the mistaken belief that there is sorne variety of causal relevance that is not sinply a brand of explanatory relevance. Once this is seen, it will seem much less plausible that mental properties are excluded from relevance to the phenomena of which we typically take them to be explanatory. to my parents Robert and Nancy Raymont and my w i f e Victoria Burke Acknowledgements 1 would l i k e t o thank my s u p e r v i s o r , W i l l i a m Seager , and my advisers, S o n i a Sedivy and Ronald de Sousa, f o r t h e i r advice and i n c i s i v e comrnents on e a r l i e r d raf ts o f t h i s m a t e r i a l . 1 would a l s o l i k e t o t h a n k Calvin N o m o r e fo r h i s s t i m u l a t i n g s u g g e s t i o n s d u r i n g t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of t h i s p r o j e c t , and P e t e r Hess, rny first p h i l o s o p h y teacher1 o w e a t remendous debt o f gratitude ( a n d money) t o my p a r e n t s , Rober t and Nancy Raymont. F i n a l l y , 1 would like t o acknowledge t h e s u p p o r t and encouragement 1 have received from m y w i f e , V i c t o r i a Burke, b o t h e m o t i o n a l l y a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l l y . T a b l e of Contents .................................... Chapter 1: Introduction 1 .................. Chapter 2: Looking for Causal Relevance -23 .............................. Chapter 3: Still Looking 95 ......................... Chapter 4: Explanatory Relevance 128 ............................................. Bibliography 163 1 ntroduction We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its room, and then says: '1 w i l l that the sun shall rise"; and at him who cannot stop a wheel, and says: ''1 will that it shall roll"; and at him who is thrown down in wrestling, and says: "here 1 lie, but I will lie here!" But, al1 laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any differently whenever we employ the expression: ''1 will"? Our mental conditions axe simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism; . . . to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we cal1 volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata, Credit for the doctrine of epiphenomenalism must go to Shadworth Hodgson (or perhaps to the organism on which he supervened) . Hodgsonf s presentation of the view antedates Huxleyr s by four years, having first appeared in Hodgsonr s The Theory of P r a c t i c e in 1870.~ The view, stripped to its essentials, is that mental phenornena are caused by physical events, but in turn cause nothing, Epiphenomenalism obviously concerns many of the issues that have traditionally arisen in discussions of 'the will'. Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Srian Leiter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) bk. II, sec. 124, T.H. Huxley, "On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata," in The P h i l o s o p h y of Mind, ed. Brian Beakley and Peter Ludlow (Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 1992), 133-6 (at 136); originally published in 1874. ' William James identifies Hodgson as the first proponent of epiphenomenalisrn in William James, The Principles of P s y c h o l o g y (New Y o r k : Henry Holt and Company, 18901, 1:130. 1 have been unable to locate a copy of Hodgson' s book. Indeed, i n t h e course o f d i s c u s s i n g q u i t e d i f f e r e n t c la ims about t h e w i l l , some ph i losophers have given clear s t a tements o f epiphenomenalism wi thou t in tend ing to do so . This i s probably t r u e o f t h e above ep ig raph from Nie tzsche , and is c e r t a i n l y t r u e o f t h e fo l l owing quo ta t ion from Wi t tgens te in : You sometimes see i n a wind a p i e c e of paper blowing about a n y b w . Suppose t h e p i e c e o f paper cou ld make t h e dec i s i on : 'Now 1 want t o go t h i s way.' 1 Say: 'Queer, t h i s paper always d e c i d e s where it is t o go, and a l 1 t h e t i m e i t i s t h e wind t h a t blows it. 1 know it i s t h e wind t h a t blows it.' T h a t same f o r c e which moves it a l s o i n a d i f f e r e n t way moves i t s d e c i s i o n s . 4 Here, Wi t t gens t e in i s g i v i n g expression t o t h e view t h a t t h e w i l l i s no t free, and y e t t h e image he p r o f f e r s n i c e l y cap tu r e s one o f t h e c e n t r a l t e n e t s o f epiphenomenalisrn, according t o which t h e same p h y s i c a l f o r c e s t h a t engender t he b o d i l y motions c o n s t i t u t i v e of behaviour a l s o " i n a d i f f e r e n t way" produce t h e d e c i s i o n s t h a t appear (mis lead ing ly ) t o be t h e causes o f t h a t behaviour , Th i s mode1 enab l e s t h e epiphenomenalis t t o account f o r t h e manifes t r e g u l a r i t i e s t h a t o b t a i n between o u r d e c i s i o n s and t h e i r corresponding behavioura l e x p r e s s i o n s wi thou t being compelled t o Say t h a t t h e former e v e n t s are causes of t h e Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lectures on Freedom of the Will," from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1 91Z-195Zr ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), 434. latter ones. These regularities can be explained sirnply by saying that the decisions and their behavioural expressions are joint effects of a common (physical) cause; as Huxley says, the volitions constitute "a collateral product" of the body' s workings . 5 Another image that nicely captures this strategy for making sense of psychophysical regularities without according efficacy to the mental was given by Hugh Elliot in the following story: Suppose that Tantalus, his hammer, and his anvil w e r e concealed . . . by a screen . . . and that a light . . threw the shadow of the hammer and anvil upon a wall. . . Every time the shadow of the hammer descended upon the shadow of the anvil, the sound of the percussion is heard. . . . What is the inevitable ef fect upon the observerr s mind? . . . He cannot escape the conclusion that the cause of each sound is the blow which the shadow of the hammer strikes upon the shadow of the anvil. . ..States of consciousness are shadows of cerebral functioning; . . . the cause of action lies in the cerebral functioning and not in the shadows which accompany it. 6 T.H. Huxley, "On t h e Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata," 135. " Hugh S . R. E l l i o t , Modern Sc i ence and the I l l u s i o n s of P r o f e s s o r Bergson {London: Longmans, Green, and Co,, 19121, 185-7 (quoted frorn Paul Edwards, ed., Immortality [Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 19971 , 184-5). E l l i o t g ives a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r i d e n t , s c i e n t i s t i c defense of epiphenornenalism. I t should be noted t h a t the doc t r i ne d id not win the support of al1 late Vic tor ian , s c i e n t i s t i c authors . Herbert Spencer f e l t compelled t o augment t h e s i x t h ed i t i on o f his F i r s t Principles with a denunciation o f Huxleyf s views (Herbert Spencer, First Princip1 es, 6 th ed. [New York: D. Appleton and Company, 19001, sec . 71b, 198-202) . H e t h e r e o f f e r s the i n t e r e s t i n g observation t h a t t h e epiphenomenalist owes us an explanation of why it is t h a t t h e v o l i t i o n s t h a t accompany an action when i t is first performed cease t o occur a f t e r the ac t i on has been repeated many t imes and become hab i tua l . Most writers (including Wittgenstein) rightly present this view as an example of deteminisrn, Huxley himself took epiphenomenalism to be consistent with the freedom of the will, on the grounds that it does not preclude onef s acting 7 in accordance with oner s desires. Clearly, though, freedom requires not just that onet s actions accord with onef s desires, but also that they be products of those desires; however, in the world depicted by epiphenomenalism, while an agent can act as she wants, she cannot act because of what she wants. 8 It is this lack of efficacy that has led many to regard epiphenomenalism as a particularly pointless brand of dualism. At least the interactionist takes there to be something the mind does, something that cannot be fully understood without appealing to a mind. By contrast, epiphenomenalists ask us to affirm the existence of nonphysical mental states while in the same breath maintaining that al1 of the effects commonly imputed to those states are in fact produced by the brain alone. But, one may ask, if a physical thing does everything that we thought was done by the mental, why not simply identify it with the mental? As the neuropsychologist, D.O. Hebb, said in his critique of epiphenomenalism, "A brain that functions in every respect T.H. Huxley, "On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata," 135. Deteminisrn does not require epiphenomenalism, since our volitions could be real causes while yet being themselves determinedlike a mind is a rnind.f'g In short, epiphenomenalisrn appears to be merely Sn anachronism in the evolution from interactionist dualism to physicalism, arising from the failure to see that once the causal powers associated with the mind have been appropriated by physical entities, there remains no reason for continuing to believe in distinct, non-physical mental events. Epiphenomenalism disappears as a relevant concern if we simply become physicalists. It is not clear, however, that epiphenomenalism really does require a metaphysical setting in which the identity of mental and physical events is denied. The world might conform to the spirit, if not the letter, of Huxleyf s out look even if al1 events are physical, for it might be the case that while mental events are physical events, their being mental in no way contributes to their having the causal powers that they have. This manifestation of epiphenomenalism within the context of a physicalist metaphysics was limned by C.D. Broad in 1925 when he said, Epiphenomenalism may be taken to assert . . . that certain events which have physiological characteristics have also mental characteristics, . . . and that an event which has mental characteristics never causes another event in virtue of its mental characteristics, but only in - - - ' D.O. Hebb, Essay on Mind (Hil lsdale , New J e r sey : Lawrence Er lbaum Associates, Publishers, 1980), 39. Hebbf s own argument f o r this clairn is pragmatis t . H e says, "To paraphrase C.S. Peirce's p r i n c i p l e of pragmatism: Consider w h a t practical e f f e c t s such a d i s t i n c t i o n of mind f r o m brain may have; then Our conception of t hose e f f e c t s is t h e whole conception of the d i s t i n c t i o n . The p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t s a r e n u l l , the dist inction is merely verbal" (D.O. Hebb, Essay on Mind, 40) . virtue of its physiological characteristics. 10 Contrary to popular belief, Broad was not the only, or even the first, eârly twentieth-century philosopher to consider this new brand of epiphenornenalism. He seems to be regarded as such by Brian ~c~aughlin." In fact, however, George Santayana, as early as 1906, had endorsed a position that bears remarkable sirnilarities to the kind of epiphenomenalism that is described by ~road.'~ Santayana' s rnanner of expression, being often poetic (and sometirnes bombastic), is not nearly as clear as Broadf S . Nevertheless, it appears t h a t Santayana wished to deny efficacy to thought "in its ideal capacity"13 or when it is "taken as a psychological e~istence",'~ while a t t h e same time allowing thought to have real causal force " th rough the natural la C.D. Broad, T h e M5nd and I t s P l a c e i n Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1925) , 472. Brian P. McLaughlin, "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical, " P h i l o s o p h i c a l Perspectives 3 (1989) : 109-35 (at 109) . See also John Heil, T h e Nature of True Minds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121; and Stephen Yablo, "Mental Causation, " The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review 101 (1992) : 245-80 (at 248 n. 8). McLaughlin implies that Broad himself was vexed by this brand of epiphenomenalism and struggled vainly to overcome it (Brian P. McLaughlin, "On Davidsonr s Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism, " in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19931, 27-40 [at 28 n. 3 1 ) . However, as William C. Kneale points out after quoting this same passage from Broad (William C. Kneale, "Broad on Mental Events and Epiphenomenalism," in T h e Philosophy of C.D. Broad, ed, Paul Arthur Schilpp [New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 19591, 437-55 [at 4421 ) , although Broad gave voice to this new kind of epiphenomenalism, he in fact happily endorsed an old-fashioned, dualistic epiphenomenalism. This interpretation is confirmed by Broad in his reply to Kneale in T h e Philosophy of C.D. Broad, ed. Schilpp, 791-4l2 George Santayana, "The Efficacy of Thought," T h e Journal of Philosophy 3 (1906) : 410-12. l3 Santayana, "The Efficacy of Thought, " 410. L4 Santayana, "The Efficacy of Thought," 411. efficacy o f t h e c r e a t u r e whose l i f e it e~~ressed."'~ Apparen t ly , t h e n , t h o u g h t rnay be c o n s i d e r e d under b o t h p s y c h o l o g i c a l ( o r 'ideal") and " n a t u r a l " a s p e c t s , l6 a n d i t is o n l y i n v i r t u e of t h e latter, p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t it is ef f i c a c i o u s . I n S a n t a y a n a ' s words, Events i n n a t u r e are never w h o l l y men ta l , and it is on t h e i r material side, t h r o u g h t h e i r s u b s t a n c e and p h y s i c a l t e n s i o n s , t h a t they are d e r i v e d from prev ious events and he lp t o shape t h e e v e n t s which f o l l o w 17 Santayana sought t o emphasise t h e n o v e l t y of h i s p o s i t i o n i n his r ep ly t o E l i s e o V i v a s , who had claimed t h a t S a n t a y a n a r s epiphenomenalism commit ted him t o dualism.18 San tayana rejected t h e cha rge , m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t , "Sensa t ion , p a s s i o n and thought a r e t h e r e f o r e e f f i c a c i o u s m a t e r i a l l y i n so f a r a s t h e y are m a t e r i a l , b u t n o t i n s o f a r as t h e y are s p i r i t u a l , " l g t h e i m p l i c a t i o n b e i n g t h a t s i n c e q u e s t i o n s l5 Santayana, "The Eff icacy of Thought," 411 . Note t h a t the very t i t l e ascr ibes eff icacy t o thought, and t h a t i n t he sentence from which t h i s quote i s taken, it is thought i t s e l f t h a t is said t o be a c t i v e i n the c rea ture ' s natural e f f i cacy . The sentence reads a s follows: "Thought might s t i l l be c a l l e d e f f i c a c i o u s i n the only sense, not magical, i n which i t s ef f icacy would be a t a l 1 congruous with i t s in t en t ; namely, through the natural e f f i cacy of t h e c rea ture whose l i f e i t expressed-" (Emphasis added) 16 Santayana uses the term "aspects" i n connection with h i s vers ion o f epiphenornenalism when he says t h a t our appreciat ion of t h i s doc t r ine "is obstructed by s u p e r f i c i a l empiricism, which a s soc i a t e s the better-known aspects of [mental] events d i r e c t l y together, without consider ing what mechanical bonds may s e c r e t l y u n i t e them" (George Santayana, "Reason i n Common Sense," i n h i s The Life o f Reason [New York: Charles Scr ibner 's Sons, 19051, 223-4). " George Santayana, Realms o f Being (New York: Charles Scr ibnerr s Sons, l94O), 315. le Eliseo Vivas, "From The Life of Reason t o The L a s t P u r i t a n , " i n The Philosophy o f George Santayana, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 194O), 313-50 ( a t 319). l9 George Santayana, 'Apologia Pro Mente Sua, " i n The Philosophy of George Santayana, ed. Schilpp, 497-605 ( a t 5 4 2 ) . (Emphasis added) about the efficacy of mental phenomena are to be answered by considering those same phenomena under both "spiritual" and material features, the epiphenomenalism endorsed by Santayana involves no cornmitment to dualisrn. It is interesting to note that Santayana articulates his epiphenomenalism in the context of a materialism that does not require the reduction of the mental to the physical. Similarly, in more recent debates about epiphenomenalisrn, the kinds of physicalism that are thought to be susceptible to this variety of epiphenomenalisrn are those that eschew the identification of mental characteristics with physical features. It is easy to see why, After all, if an event causes its effects in virtue of its physiological properties, and if those properties just are its mental properties, then the effects were caused in virtue of those mental characteristics. Thus, the sort of epiphenomenalism that Broad and Santayana describe afflicts only those versions of physicalism that do not countenance the reduction of mental properties to physical features. Aïthough in this passage Santayana qualifies the sort of efficacy under consideration as ef f icacy wi th respect to material effects, he elsewhere denies that mental phenomena qua spiritual are efficacious with respect to other mental states (Santayana, "The Efficacy of Thought," 411). 2Ls Vivas says, "He [Santayana] is a materialist, but he does not believe that we can reduce mind to matter" (Vivas, "From The L i f e of Reason to The Last Puritan," 319). Vivas bases his clairn on what Santayana says in Santayana, "Reason in Cornmon Sense," 205-7. The interpretation appears to have been accepted by Santayana, who remarks that Vivas "sees what my principles are, . . . 1 am condemned without being misrepresented" (Santayana, "Apologia Pro Mente Sua, " 541) . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e c u r r e n t most p o p u l a r b r a n d s of p h y s i c a l i s m are o f j u s t t h i s s o r t , P h y s i c a l i s t s today t e n d t o allow t h a t a l t h o u g h each mental t o k e n i s i n fact a physical t o k e n , e a c h s u c h p a r t i c u l a r is a t o k e n o f two d i s t i n c t t y p e s , one m e n t a l and t h e o t h e r p h y s i c a l ; t h e m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l t y p e s canno t be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h e a c h other. T h e main r e a s o n s f o r e n d o r s i n g t h i s v i e w have been d o u b t s a b o u t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e psycho-phys i ca l l a w s that would be needed t o s u p p o r t t h e r e d u c t i o n of m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s t o p h y s i c a l f e a t u r e s , a l o n g w i t h t h e belief t h a t a n y g i v e n t y p e of m e n t a l s t a te i s realisable b y many d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f p h y s i c a l s tate, a n d is t h e r e f o r e i d e n t i c a l w i t h none of them? It is t h o u g h t t h a t once t h e physica l i s t t h u s s u n d e r s m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s f r o m each o t h e r - t h a t is, once s h e becomes a n o n r e d u c t i v e p h y s i c a l i s t - s h e t h e r e b y opens t h e d o o r t o a host of w o r r i e s a b o u t epiphenomenal ism. However, i n o r d e r t o get t h e s e worries o f f t h e g round w e must f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e a p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s p re supposed ( b u t n o t e x p l i c i t l y s ta ted) by bo th Broad and San tayana i n t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e new k i n d o f epiphenomenal ism t h a t is now widely t h o u g h t t o bedevil n o n r e d u c t i v e p h y s i c a l i s m . T h i s '' The most influential rendering of these doubts derives from Donald Davidsonrs anomalous monisrn (Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," in his Essays on A c t i o n s and Events [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19801, 207-25) . 22 Hilary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States," in his Mind, Language and R e a l i t y (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19751, 429-40. is, namely, t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t when one e v e n t causes a n o t h e r , o n l y some o f t h e cause ' s p r o p e r t i e s need be r e l e v a n t t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e e f f e c d 3 For example, when a r e d b r i c k i s thrown a t a window, t h e window b r e a k s because a b r i c k o f t h a t m a s s and moving a t t h a t v e l o c i t y s t r u c k it, and n o t because it w a s s t r u c k by a b r i c k t h a t w a s red. T h e b r i c k r s mass and v e l o c i t y are causally r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s o f t h e cause , w h i l e i t s r e d n e s c i s n o t . More g e n e r a l l y , for any cause , w e must d i s t i n g u i s h between t h o s e o f i t s p r o p e r t i e s t h a t are causally relevant and t h o s e that are i n e r t . T h e i s t h a t m e n t a l d i v i d e . There a re worry t h a t besets nonreduc t ive f e a t u r e s will fa11 on t h e inert p h y s i c a l i s t s side o f t h i s f o u r main s o u r c e s o f t h e fear t h a t mental f e a t u r e s a r e c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . The f i rs t i s a worry about t h e e f f i c a c y of c o n t e n t and d e r i v e s from t h e v i e w t h a t a l 1 c o n t e n t i s b r o a d ? To Say that c o n t e n t is b r o a d is t o s a y t h a t it i s n o t local. The c o n t e n t o f a belief , f o r example, is n o t c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n o n e r s head b u t is i n s t e â d a much more expansive s o c i a l matter, b e i n g p a r t l y c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e p r a c t i c e s of one ' s c o m n i t y of l anguage u s e r s . But i f 23 In the above quotations from Broad and Santayana, t h i s r e l a t iv i sa t ion of eff icacy t o the cause's propert ies is captured by Broad i n the locution "in v i r t u e of", and by Santayana i n the phrase " in so f a r asrr. '' Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaningr ," i n h i s Mind, Language and Reality, 215-71; and Tyler Burge, "Individualism and t h e Mental," Mïdwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979) : 73-121. this is so, then how can content be efficacious? We like to think that what happens here and now is an effect of causes that were present and exercising their influence in the here-and-now (or the here-and-recent-past). But if content exceeds these boundaries, if it really is the broad social being that many now think it is, then it would seem to be too rernote to influence such local phenornena as my raising my a m . 25 Problems concerning the efficacy of broad content are not peculiar to non-reductive physicalisrn. As Tim Crane has noted, even if content properties could be reduced to purely physical environmental properties and relations, it would still not be clear how such broad features could be locally ef ficacious . 26 For this reason, questions arising f rom the broadness of content will not be a central Eocus in what follows (although the results that are reached may well have some bearing on those questions). A second reason for doubting the causal relevance of mental properties is grounded in one type of non-reductive 2 7 physicalism, namely, functionalism. Functionalists *' Excellent discussions o f the e f f i cacy of broad content can be found i n John Heil, "The Legacy of Cartesianism," chap. 2 i n Tne Nature o f True Minds; and Tyler Burge, "Individuation and Causation i n Psychology, " Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989) : 303-22, 26 Tim Crane, "The Mental Causation Debate," Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society (Suppl.) 69 (1995): 211-36 (at 224-5)27 This pxoblem is presented i n Frank Jackson and P h i l i p P e t t i t , "F'unctionalism and Broad Content, " Mind 97 (1988) : 381-400; and Frank Jackson and Phi l ip P e t t i t , "Program Explanation: a General Perspective," Analysis 50 (1990) : 107-17; and Ned Block, "Can the Mind Change the conce ive o f m e n t a l features as a b s t r a c t , h i g h e r o r d e r p r o p e r t i e s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , each menta l p r o p e r t y is thought t o be t h e p r o p e r t y o f h a v i n g c e r t a i n f i r s t o r d e r p r o p e r t i e s that c a u s a l l y i n t e r a c t i n such a way as t o realise t h e t y p i c a l causal r o l e t h a t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h a t t y p e o f m e n t a l s t a te . T h e problem i s t h a t t h e firsto r d e r r e a l i s i n g p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s a p p e a r t o be d o i n g a l1 t h e c a u s a l work. C a u s a l r e l e v a n c e a c c r u e s o n l y t o them. The h ighe r -o rde r f u n c t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s a t t a c h t o t h e i r b e a r e r s o n l y i n consequence of t h e c a u s a l connec t ions hav ing a l r e a d y been f i x e d by t h e f i r s t o r d e r implement ing s tates . While t h i s p rob lem does n o t c o n f r o n t var ie t ies o f nonr e d u c t i v e p h y s i c a l i s m o t h e r t h a n func t iona l i s rn , it will be addressed i n t h e f o l l o w i n g chapters, b o t h a s a direct c h a l l e n g e t o t h e e f f i c a c y of m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s and as a s o u r c e o f coun te rexamples t o p u r p o r t e d tes ts o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e . A t h i r d c h a l l e n g e t o t h e e f f i c a c y of men ta l p r o p e r t i e s i s posed by t h e a p p a r e n t c a u s a l c l o s u r e o f t h e p h y s i c a l r e a l m . According t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of c l o s u r e , o n l y p h y s i c a l e v e n t s and p r o p e r t i e s be long t o any c a u s a l series t h a t r e s u l t s i n a p h y s i c a l e v e n t . If t h i s is t r u e , t h e n it seems t h a t menta l p r o p e r t i e s are n o t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o any World?" in Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, ed. George Boolos (Cambridge: Cambridge University P r e s s , 1990), 137-70. a c t i o n t h a t produces p h y s i c a l effects; f o r , accord ing t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of c l o s u r e , o n l y p h y s i c a l f e a t u r e s c o n t r i b u t e c a u s a l l y t o the produc t ion o f t h e s e e f f e c t s , and, i f nonr e d u c t i v e p h y s i c a l i s m i s t r u e , men ta l p r o p e r t i e s a r e n o t p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s . It shou ld be noted t h a t w e do n o t s t r i c t l y need t h e p r i n c i p l e o f c l o s u r e i n o r d e r t o g e n e r a t e t h i s problem. Al1 t h a t i s needed is t h e d a i m t h a t each of o u r a c t i o n s can be accounted f o r i n t h e language o f a p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e . Thus, even i f we remain unsure about sornething as comprehensive a s the p r i n c i p l e of c l o s u r e , w e rnight feel c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e cause of m y opening t h e f r i d g e can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d i n p u r e l y p h y s i c a l terms, by t a l k i n g about t h e neurophys io log ica l e v e n t s t h a t s e n t s i g n a l s through rny nervous system and i n t o rny muscles, caus ing them t o c o n t r a c t and r e l a x i n ways t h a t cu lminated i n t h e f r i d g e d o o r r s being opened. If m e n t a l f e a t u r e s are n o t p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s , then it i s hard t o see how my d e s i r e f o r juice can be f i t i n t o t h i s c a u s a l sequence. 28 " Interestingly, many of the old-fashioned dualistic epiphenomenalists were motivated by similarly modest considerations. They refrained from making sweeping metaphysical claims about the nature of causation or the closure of the physical realm. For example, Huxley briefly considers the worry that mental events are too unlike physical states to act on them, but quickly dismisses it as "superfluous" (T.H. Huxley, 'On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata," 135). He clearly regards his epiphenomenalism as an empirical hypothesis supported by evidence about reflex actions and the behaviour of unconscious frogs (T .H. H ~ l e y , "On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata," 133-4). Broad goes so far as actually to defend the coherence of interactionism and its compatibility with the conservation laws (C.D. Broad, The Mïnd and Its P l a c e in Nature, 95-133) , but, in the end, opts for epiphenomenalism on the basis Return ing t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of c l o s u r e , it may be felt t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s t o o s t r o n g , and s h o u l d be replaced by t h e more modest d a i m t h a t fo r e v e r y p h y s i c a l e v e n t , t h e r e are p h y s i c a l events and p r o p e r t i e s t h a t w e r e s u f f i c i e n t t o produce it, o r a t least t o f i x the p r o b a b i l i t y o f i t s occur rence ; t h e r e may indeed be o t h e r , non-phys ica l f a c t o r s i n i t s c a u s a l h i s t o r y , b u t t h e y w e r e o v e r d e t e r m i n i n g c a u s e s t h a t d id n o t b r i n g a b o u t any r e s u l t ( o r yield any p r o b a b i l i t y of an outcome) t h a t w a s n o t a l r e a d y f i x e d by t h e p u r e l y p h y s i c a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e c a u s a l c h a i n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s n o t a promis ing b a s i s f o r an accoun t o f men ta l c a u s a t i o n . For even i f o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n is p o s s i b l e , it is s u r e l y n o t as p e r v a s i v e a s it would need t o be i n o r d e r f o r eve ry human a c t i o n t o be a n e f fec t both o f p h y s i c a l and men ta l a n t e c e d e n t s . Thus w e s t i l l face t h e problem o f a c c o r d i n g c a u s a l po tency t o t h e menta l i n a world i n which a l 1 t h e c a u s a l work has a p p a r e n t l y a l r e a d y been done by p h y s i c a l e v e n t s and f e a t u r e s . 29 Problems a r i s i n g Erom t h e a l l e g e d c a u s a l c l o s u r e ( o r a t least comple teness ) o f the p h y s i c a l r e a l m c o n f r o n t a l1 forms o f non-reduct ive p h y s i c a l i s m . Perhaps t h a t e x p l a i n s why, of of the apparent sufficiency of physical explanations to account for our behaviour, together with considerations of "economy" (C .D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, 475-7). Z9 My statement of this problem of mental causation follows closely Jaegwon Kim's presentation of it, particularly in Jaegwon Kim, "The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism, " in his Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 265-84 (esp. 279-84). the four problems of mental causation h e r e canvassed, this one has received the most attention in the literature. Although the focus in what follows will not at first be on this problem of mental causation, we will have occasion to revisit this set of issues later when it becomes apparent that some of the attempted solutions to this problem have also been advanced as solutions to the fourth problem of mental causation (e . g . , the putative ' trope' solution) Moreover , much of what we Say in coming to g r i p s with the fourth problem (particularly about the very concept of causally relevant properties) will also have application to t h e closure worries. The fourth difficulty for mental causation arises in the framework of Donald Davidsonrs version of non-reductive physicalism, anomalous monism. Davidson is the non-reductive physicalist who has had most often to contend with the charge of being an unwitting epiphenomenalist. Indeed, much of the contemporary debate surrounding epiphenomenalism originated with criticisms of his philosophy of mind. The claim that t h e principles of anomalous monism support epiphenomenalism seems first to have been made by Frederick Stoutland, Peter Hess and Ted Fionderich. 30 Contemporary 30 Frederick Stoutland, "The Causation of Behavior," in Essays on Wi t tgens te in i n Honor o f G.H. von Wr igh t ( A c t a Philosopnica Fennica, XXVIII [Amsterdam: North-Holland, 197611, 286-326 (at 307); Peter Hess, "Actions, Reasons, and Humean Causes," Analysis XLI (1981) : 77-81; and d i s c u s s i o n s o f t e n i n c l u d e r e f e r e n c e s t o S t o u t l a n d a n d Honderich as t h e f irst t o have h i t upon t h i s set of w o r r i e s . 31 Hessr s work, by cornparison, h a s been n e g l e c t e d . T h i s is s t r a n g e , s i n c e it w a s Hess's p a p e r t h a t began t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n Analysis t o which H o n d e r i c h r s p a p e r w a s a c o n t r i b u t i o n . T h e difficulty i n D a v i d s o n r s o u t l o o k is thought t o derive from t h r e e c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f anomalous monism. The f i rs t p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t m e n t a l e v e n t s c a u s a l l y i n t e r a c t w i t h p h y s i c a l e v e n t s . Second, e v e n t s t h a t c a u s a l l y i n t e r a c t fa11 u n d e r s t r ic t l a w s ; i f a c a u s e s b, t h e n there i s a s t r i c t l a w t h a t relates a p r o p e r t y of a t o a f e a t u r e of b, T h i r d , m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s are absent f rom s t r i c t l a w s ; t h e r e are no s t r i c t p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r p s y c h o p h y s i c a l l a w s . " Accord ing t o t h e f i rs t p r i n c i p l e m e n t a l e v e n t s e n t e r i n t o c a u s a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , b u t , i n view o f the second c l a i m , t h e y do s o o n l y by v i r t u e of f a l l i n g under s t r i c t laws. However, g i v e n t h e t h i r d c l a i m , none of t h e i r m e n t a l f e a t u r e s are referred t o i n t h o s e laws , and none o f t h e i r men ta l q u a l i t i e s c a n be reduced t o t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s that are Ted Honderich, "The Argument for Anomalous Monism," Analysis XLII (1982) : 59-64, '' In his chronicle of the debate, Brian McLaughlin credits Stoutland, Honderich and a host of authors writing in the mid-1980's with the epiphenomenalist criticism of Davidson (McLaughlin, "Type Epiphenornenalisrn, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical," 131 n. 2). Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer do likewise (Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer, "Mind Matters, " The Journal of Philosophy 84 11987) : 630-42 [at 634 n. 101 ) . 32 Donald Davidson, "Mental Events, " 208. c i t e d i n t h e s t r i c t laws . As a r e s u l t , it would seem t ha t menta l e v e n t s e n t e r into c a u s a l t r a n s a c t i o n s s o l e l y b e c a u s e o f t h e i r s t r i c t l y nomic p h y s i c a l f e a t u r e s and n o t because o f any men ta l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t t h e y p o s s e s s Thus, a c c o r d i n g t o Davidsonrs c r i t i cs , anornalous monism g e n e r a t e s epiphenomenalism: even though it a l l o w s e v e n t s t h a t have menta l p r o p e r t i e s t o be c a u s e s , i t i m p l i e s t h a t no such e v e n t e n j o y s i t s c a u s a l s t a t u s i n v i r t u e o f i t s men ta l p r o p e r t i e s . These p o i n t s can be i l l u s t r a t e d by means o f t h e f o l l o w i n g example t h a t w a s p r e s e n t e d by E r n e s t Sosa . 33 Suppose a gun s h o t k i l l s E d . The s h o t is a loud n o i s e , s o a loud n o i s e k i l l s Ed. I n a s e n s e , t h a t is t r u e . However, a d d s Sosa, Ed i s o n l y k i l l e d by t h e loud n o i s e qua a s h o t , n o t by t h e n o i s e qua a l o u d n o i s e . The s h o t ' s l o u d n e s s is c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t t o i t s effect (Ed's d e a t h ) . T h i s i s shown, a c c o r d i n g t o Sosa , by t h e t r u t h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g c o u n t e r f a c t u a l : "had t h e gun been equ ipped w i t h a s i l e n c e r , t h e s h o t would have k i l l e d t h e v i c t i m j u s t t h e same."34 The p o i n t o f S o s a ' s cr i t icism i s t h a t i f anomalous monisrn i s t r u e , t h e n e v e r y m e n t a l p r o p e r t y is l i k e t h e s h o t ' s l oudness : a l t h o u g h a n e v e n t t h a t has s u c h a f e a t u r e may b e a cause , it is n o t i t s p o s s e s s i o n o f t h a t f e a t u r e t h a t makes - - - - - - - 33 Ernest Sosa, "Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation, " Midwest Stud ies in Philosophy 9 (1984) : 271-81 (at 277-8) , 3 4 Ernest Sosa, "Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation," 278. it a c a u s e . Causes c o u n t as c a u s e s o n l y i n v i r t u e o f t h e i r s t r i c t l y nomic p h y s i c a l q u a l i t i e s . S i n c e men ta l p r o p e r t i e s are n o t s t r i c t l y nomic, a m e n t a l c a u s e r s m e n t a l a s p e c t c o n t r i b u t e s n o t h i n g t o i t s b e i n g a c a u s e . It is t h u s c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . The key assumpt ion h e r e i s t h a t whenever o n e e v e n t c a u s e s a n o t h e r , some of t h e c a u s e ' s p r o p e r t i e s are c a u s a l l y relevant t o t h e e f f e c t , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e c a u s e produces t h a t effect o n l y i n v i r t u e o f hav ing t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s . I n Chap te r Two, 1 s h a l l a c c e p t t h i s a s sumpt ion f o r the s a k e of argument , and t h e n i n q u i r e as t o t h e n a t u r e of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h u s conce ived . 1 b e g i n by c o n s i d e r i n g a n a t t e m p t by B a r r y Loewer and E r n e s t LePore t o arrive a t a p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t w e t a k e m e n t a l features t o e n j o y . The c o n c l u s i o n of Chap te r Two i s t h a t t h e i r a t t e m p t t o do s o f a i l s . W e t y p i c a l l y r e g a r d menta l p r o p e r t i e s as having a s t r o n g e r form o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a n c e r t a i n o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s ( e . g . , d i s p o s i t i o n s ) . However, w h i l e LePore and Loewer a l l o w t h a t t h e r e i s some th ing more i n t h e way o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , t h a t is, a s t r o n g e r r e l e v a n c e r e l a t i o n t h a t sorne p r o p e r t i e s e n j o y (what t h e y cal1 r e l e v a n c e l } , t h i s t o o i s a m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n , one t h a t ( b y t h e i r own l i g h t s ) o n l y s t r i c t l y nomic f e a t u r e s have. Men ta l p r o p e r t i e s , s i n c e t h e y are n o t s t r i c t l y nomic, are d e f i c i e n t i n t h i s r e s p e c t . Thus, i f w e a c c e p t t h e i r i n i t i a l a s sumpt ions , t h e n m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s a p p e a r t o lack something t h a t b a s i c p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s have, and t h a t would set men ta l f e a t u r e s a p a r t from d i s p o s i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s . Moreover, t h e r e does n o t a p p e a r t o be any p romis ing way t o r e s c u e men ta l p r o p e r t i e s f rom t h i s p l i g h t , s o l o n g as w e c o n t i n u e t o r e g a r d t h i s p r o j e c t as one of d e f i n i n g a me taphys ica l r e l a t i o n called " c a u s a l re levance" , whereby a p r o p e r t y m a k e s a n e v e n t the c a u s e of some effect, and i n which men ta l p r o p e r t i e s can t h e n be shown t o s t a n d . I n Chap te r Three , I c o n s i d e r r e c e n t a t t e rnp t s t o d e f i n e a more e x p l i c i t l y m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t menta l p r o p e r t i e s can be said t o have. The a t t e rnp t s i n v o l v e an a p p e a l t o t r o p e s , t h a t is , p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s o f p r o p e r t i e s t h a t can p l a u s i b l y be t h o u g h t t o e n j o y some real e f f i c a c y of the sort t h a t seems t o be a t i s s u e i n d i s c u s s i o n s o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e . 1 a r g u e t h a t a l 1 such a t t e m p t s f a i l , b u t t h a t t h e i r f a i l u r e i s i n s t r u c t i v e , f o r it shows t h e f u t i l i t y of t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e as a me taphys ica l r e l a t i o n . The l e s s o n t a k e n from t h i s c h a p t e r is t h a t i n s o f a r as w e have any legitimate c o n c e p t i o n of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e a t a l l , i t is a c o n c e p t i o n o n l y o f a n i n t e n s i o n a l , e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e r e l a t i o n , a c r e a t u r e o f p r a g m a t i c s and ep i s t emology r a t h e r t h a n of me taphys i c s . C a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i s j u s t c a u s a l e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e . I n t h e f i n a l c h a p t e r , 1 set o u t w h a t 1 t a k e t o be t h e m o s t impor t an t i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s r e a l i s a t i o n for t h e m e n t a l c a u s a t i o n debate. F i r s t among t h e m is t h e t h o u g h t that t h e r e i s no clear s e n s e i n which m e r e l y e x p l a n a t o r i l y r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s can be said t o compete w i t h each o t h e r f o r , a n d e x c l u d e o n e a n o t h e r f r o n , r e l e v a n c e t o a given effect . T h i s o p e n s t h e way t o an accommodating p l u r a l i s r n i n which a l 1 p r o p e r t i e s can be s e e n t o be m e t a p h y s i c a l l y on a n e q u a l f o o t i n g , b u t i n which some may s t a n d o u t i n the c o n t e x t as b e i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t o r y t a s k a t hand. T t i s a c e n t r a l emphas i s o f t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t i n t h i s way, p l u r a l i s m can be achieved w i t h o u t t h e d e s p e r a t e e x p e d i e n t o f e x p l a n a t o r y p a r a l l e l i s r n ( f i rs t d e s c r i b e d by W i l l i a m J ames ) , i n which it i s assumed t h a t p r o p e r t i e s r e a l l y do compete f o r and e x c l u d e each o t h e r f rom r e l e v a n c e t o the same explanandurn, and t h a t w e c a n t h e r e f o r e o n l y g ive m e n t a l f e a t u r e s some e x p l a n a t o r y work t o do by d e l i m i t i n g a s p h e r e of non -phys i ca l explananda o v e r which they wield a n e x c l u s i v e p r o p r i e t a r y concern . A second t h e m e o f t h e conc lud ing c h a p t e r i s t h a t since c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e is j u s t a r e l a t i o n o f e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e , i t can i n no s e n s e b e u n d e r s t o o d as a r e l a t i o n whereby p r o p e r t i e s make t h e c a u s e t o be a cause o f j u s t those effectsN o t al1 o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s who emphas i se t h e mere ly e x p l a n a t o r y r o l e o f p r o p e r t i e s draw t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . For example, Fred D r e t s k e s a y s , "Events are c a u s e s , b u t f a c t s e x p l a i n , and facts, a t least i n t h e c a s e o f c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s , have t o d o w i t h t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e c a u s e t h a t make it a cause."" However, t o t h i n k o f e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e i n t h i s way, as a n y k i n d of making o f t h e w o r l d r s c a u s a l series t o f o l l o w t h e t r a j e c t o r i e s t h a t t h e y do, is thereby t o r e n d e r it a m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n , I t i s t o i m p l i c a t e p r o p e r t i e s , mere a b s t r a c t i o n s , i n a s t r a n g e kind of e f f i c a c y . For it is t o depict p r o p e r t i e s and t h e r e l e v a n c e r e l a t i o n s between them as b e i n g somehow p r i o r to, and d e t e r m i n a t i v e o f , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e n a t u r a l , e x t e n s i o n a l r e l a t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n amongst t h e c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s that b e a r t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s . I t i s t o r e p r e s e n t a b s t r a c t i o n s as somehow s h a p i n g the a g g r e g a t e o f p a r t i c u l a r s i n t o a c a u s a l l y o r d e r e d series. If w e can break free o f th is habit of t h o u g h t , w e s h a l l f i n d t h a t t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o a s s i g n b a s i c p h y s i c a l properties (as opposed t o e v e n t s ) a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n , a s hav ing a n e x c l u s i v e power t o make a n y g i v e n c a u s a l h i s t o r y take t h e s h a p e t h a t it h a s , l o s e s i t s a l l u r e . Once basic p h y s i c a l f e a t u r e s have l o s t t h e i r '' Fred Dretske, "Reasons and Causes, " Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989) : 1-15 (at 2) . (Emphasis added) privileged p o s i t i o n , o t h e r properties (including m e n t a l features) will no l m g e r seem to be causafly deficient by comparison with t h e m . 2 . Looking for Causal Relevance Mlhi a docto doctore Domanda t u r causam et ra tionem quare Opium f a c i t domire . A quoi respondeo, Quia e s t in eu V e r t u s dormi t iva , Cujus est n a t u r a Sensus assoupire. 1. The LePore and Loewer Solution E r n e s t LePore and Barry Loewer have t r i ed t o de fend anomalous monism from t h e a c c u s a t i o n of epiphenomenalism. 3 7 They b e g i n by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between two k inds o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e . P r o p e r t i e s F and G are said t o b e " c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t i " t o event c1 s c a u s i n g e v e n t e i f f c has F and e h a s G, and t h e r e i s a strict l a w o f n a t u r e t o t h e effect t h a t F-type e v e n t s cause G-type e v e n t s . " Note t h a t i n t h i s case t h e e x p l a n a n d m (what F and G are said t o be r e l e v a n t t o ) i s c ' s caus ing e. T h a t is, w e are t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n why c and e c o u n t as be ing c a u s a l l y i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t h e first p l a c e . By c o n t r a s t , when w e set o u t t o f i n d a p r o p e r t y t h a t is "causally r e l evan t*" o u r e x p l a n a t o r y p r o j e c t is n o t so 3"oliere, T h e Imaginary I n v a l i d (Le malade i m a g i n a i r e ) , in The Dramatic Works of Moliere, trans. Charles Heron Wall, vol. III (London: George B e l l and Sons, 1908) 465, According t o W a l l , t he Third In te r lude , from which t h i s quote i s taken, is un t r ans l a t eab l e , being a punf i l l ed mixture of dog-Latin and French. The cha rac t e r who u t t e r s t he se lines is not a doc tor , but , f o r simplicity, I s h a l l refer t o him as such anyway. My thanks t o William Seager f o r suggest ing t h e t i t l e of this chapter. ;' LePore and Loewer, "Mind Matters, " 630-42. " LePore and Loewer, "Mind Matters, " 634-5. ambit ious: i n s t e a d o f e x p l a i n i n g why c and e c o u n t as b e i n g c a u s a l l y related a t a l l , w e are merely t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e e f f e c t (e) has one of t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t it tas, and w e hope t o account f o r t h i s by appeal t o t h e n a t u r e o f i t s cause (i. e., by appea l t o t h e cause1 s having one of t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t it h a s ) . Thus we speak of c's having F being c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t 2 t o e l s having G, a r e l a t i o n t h a t o b t a i n s i. c causes e, ii, Fc and Ge, iii. i f c had not possessed F then e would n o t have had G ( o r , i n LePore1s and Loewer's n o t a t i o n , -Fc > G e ) , and i v . Fc and G e a r e l o g i c a l l y and m e t a p h y s i c a l l y independent . 3 9 W e now have two ways t o r ebu t t h e c l a i m t h a t any g i v e n s e t of p r o p e r t i e s i s epiphenomenal: w e can e i t h e r show t h a t t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s are c i t e d i n s t r i c t c a u s a l l a w s and a r e t h u s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t r , o r w e can show t h a t t h e y meet c o n d i t i o n s i i v and are t h u s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t 2 . With r e g a r d t o t h i s second op t ion , c o n d i t i o n iii i s t h e most s a l i e n t f o r our purposes, f o r it o u t l i n e s a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l dependency r e l a t i o n t h a t can indeed p l a u s i b l y be t a k e n t o e s t a b l i s h a type o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e . Moreover, p r o p e r t i e s need not appear i n any strict c a u s a l l a w s i n o r d e r f o r t h i s 39 LePore and Loewer, "~ind' Matters, " 635. dependency relation to obtain between them. Al1 that is necessary in order for e ' s having G to depend counterfactually on c t s having F is that there be a causal law, possibly non-strict (Le., containing a ceteris paribus clause), according to which F-type events produce G-type events. Such a law is sufficient to support the relevant counterfactual. In the light of this, we cannot infer the epiphenomenal status of a property merely from the fact that it is not mentioned in strict causal laws. 4 O According to LePore and Loewer, the psychological and behavioural features of some states counterfactually depend upon the psychological properties of antecedent events, with the result that the latter features are causally relevant2 to the instantiation of the former properties by those states (assuming that conditions i, ii and iv are also met). For example, when 1 open the fridge it is true (according to LePore and Loewer) that if 1 had not wanted a Coke and believed that 1 could get one from the fridge, then 1 would not have opened it. That is, if my brain state had not had those psychological features, it would not have been followed by that sort of behaviour. LePore and Loewer interpret this counterfactual as follows: in the possible Others who appeal t o coun te r f ac tua l dependency r e l a t i o n s i n order t o ward off the bogey of epiphenomenalism are John H e i l and Alfred M e l e , "Mental Causes, " American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991) : 61-71; and Terence Horgan, "Mental Quausation, " Phi1 osophical Perspectives 3 (1989) : 47-76, wor lds t h a t are t h e most s i m i l a r t o t h e a c t u a l world b u t i n which 1 do n o t want a C o k e and believe t h a t 1 can get one from t h e f r i d g e , 1 d o n o t open t h e f r i d g e . T h i s c o u n t e r f a c t u a l is t r u e , t h e y m a i n t a i n , and is s u p p o r t e d by a ceteris p a r i b u s law t o t h e effect t h a t t h o u g h t s w i t h t h o s e c o n t e n t s t y p i c a l l y produce. t h a t so r t o f behaviour . 41 If. A Problem for LePore and L o e w e s Content t h u s seems t o have been e x o n e r a t e d o f t h e c h a r g e of ep iphenonenal i sm. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s p u t a t i v e v i n d i c a t i o n o f c o n t e n t ' s efficacy i s merely a p p a r e n t , f o r L e P o r e r s and L o e w e r ' s c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e 2 cornes t o o c h e a p l y . This i s e v i d e n t Erom t h e fact t h a t p r o p e r t i e s t h a t do n o t s e e m t o have the s o r t of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t w e regard menta l f e a t u r e s as h a ~ i n g ~ ~ can n o n e t h e l e s s p a s s t h e test l a i d o u t in c o n d i t i o n s i i v , The p r o p e r t i e s t h a t 1 h a v e i n mind are a k i n t o t h e v i r t u s d o r m i t i v a t h a t w a s f amous ly p i l l o r i e d by Mol i e re i n L e Malade I m a g i n a i r e . I n Molierefs t a l e , a d o c t o r , when asked why opium induces s l e e p , answers t h a t it does s o because i t h a s a power t o i n d u c e s l e e p ( a virtus d o r m i t i v a ) . W e f i n d t h i s answer comical b e c a u s e it is s o c l e a r l y vacuous: r a t h e r than e x p l a i n i n g why opium p u t s p e o p l e t o s l e e p , t h e d o c t o r ' s a p p e a l t o i t s power t o i n d u c e " L e P o r e and L o e w e r , "Mind M a t t e r s , " 6 4 1 . '' TO which 1 shall refer i n the r e m a i n d e r of t h i s chapter sirnply as "causal relevance" . sleep merely re-describes the phenomenon for which we had requested an explanation. Dispositions generally are causally irrelevant to their manifestations, and yet appear to satisfy conditions i-iv. Consider, for exarnple, the claim that Mort fell asleep because he took a sleeping pill. The cause here has the property of dormitivity: it is a taking of a dormitive pi11. 43 1s this property causally relevant* to Mort ' s falling asleep? Suppose he really did fa11 asleep as a result of taking the pill, so that conditions i and ii are satisfied; that is, he both takes the pi11 and Ealls asleep, and the former event causes the latter one. Moreover, if the cause had not been a taking of a donnitive agent, Mort would not have fallen asleep. So condition iii is met. It might appear that we have a violation of condition iv, s i n c e the property that we are assessing for causal relevance~ ( v i z . , dormitivity) is defined in terms of its effects, and thus would appear not to be "logically and metaphysically independent" of them. Notice, however, that 4 3 1: should note briefly that there inevitably arises in these contexts a minor glitch: causes and effects are events; dormitivity and other dispositions are properties of things ('continuantsw), such as pills, rather than of events; and yet 1 am treating dispositions as though they were properties of the cause, and thus of events. 1 will continue to speak of dispositions as properties of causes, where this means that they are properties either of the event that is the cause or of some thing that is implicated in that event. This difficulty is not peculiar to dispositions. Shapes, e.g., are not, stridtly speaking, properties of events, and yet it is surely legitirnate to speak of squareness as a causally relevant feature of the cause when we, Say, try to fit a square peg into a round hole. i v o n l y p r e c l u d e s a very s t r o n g s o r t of c o n c e p t u a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h e cause and t h e effect. A s LePore a n d Loewer put it, c's b e i n g F a n d e f s b e i n g G are r n e t a p h y s i c a l l y i ndependen t i f f t h e r e is a p o s s i b l e w o r l d i n which c ( o r a c o u n t e r p a r t o f c) is F but e ( o r a c o u n t e r p a r t o f e) f a i l s t o o c c u r o r fails t o be G a n d vice v e r s a . 44 I n v i e w o f t h i s , c o n d i t i o n i v bars c ' s p r o p e r t y F from b e i n g c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t 2 t o ers h a v i n g G o n l y i f F is d e f i n e d i n s u c h a way as t o e n t a i l t h a t Chat p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t , e , h a s G. It t h u s e n s u r e s , f o r example , t h a t t h e explosion 's p r o p e r t y o f "be ing what destroyed t h e b r i d g e o v e r t h e River K w a i " i s n o t c a u s a l l y re levant ; ! t o t h e b r i d g e ' s d e s t r u c t i o n . More g e n e r a l l y , c l a u s e i v bars a n y p r o p e r t y of t h e c a u s e t h a t i s d e f i n e d i n s u c h a way as t o p r e suppose that t h e effect token, t h e o n e t h a t w a s a c t u a l l y b rough t a b o u t by t h a t cause , h a s c e r t a i n o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t it has , a n d it bars t h a t p r o p e r t y o f t h e c a u s e f rom be ing r e l e v a n t 2 t o j u s t t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e effect . I t does n o t bar p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e c a u s e t h a t are d e f i n e d as d i s p o s i t i o n s o r t e n d e n c i e s g e n e r a l l y t o p r o d u c e a c e r t a i n t ype of effect ( b u t n o t t o p roduce a n y effect i n p a r t i c u l a r ) . For i n s t a n c e , g i v e n t h a t d o r m i t i v i t y i s a d i s p o s i t i o n g e n e r a l l y t o induce sleep, t h e c a u s e ' s "be ing a t a k i n g of a d o r m i t i v e a g e n t b y 4 4 LePore and Loewer, " M i n c i Matters," 635 n. 13Mort " is metaphysically independent (in view of the above definition) of the effect's "being a falling asleep of Mort", since there is a possible world in which the former state of affairs obtains but in which the effect is not a falling asleep of Mort, Sleeping p i l l s don't ahays work. Thus, dormitivity does not transgress condition iv. It might be thought that LePorer s and Loewer' s understanding of logical and metaphysical independence is needlessly strong, and that we should simply amend it to bar those properties of the cause that bear weaker conceptual connections to properties of the effect from being causally relevant to them4' Unfortunately, it is hard to see how to do this without inadvertently barring mental features from being causally relevant to their behavioural effects. As A.1. Melden emphasised, mental causes bear an interna1 connection to their effects in virtue of their content. 4 6 Indeed, some have plausibly maintained that it is part of the very structure of an intention's content that it represent not only the effect but its own efficacy with 4 7 respect to it. Moreover, according to one of the most influential contemporary theories of the mind, namely, functionalism, mental features are themselves definable in 4 5 My thanks to William Seager for pressing this objection. 4 6 A.I. Melden, Free Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19611. 47 John Searle, 'Intention and Action," chap. 3 in Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). terms o f their t y p i c a l c a u s e s and effects, a n d t h u s i n p a r t as g e n e r a l t e n d e n c i e s t o p roduce c e r t a i n t y p e s o f e f f e c t . It i s t h u s hard t o see how we c o u l d change c o n d i t i o n i v i n such a w a y as t o b a r d i s p o s i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s f rom c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t o t h e e f f e c t s i n t e r m s of which t h e y are d e f i n e d w i t h o u t a l s o c a t c h i n g m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s i n o u r n e t . It would s e e m , then, t h a t the p r o p e r t y of t h e cause that w e are c o n s i d e r i n g ( v i z . , b e i n g a t a k i n g o f a d o m i t i v e a g e n t by Mort) passes t h e test l a id o u t i n c o n d i t i o n s i i v a n d i s t h e r e f o r e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t 2 t o t h e e f fec t rs having t h e p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g a f a l l i n g a s l e e p of Mort . L e P o r e and L o e w e r may a c c e p t a l1 o f t h i s , b u t deny t h a t it p o s e s d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r t h e i r a c c o u n t , s i n c e d i s p o s i t i o n s r e a l l y are, i n some p e r f e c t l y r e s p e c t a b l e s e n s e , c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o their m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . A f t e r a l l , t h e y may c o n t i n u e , w e find t h e d o c t o r l s e x p l a n a t i o n i n M o l i e r e ' s example t o be c o m i c a l o n l y i n s o f a r as w e t a k e h i s explanandum t o be t h e fact t h a t each p e r s o n who takes opium fa l l s a s l e e p . I n t r y i n g t o a c c o u n t f o r t h i s , h e is a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p l a i n why one e v e n t c a u s e s a n o t h e r ; more a c c u r a t e l y , he is t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n why, i n a n y g iven case, someone's t a k i n g o f opium c a u s e s a n e v e n t t h a t can be characterised as " f a l l i n g a s l eep" . T h i s t a s k c a n o n l y be carried o u t by m e n t i o n i n g p r o p e r t i e s t h a t are c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t l , f o r it r e q u i r e s e x p l a i n i n g why one event (c) causes another event (e). The fact t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s are no t up t o t h i s t a s k o n l y i n d i c a t e s t h î t t h e y are n o t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t l f and w e have as y e t no r e a s o n t o reject t h e c l a i m ( o f f e r e d i n d e f e n s e of LePore and Loewer) t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s p o s s e s s a k ind of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t i s e v e r y b i t as s t r o n g as t h a t e n j o y e d by menta l f e a t u r e s Purveyors o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e a r e l i k e l y t o f i n d t h i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , s i n c e i t would a p p e a r t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s are s t a n d a r d l y i r r e l e v a n t n o t o n l y t o such facts a s t h a t c caused e , b u t a l s o t o facts of t h e form "e h a s G"; t h a t is, t h e y a r e c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t t o p r e c i s e l y t h e s o r t of explanandum that is supposed t o be t h e f o c u s o f c a u s a l re levance2 . To p u t it i n te rms o f my example, d o m i t i v i t y i s n o t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o Mor t ' s f a l l i n g a s l e e p e , t o t h e e f fec t l s having t h e p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g a f a l l i n g a s l e e p o f M o r t ) . M y r e a s o n f o r s a y i n g t h i s derives from Ned B l o c k ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f " t h e s t a n d a r d c a u s a l i n e r t n e s s o f t h e secondorder ."'* D o r m i t i v i t y is a second-order p r o p e r t y , namely, t h e p r o p e r t y o f p o s s e s s i n g some o r o t h e r f i r s t o r d e r ( u s u a l l y chemica l ) property t h a t t e n d s t o i nduce s l e e p i n human be ings . It i s o n l y i n v i r t u e o f i t s having t h i s firsto r d e r p r o p e r t y t h a t t h e p i 1 1 c o u n t s as a d o r m i t i v e a g e n t a t a l l , f o r it i s o n l y b e c a u s e o f t h e f i r s t o r d e r p r o p e r t y t h a t B l o c k , "Can the Mind Change the World?" 163. the pi11 tends to cause sleep in h~mans.~' Dormitivity is thus conceptually after the fact (so to speak) as concerns the causation of sleep: it cannot be what is responsible for producing sleep, since it is itself a consequence of the pillls having some other, first-order property that is responsible for producing this effect.'' Putting it very roughly, the pillls power to induce sleep is already "in place" by the time dormitivity arrives on the scene. In fact, dormitivity only arrives on the scene at al1 because the causal stage has already been set. 5 1 LePore and Loewer might object that this reasoning only illustrates, once again, the causal irrelevancel of dispositions, since it at best only shows that dispositional properties obtain because of, and thus cannot account for, the causal relations of their bearers; and this only arnounts to the claim that dispositions cannot be called upon to - - - - - - 4 9 Strictly speaking, the lower-level property that is causally relevant to the production of sleep need not be first-order. It need only be a property of a lower level than dormitivity. This sort of reasoning is given by Frank Jackson: "Which of the two properties actually causes the breaking of a fragile object - . . when it is dropped--its fragility, or the categorical basis of its fragility? . . . The fragility of a glass is a matter of its having a nature that would cause the glass to break on dropping; but if the nature would do the causing, then, by Modus Ponens, it does do the causing- . . . But the nature is the categorical basis. Ergo, the categorical basis and not the disposition causes the breaking" (Frank Jackson, "Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation," Proceeclings of the Azistotelian Society 95 [1995] : 253-68 [at 2561) . Jackson takes a similar line regarding dispositions in Frank Jackson, "Mental Causation, " Mind 105 (1996): 377-413 (at 393-4); in David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 19961, 264-5; and in Frank Jackson, "The Primary Quality View of Color," Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 199-219 (at 202-4). '' 1 am using temporal metaphors in an effort to reflect the order of conceptual priority. account for t h e fact t h a t e v e n t s c and e are c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d t o each o t h e r . But t h i s o b j e c t i o n misses t h e point, f o r when w e c o n s i d e r a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , s u c h as t h e one i n which Mort t a k e s a s l e e p i n g p i l l , it is clear t h a t t h e c a u s e c a n be said t o be d o r m i t i v e o n l y i n consequence of t h e fact t h a t t h e p i 1 1 t e n d s t o produce a c e r t a i n kind o f e f f e c t in peop le . Thus, s i n c e d o r m i t i v i t y is a f e a t u r e o f t h e c a u s e o n l y because t h e c a u s e is l i k e l y t o put p e o p l e t o s l e e p , d o r m i t i v i t y canno t i tself be called upon t o e x p l a i n why t h e effect of t a k i n g t h e p i 1 1 is a f a l l i n g a s l e e p . Here, t h e e x p l a n a n d m ( t h e one t h a t d o r m i t i v i t y c a n n o t be c a l l e d upon t o e x p l a i n ) is n o t s imply t h e fact t h a t e v e n t s c and e are c a u s a l l y interrelated, b u t is r a t h e r t h e fact t h a t t h e effect has t h e p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g a f a l l i n g a s l e e p ( o r , i n LePore1s and Loewerf s schema, it i s t h e fa& t h a t e h a s G) . D o m i t i v i t y , t h e n , is a c a t e g o r y i n t o which i t e m s may be c l a s s e d o n l y r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , i n view of t h e fact t h a t t h e c a u s a l connec t ion t o a p a r t i c u l a r t y p e o f effect ( v i z . , sleep) has already been f i x e d . To p u t t h i s i n terms of my ear l ier metaphor, by t h e t i m e d o m i t i v i t y arrives on t h e s c e n e t h e whole c a u s a l s t a g e has a l r e a d y been set, and d o r m i t i v i t y is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t n e i t h e r t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n o b t a i n s n o r to t h e fact t h a t the effect h a s t h e p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g a f a l l i n g a s l e e p . T h e f a c t t h a t d o r m i t i v i t y and o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n s m e e t c o n d i t i o n s i iv, and are t h u s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t 2 , o n l y g o e s t o show t h a t causal r e l e v a n c e 2 i s n o t a f o m of g e n u i n e causal r e l e v a n c e a t a l l , o r , a t least , it i s n o t t h e k i n d o f r e l e v a n c e t h a t w e take m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s t o have . 5 2 III. Causal-Explanatory Relevance Whatever v i e w some may t a k e c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e ( o r l a c k t h e r e o f ) of d o r m i t i v i t y and o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n s , w e must acknowledge t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s are n o t e n t i r e l y devoid o f e x p l a n a t o r y s i g n i f i c a n c e . T h i s cornes o u t most c lear ly when w e c o n s i d e r the debate s u r r o u n d i n g one s u c h f e a t u r e , namely, e v o l u t i o n a r y f i t n e s s . W e o f t e n e x p l a i n t h e s u r v i v a l of a s p e c i e s by a p p e a l t o i t s f i t n e s s . Some have rna in t a ined t h a t al1 such e x p l a n a t i o n s are t a u t o l o g i e s , on t h e g rounds t h a t a s p e c i e s c o u n t s as b e i n g ' f i t ' o n l y i f it a c t u a l l y s u r v i v e s ; so that t h e supposed e x p l a n a t i o n b o i l s down t o the t r i v i a l t r u t h t h a t t h e s p e c i e s s u r v i v e d because it s u r v i ~ e d . ~ ~ T h i s p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t f i t n e s s i s t o be d e f i n e d i n tems of a n a c t u a l t o k e n effect, namely, the a c t u a l s u r v i v a l o f the very s p e c i e s t h a t i s said t o be f i t . . - - - -5 ' Brian McLaughlin also denies that causal relevancez is genuine causal relevance, in the sense that is at issue in debates about epiphenomenalism. He concludes that LePore and Loewer "should be viewed as attempting to mitigate the severity of the charge of [e-piphenomenalism) rather than as attempting to refute it" (McLaughlin, "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical, " 124) . 53 Karl Popper rnakes this sort of cornplaint in his "Autobiography," in The Philosophy of K a r l Popper, ed. Paul Arthur Schillp (La Salle: Open Co-urt, 1974), 3-181 (at 1371. Explanations in terms of fitness are thus assimilated to the explanation of the bridge's collapse by appeal to the cause's property of "being what destroyed the bridge over the River Kwai". Those who have risen to the defence of fitness explanations reject this assimilation. They deny that a speeies is fit only if it a c t u a l l y survives. Instead (they maintain), fitness is a matter of being disposed to survive. 54 Fitness is thus rendered a second-order property . As Peter Godfrey-Smith says, it is "identified with the property of having some structural property or properties that make the organism l i k e l y to have a lot of offspring. "'' Intuitively, this response to the critics of Darwin does restore some explanatory content to appeals to fitness. The case of fitness illustrates our tendency to accord properties explanatory significance even if they are secondorder , dispositional features. This might appear to pose difficulties for the daim that such second-order properties are typically not causally relevant to their bearersr effects. However, it should be noted that the explanatory significance that is secured for evolutionary fitness by the above approach is of a relatively low grade. By construing evolutionary fitness as a disposition, we accord it a degree Where this disposition is understood in terms of probabilities construed as propensities. 55 Peter Godfrey-Smith, Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) , 190. of explanatory relevance, but (again quoting Godfrey-Smith), "Only in the weak sense in which the existence of a disposition explains its manifestati~n."~~ This weak form of explanatory significance does not bring with it causal relevance. More specifically, even though second-order dispositional properties enjoy a weak variety of explanatory relevance, they seem to remain causally irrelevant and t h u s epiphenomenal. One may ask how a feature can have this grade of explanatory relevance, which is a kind of causal-explanatory relevance ( L e - , relevance to a causal explanation), and yet not be causally relevant simpliciter. Block has suggested how this might corne to passa5' According to Block, the daim that 1 t e l l asleep because 1 took a dormitive pi11 is causal-explanatory, "Because it rules out alternative causal explanations of rny falling asleepMS8 For instance, it rules out saying that 1 fell asleep because 1 had had no sleep the night before. The appeal to the dormitivity of the sleeping pi11 rules out alternative explanations (and is thus causalexplanatorily relevant) because it " 'brings inr " or "involves an appeal to" the first-order chemical property of " Godfrey-Smith elucidates as follows: "Saying t h a t a t r a i t did wel l because of its f i t n e s s is l i k e saying a glass broke because of its f ragility" (Godf rey-Smith, C o m p l e x i t y and the Function of Mind in Nature , 189-90). Block, Y a n the Mind Change the World?" 162-3. Block, "Can t h e Mind Change the World?" 163. t h e s l e e p i n g p i 1 1 that is g e n u i n e l y c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o i n d u c i n g It is p e r h a p s more a c c u r a t e t o Say t h a t o u r a p p e a l t o t h e d o r m i t i v i t y of t h e pi11 mere ly l oca te s t h e f irst-order c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t y ( i n t h e chernical c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p i l l ) w i t h o u t s p e c i f y i n g it i n a n y i n t e r e s t i n g level of detai l , t h e r e b y ' f l a g g i n g f o r o u t l i n i n g t h e c a u s a l p a t h t h a t c u l m i n a t e d i n my f a l l i n g a s l e e p . S w i t c h i n g me taphor s , it h e l p s t o trace t h e c o n t o u r s o f t h i s c a u s a l c h a i n w i t h o u t m e n t i o n i n g any o f t h e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s £rom which it is f o r g e d . L e t u s cal1 s u c h e x p l a n a t i o n s , i n which w e c i te p r o p e r t i e s t h a t have o n l y t h i s low g r a d e of c a u s a l e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e w i t h o u t a l s o b e i n g c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t , " f l agg ing r r e x p l a n a t i o n s , a n d t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h e r e i n ment ioned " f l a g g i n g " p r o p e r t i e s . The r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t t h e r e are f l a g g i n g p r o p e r t ies alerts u s t o t h e dange r o f c o n f l a t i n g m e r e c a u s a l - e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e (o f e v e n this w e a k v a r i e t y ) w i t h g e n u i n e c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , s i n c e f l a g g i n g p r o p e r t i e s e n t e r i n t o t h e fo rmer , b u t n o t t h e l a t t e r , r e l a t i o n . A t t e n t i o n t o t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n s h o u l d p r e v e n t any e a s y i n f e r e n c e from t h e c a u s a l impotence of a p r o p e r t y t o its c a u s a l e x p l a n a t o r y i r r e l e v a n c e . 60 M y f o c u s , t h o u g h , is on d e n y i n g t h e - - - - - - 59 Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?" 163. (Emphasis in the o r ig ina l ) Thus w e should reject the following inference that Louise Antony draws: 'If anomalous monism is t rue , then the mental properties of reason a r e causally irrelevant t o the production of action. And i f t h a t f s t h e case, then the c i t a t i o n of a reason, even i f it i s the contrapositive; causal-explanatory relevance (of even this low grade) does not imply causal relevance. From the fact that a flagging property can legitimately be cited in a causal explanation of so-and-so, and is thus in some sense causal-explanatorily relevant to it, it does not follow that that property is causally relevant to the production of soand -so. IVIntensionality Preser~ed It might be thought that the notion of a flagging explanation extensionalises explanatory contexts, and will therefore be found objectionable to Davidsonians and others6' who assert the intensionality of explanatory contexts. For it appears that one can mark out ( 'flagf ) the causal route that cufminated in the effect that is to be explained, and thereby rule out alternative causal explanations, simply by referring to the cause in some way or other. It does not matter how one picks out the cause; as long as one does so, one will have succeeded in providing a flagging explanation. This daim is to be rejected. To see -citation of a cause, is not in itself a causal explanation of the subsequent event" (Louise Antony, "The Causal Relevance of the Mental: More on the Mattering of Minds," Mind and Language 6 [1991] : 295-327 [at 3231). Two pages later, Antony elevates the grounds for t h i s inference to the status of a principle, the Causal Potency Condition, according to which, 'A citation of a cause counts as explanatory only if the properties cited in t he description of the cause are causally potent properties" (Antony, "The Causal Relevance of the Mental," 325). "' Notably, P.F. Strawson in his "Causation and Explanation," in Essays on Davidson, eds, Bruce Vermazen and Merrill Hintikka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) , 115-35. why, c o n t r a s t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between f l a g g i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s and e x p l a n a t i o n s t h a t cite causally r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s with a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t is drawn by Dav id -Hi l l e l R u b e d 2 Ruben d i s t i n g u i s h e s between giving an e x p l a n a t i o n o f something and mere ly " implying t h a t t h e r e i s some e x p l a n a t i o n of t h a t t h i n g , w i thou t a c t u a l l y g i v i n g it . "63 F o r exarnple, 1 ' g i v e f a n e x p l a n a t i o n when 1 Say t h a t t h e h u r r i c a n e c a u s e d t h e l o s s of l i f e ; w h i l e 1 merely imply t h a t t h e r e is some e x p l a n a t i o n o f t he l o s s o f l i f e when 1 Say t h a t t h e e v e n t r e p o r t e d i n T h e Times on Tuesday is r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e f a t a l i t i e s . By making t h e l a t te r cla im, 1 succeed i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e cause of t h e d e a t h s and y e t do n o t succeed i n e x p l a i n i n g thern, for 1 have n o t referred t o t h e cause i n t h e r i g h t way. A s a r e s u l t , 1 have mere ly i n d i c a t e d t h a t an e x p l a n a t i o n can be had by d i f f e r e n t l y d e s c r i b i n g t h e e v e n t t o which 1 have referred. Ruben u s e s t h i s example t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e i n t e n s i o n a l n a t u r e o f e x p l a n a t i o n . When 1 mere ly irnply that t h e r e is a n e x p l a n a t i o n by a l l u s i o n t o T h e T i m e s , 1 p r o v i d e no new i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e c a u s a l p a t h t h a t cu lmina ted i n t h e l o s s of l i f e : my c l a i m , t a k e n on i t s own ( i n i s o l a t i o n f rom any f u r t h e r c l a i m abou t what w a s r e p o r t e d i n t h e newspaper on Tuesday) , does n o t r u l e o u t a n y of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s a l p a t h s t h a t c o u l d David-Hillel Ruben, Explaining Explanafion (London: Routledge, 1990), 164, 63 Ruben, Explaining Explana tion, 164. have r e s u l t e d i n t h a t e v e n t . 1 do, o f c o u r s e , p r o v i d e you w i t h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e cause , whatever it is, w a s mentioned i n t h e Tuesday e d i t i o n o f T h e T i m e s , b u t t h i s i s n o t t h e same as p r o v i d i n g you w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t what it w a s t n a t led to t h e l o s s o f l i f e . For a l1 you have y e t been t o l d , t h e f a t a l i t i e s c o u l d have been t h e r e s u l t of a n ea r thquake , o r a t ida l wave, o r an o u t b r e a k o f the Ebola v i r u s , o r . . . . A l 1 o f t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e c a n d i d a t e c a u s e s remain i n t h e r u n n i n g i n t h e l i g h t o f m y c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f t h e cause as t h e e v e n t t h a t w a s r e p o r t e d i n The T i m e s . By c o n t r a s t , 1 r u l e out some c a n d i d a t e c a u s e s when 1 Say t h a t M o r t f e l l a s l e e p b e c a u s e he took a s l e e p i n g p i l l : I r u l e o u t any c a u s a l c h a i n that does not p roceed through t h e p i l l . Even though I have n o t s p e c i f i e d t h e cause i n any i n t e r e s t i n g detai l , 1 have a t least located it . 1 t h u s succeed i n p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n abou t t h e causal h i s t o r y t h a t l i e s behind M o r t ' s f a l l i n g a s l e e p , Michael P a t t o n h a s ~ b j e c t e d ~ ~ t h a t t h e c l a i m ( C ) The even t r e p o r t e d i n The Times on Tuesday caused t h e d e a t h s . d o e s r u l e o u t a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s a l p a t h s , namely, t h o s e that were n o t r e p o r t e d i n The Times on Tuesday; so t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o f be ing r e p o r t e d i n The T i m e s on Tuesday is, by my - " In Michael Patton, commentary on "Does Anything Break Because It 1s Fragile?" by Paul Raymont (paper presented at the annüal Mid-South Conference in Philosophy, Memphis, TN, February 1998). s t a n d a r d s , a c a u s a l e x p l a n a t o r i l y r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e . A g a i n s t t h i s o b j e c t i o n , l e t u s n o t e t h a t b e i n g reported i n The Times o n Tuesday i s a n e x t r i n s i c , i n e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of t h e c a u s a l sequence t h a t led t o t h e d e a t h s , one t h a t j u s t about any c a u s a l t ra jectory c o u l d s a t i s f y . I n t h i s s e n s e , c h a r a c t e r i s i n g t h e c a u s e i n t h i s way does n o t r u l e o u t a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s a l p a t h s . S i n c e p r a c t i c a l l y any causal p a t h c o u l d s a t i s f y t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , w e are n o t b r o u g h t a n y closer t o d i s c o v e r i n g which c a u s a l p a t h i n fact l ies beh ind t h e d e a t h s when t h e c a u s e is c h a r a c t e r i s e d i n t h i s f a s h i o n . P a t t o n might d i s m i s s t h i s as i r r e l e v a n t , s i n c e t h e e v e n t t h a t i s i n f ac t t h e c a u s e o f the d e a t h s i s t h e designatum o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n , "The e v e n t r e p o r t e d i n The Times on Tuesday", a n d c l e a r l y t h e c l a i m that t h e d e a t h s w e r e c a u s e d by t h a t e v e n t does r u l e o u t a l1 c a u s a l p a t h s e x c e p t f o r t h e a c t u a l one. 6 5 I n r e sponse , recall t h a t i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n whether t h e p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g r e p o r t e d i n The Times on Tuesday is c a u s a l e x p l a n a t o r i l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e f a t a l i t i e s , w e rnust gauge the i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f ( C ) by d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r it r u l e s o u t a n y of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s a l p a t h s 65 This i s suggested by h i s remark t h a t w e hers have 'a case of r ig id designation by a d e f i n i t e description." Similar reasoning m a y l i e behind the quasi-Lewisean view described i n William Child, Causality, Interpretation and the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) , 104. According to tha t view, "'The Titanic sank because of an event mentioned on page three of the Guardian' is no l e s s of an explanation than ' T h e Titanic sank because it h i t an icebergr ." t h a t might have g i v e n r ise t o t h a t effect. P a t t o n does t h i s by f i rs t f i x i n g the s e m a n t i c v a l u e o f ( C ) ( i n c l u d i n g t h e r e f e r e n c e of i t s d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n ) and t h e n a s k i n g whether that p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t exc ludes any of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s a l p a t h s . B u t surely t h i s i s n o t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e concept of i n f o r m a t i o n t o a p p l y h e r e . S u r e l y the t y p e o f i n f o r m a t i o n at i s s u e has a more f i n e g r a i n e d and i n t e n s i o n a l n a t u r e d e r i v i n g f r o m i t s close dependence on belief and knowledge c o n t e n t s . For example, if L o i s Lane knows t h a t Superman can f l y b u t n o t t h a t C l a r k Kent can fly, t h e n t h e s e two c l a i m s e x p r e s s d i f f e r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n even 66 though t hey have t h e sarne e x t e n s i o n a l c o n t e n t . S i m i l a r l y , s i n c e one can know ( C ) w i thou t knowing a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c a u s e o f t h e d e a t h s ( e x c e p t t h a t it w a s r e p o r t e d i n t h e newspaper ) , w e may conc lude t h a t ( C ) conveys no new i n f o r m a t i o n ( i n t h e r e l e v a n t s e n s e of " informat ion") t h a t r u l e s o u t any of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s a l p a t h s - I t would be wrong t o o p e r a t e w i t h t h i s i n t e n s i o n a l n o t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n i f w e were t r y i n g t h e r e b y t o reach m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s ( e . g . , abou t whether the c a u s e " The example is borrowed from Terence Horgan, "Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia, " Philosophical Quar ter ly 34 (1984) : 147-53 (at 150). My response to Patton owes a great deal to Horganfs discussion of the distinction between extensional and intensional notions of information, He says, 'If one lacks an item of knowledge then one lacks the corresponding item of information . . . . This close link between knowledge and information means that information inherits the intensionality of knowledge, " (Horgan, "Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia," 150) . really is the event described in The Times) . However, when we are deciding whether a claim rules out alternative causal explanations (in the course of reaching a verdict about causal-explanatory relevance), we should assess its informational content in the intensional sense of information. We are, after all, talking about explanatory relevance, and explanation is essentially epistemic and intensional. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that what is being assessed for causal-explanatory relevance is a property of the cause (or the cause under an aspect) and not the cause simpliciter. 67 But if we adopt Pattonf s extensional concept of information, then our focus will be on the reference of the definite description in ( C ) , and thus on the cause itself rather than one of its properties. It is only when we deploy the intensionaf notion of information that the focus remains on the property cited in the definite description (i-e., on the property by means of which we secure reference to the cause) and not on the cause itself, In conclusion, the notion of a flagging explanation is compatible with the view that explanation is intensional. For in giving a flagging explanation, the cause cannot be referred to in just any old way. It must be characterised in " 7 will la te r be emphasised, the same can be said of causal relevsnce, a fact that is often overlooked in debates about mental causation. a manner t h a t at least locates t h e c a u s e a n d thus r u l e s out some o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c a u s a l h i s t o r i e s that migh t have produced t h e effect i n q u e s t i o n . W e do t h i s when w e characterise t h e c a u s e i n d i s p o s i t i o n a l terms, D i s p o s i t i o n s , t h e n , w h i l e n o t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t , do a t least p o s s e s s c a u s a l e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e . V. Why Molierer s Doctor is a Quack W i t h t h e n o t i o n o f a f l a g g i n g e x p l a n a t i o n i n mind, w e c a n be t te r u n d e r s t a n d t h e i n a d e q u a c y o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n given by M o l i e r e r s d o c t o r , Tt will h e l p t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h r e e k i n d s o f e x p l a n a t o r y p r o j e c t . 1 shall do so i n tems o f t h e t h r e e k i n d s of why-quest ion t h a t g i v e r ise t o them. F i r s t , w e rnay a s k w h y e is G. It is ( a t least s o m e t i m e s ) a p p r o p r i a t e t o answer t h i s k i n d of q u e s t i o n w i t h o u t c i t i n g p r o p e r t i e s whose r e l e v a n c e t o t h e effect is e n l i g h t e n i n g i n a n y detai led o r i n t e r e s t i n g way. I n s u c h cases, it is s u f f i c i e n t rnerely t o ment ion a f l a g g i n g property, such as a d i s p o s i t i o n ; f o r w e t h e r e b y p o i n t t o some o t h e r e v e n t , cf and suggest t h a t someth ing a b o u t i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h i s effect . I n d o i n g s o , w e provide new i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t why e has corne t o be G. Next, w e may a l r e a d y know t h a t c c a u s e d e , b u t ask why c a n d e coun t as b e i n g c a u s a l l y related. P r e s s e d fa r enough, t h i s q u e s t i o n r e q u i r e s g i v i n g a t h e o r y o f c a u s a t i o n . In answering it, w e may Say, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t c and e are c a u s a l l y connected j u s t i n case one of c's p r o p e r t i e s is linked by a str ict l a w o f nature t o one o f e r s p r o p e r t i e s ; and t h a t it is i n v i r t u e o f t h e s e two p r o p e r t i e s t h a t t h e two even t s count as being c a u s a l l y related. T h i s , e v i d e n t l y , i s t h e s o r t of why-question t h a t LePore and Loewer have i n mind when they introduce their n o t i o n o f c a u s a l r e l evance l - Finally, w e m a y a l r e a d y know t h a t c caused e t o be G, b u t ask why it did . That is, w e rnay a s k what it i s about c t h a t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e f s be ing G. Th i s is t h e s o r t of q u e s t i o n t h a t w a s p u t t o M o l i e r e l s d o c t o r . H e w a s asked why opium p u t s people t o s l e e p . I n answering t h i s kind of whyques t ion , It i s n o t a p p r o p r i a t e t o mention a f l a g g i n g p r o p e r t y t h a t j u s t l o c a t e s t h e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r i n t h e opium. A f t e r a l l , t h e f a c t t h a t w e a r e a s k i n g why the opium p u t s people t o s l e e p shows t h a t w e have a l r e a d y l o c a t e d t h e cause o f t h e s l e e p i n t h e opium, and a r e now a s k i n g what t h e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r of t h e opium i s . S i n c e our q u e s t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t w e a l r e a d y know t h a t t h e c a u s a l pa th goes through t h e drug, w e a r e c l e a r l y not a s k i n g for a mere l o c a t i o n of t h e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r , but r a t h e r f o r a s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f i t . W e want t o know what it is about t h e opium t h a t is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p u t t i n g people t o s l e e p . Those who a c c e p t the terms o f t h e d e b a t e a b c u t c a u s a l relevance (to which LePore and Loewer are contributing) are likely to construe this as an attempt to discover a firstorder (likely chemical) property that opium has and in virtue of which it counts as a dormitive agentRegardless, we expect Moliere's doctor to tell us about properties of the opium that have this more interesting and enlightening relation to the effect. Instead of doing so, he only gives us a flagging explanation, one that locates the causally relevant feature in the opium. He thus merely repeats what we already know (indeed, what our why-question presupposes), namely, that something about the opium is responsible for causing sleep. On this reading, Moliere's joke illustrates the causal irrelevance of dispositions, for it derives its humour from the fact that it is pointless to refer to dispositions when we are asked to name causally relevant propertiesIt should be noted that in some contexts, it is appropriate to respond to the third kind of why-question without specifying properties that are relevant in some more interesting way to the effect. For instance, as Georges Rey has pointed out, it could be appropriate to reply to the sort of question that was put to Moliere's doctor by saying that the person who took the opium had an allergic reaction 60 zo ir, Of course, the allergic reaction would be a reactiorr Co t h e opium, so thac t o g i v e t h i s answer is t o l o c a t e t h e c a u s a l l y relevant fac tors partly in t h e drug and p a r t l y i n t h e opium-taker ' s body. We do l i k e w i s e when w e e x p l a i n t h e effect by saying t h a t t h e opitlm has a dcrmitive virtue. The d i f f e r e n c e between these two answers i s that t h e latter one s u g g e s t s t h a t the c a u s û l l y relevant factors i n t h e op iumtake r f s body a r e t y p i c a l o f o t h e r p e o p l e ' s b o d i l y c o n s t i t u t i o n s , s o t h a t w e can expec t t h e drug t o induce sleep i n most o t h e r peop le t o o . B y c o n t r a s t , t h e answer t h a t p o s i t s an a l l e r g i c r e a c t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e is something a t y p i c a l about t h e op iumtake r r s body and i t s r e a c i i o n t o t h e drug, s o t h a t w e shou ld n o t e x p e c t opium t o c a u s e s l e e p i n most o t h e r peop le . Th i s answer t h u s f o c u s e s o u r a t t e n t i o n on t h e c a u s a l l y relevant f a c t o r s t h a t l i e w i t h i n t h e opiumt a k e r ' s body; it m a r k s t h e m as be ing more p e r t i n e n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t o r y t a s k a t hand. It should be clear f r o m t h e c o n t e x t , however, t h a t i n M o l i e r e r s p l a y t h e ernphasis i s i n s t e a d on t h e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s t h a t l i e w i t h i n t h e opium. They a r e more s a l i e n t f o r o u r e x p l a n a t o r y purposes . T h i s i s e v i d e n t frorn t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e p l a y , t h e q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e is not w h y opium p u t s a p a r t i c u l a r pe r son t o sleep, b u t r a t h e r why it pu t s peop le ( g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g ) t o s l e e p . 68 Georges Rey, Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell P u b l i s h e r s , 1997), 207 n. 36. T h i s w a y o f frarning t h e q u e s t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t a pe r son who fa l l s a s l e e p d o e s n o t e x h i b i t a n a t y p i c a l r e a c t i o n ( e . g . , a n a l l e r g i c one) t o t h e d r u g . So it i s c lear f rom t h e c o n t e x t i n M o l i e r e ' s p l a y that t h e f o c u s of a t t e n t i o n is on t h e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t factors t ha t l i e w i t h i n t h e opium (and on how they i n t e r a c t with a t y p i c a l human body t o i n d u c e s l e e p ) . T h a t is w h a t i s be iny asked abou t . The humour i n M o l i e r e ' s j o k e derives from t h e fact t h a t t h e doctor does n o t s u c c e e d i n i d e n t i f y i n g any s u c h c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s m e r e l y by p o s i t i n g a virtus d o r m i t i v a i n the opium, f o r t o p o s i t s u c h a d i s p o s i t i o n is j u s t t o t e l l u s what w e a l r e a d y know, namely, t h a t t h e d r u g h a s something, a s yet unspecified, t h a t p u t s p e o p l e ( i n general) t o s l e e p . 69 " Rey claims that in "La Maladie Imaginaire" (sic) there are other appropriate answers to the question that was put to the doctor that do not identify the causally relevant factors. He says, 'It is not altogether clear precisely wherein the problem of dormative virtue explanations is supposed to lie. After all, something's being a sleeping pi11 can be explanatory of why it put someone to sleep (it wasngt an accident, an allergic reaction, something that had been combined with the pi11 . . . ) " (Rey, Contemporary Philosophy of Mnd, 207 n. 36) . (Ernphasis and ellipsis in the original) Note, however, that the first and third possibilities (adumbrated in his parenthetic remark) preclude its being the pi11 that caused the sleep. After all, to Say that it was "an accident" is precisely to deny that the pi11 caused the person to fa11 asleep--something else did, and it was merely a coincidence that it did so right after the pi11 was taken. To Say that something had been combined with the pi11 is to locate the causally relevant factor in that other thing (the "something" that was cornbined with the pill), and is thereby to deny that the pi11 put the person to sleep. In Moliere's story, these possibilities have already been ruled out, since the characters in the play already know that it is the opium that generally causes sleep; they know that it does so not just by fluke or accident in one particular case, and not just when it is combined with something else. Hence, in the context, sornething's being a sleeping pi11 (or having a domitive virtue) is not explanatory, for it does not rule out any possibilities that have not already been ruled out by the people who framed the question. It does not meet their request for an VI. CostLy Intuitions M y c r i t i c i s m o f LePore and Loewer c h a l l e n g e s t h e i r u s e o f c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s as a test of t h e sor t of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t w e t a k e men ta l features t o have . 1 c l a i m t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s are n o t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e effects i n terms of which t h e y are d e f i n e d , but t h a t they n o n e t h e l e s s pass the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test for c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t o t h o s e effects (as g iven i n LePore1s and Loewer l s c o n d i t i o n iii). From t h i s 1 conclude t h a t t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test is i n a d e q u a t e a s a test of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e . I t i s t empt ing t o respond t o t h i s argument by t u r n i n g it on i t s head. Why n o t assume t h e second p remise t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e d e n i a l of t h e c o n c l u s i o n , and i n f e r from t h e s e two a s sumpt ions t h a t t h e f irst premise is false ( L e , i n f e r t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s r e a l l y are c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e effects i n terms of which t h e y a r e d e f i n e d ) ? Such a n i n v e r s i o n s e e m s e s p e c i a l l y a p p e a l i n g i f w e a p p l y a c o s t b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s t o t h e c l a i m s a t i s s u e . By denying t h e c o n c l u s i o n , w e g e t a n i n t u i t i v e l y p l a u s i b l e tes t o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t o u r m e n t a l E e a t u r e s p a s s . A l 1 we have t o do i n r e t u r n i s t o c u r b t h e i n t u i t i o n s t h a t s u p p o r t e d t h e first prernise: d o r m i t i v i t y , immunity, f i t n e s s -- - -- identification of the causally relevant properties of the opium. In short, the alternative explanations envisioned by Rey are not really answers to the why-question that was put to Molierels doctor, for they do not explain the explanandum that is presented in that question. Instead, they are at best attempts to correct a mistaken presupposition of the question ( e g . , the assumption that it is the opium that puts people to sleep, or that opium has this effect on most people --not just on those who have an allergy to it). and other dispositions really do have some robust form of causal relevance which can be uriderstood in terms of their accounting for their bearersr production of sleep, health and survival respectively. By reconciling ourselves to this mildly counterintuitive view, we spare ourselves the extremely counterintuitive consequences of epiphenomenalism. This seems to be the approach favoured (tentatively) by Block." In his view, we can avert the dire consequence of epiphenomenalism by denying the first premise and conclusion of the above argument, thereby affirming a counterfactual test of the sort of causal relevance that we regard mental features as having, Indeed, Block sees this as a reason for preferring a counterfactual test to a nomological one;'l since it is, in his view, not clear that one can avert epiphenomenalism if causal relevance is nomologically cons trued. 7 2 It is puzzling that Block regards counterfactual tests of causal relevance as being free of the sorts of difficulties that afflict nomological tests. For instance, he notes that any nomological standard of causal relevance must face the problem that, "There can be . . . nomological correlation of F with G without a causal relevance r e l a t i o n 7 0 Slock, 'Tan the Mind C h a n g e the World?" 157. 71 Block, Y a n the Mind C h a n g e the World?" 159, 166. 7' Block, "Can the Mind Change the World?" 146-8. In fact , according to Block, nomological conceptions of causal relevance seem positively to support epiphenomenalism (Block, "Can the Mind Change the World?" 1578 ) between F and AS an example, he asks us to suppose that there is a metal rod connecting a fire to a bombe If the rodts thermal conductivity is increased, the rod will transfer enough heat to the bomb tu cause it to explode. Block adds that according to the Wiedemann-Franz law, we cannot (under normal conditi~ns) increase a thingrs thermal conductivity without also raising its electrical conductivity. (It is not clear, f rom Blockr s presentation, wh'ether the implication goes the other way as well: we cannot increase the rodts electrical conductivity without also boosting its thermal conductivityPresumably it does, for in order for Blockrs counterexample to work, it must be the case that whenever such a rodrs electrical conductivity is increased, there is an explosionBut this would not follow if there were ways of increasing the rodrs electrical conductivity without increasing its thermal conductivity, and thus without causing the bomb to explode.) Given this law-like correlation, it follows that an increase in the electrical conductivity of the rod Is nomologically sufficient for the bomb to explode. Thus, on a nomological test of causal relevance, the cause's being an increase in electrical conductivity is causally relevant to the explosion, And yet, Bfock adds, clearly it is only the increase in thermal conductivity that is causally relevant, '3 Block , "Can the M i n d Change the World?" 146, While t h i s m a y be SOI it is hard t o see w h y t h e s e considerations s h o u l d n o t a l s o pose a problem f o r c o u n t e r f a c t u a l tests o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e . A f t e r all, nomological connections ground c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s . If t h e i n c r e a s e i n e lectr ical c o n d u c t i v i t y r e a l l y is nornological ly s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e e x p l o s i o n , t h e n t h e r e s h o u l d b e a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l t o t h e effect t h a t i f the cause had not been an i n c r e a s e i n t h e rod's electrical c o n d u c t i v i t y , t hen t h e effect would n o t have been an e x p l o s i o n . I n which case, t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test i s e q u a l l y g u i l t y o f y i e l d i n g t h e f a l s e clairn that t h e rod's r i s i n g e lectr ical c o n d u c t i v i t y i s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e e x p l ~ s i o n . ' ~ It seems, t h e n , t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s raised by Block ' s counterexample e q u a l l y b e s e t bo th t h e nomologica l and the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l c o n c e p t i o n s of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , even though Block on ly p r e s s e s t h e case against the nomological a c c o u n t . 7 5 A f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t y f o r Blocicls approach is t h a t i t r e q u i r e s u s s imply t o set aside any i n t u i t i o n s that mi l i t a t e '' Similar problems arise from Leibniz's Pre-established Rarmony, according to which there are law-like correlations between the activities of the various monads without any causal relations (and thus without any relations of causal relevance) between them. In such a model, the correlations are laws of nature, and ground counterfactuals, and yet neither the laws nor the counterfactuals suffice for relations of causal relevance. 75 David Robb maintains that such 'forkf cases as the one that Block considers invalidate both the nomological and the counterfactual tests of causal relevance, although he does not make note of Blockfs apparently inconsistent application of the 'forkf criticism only to the nomological criterion, while endorsing a counterfactual test. See David Robb, "The Properties of Mental Causation," The Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997) : 178-94 (at 181). against the causal relevance of dispositions to their manifestations. This becomes less easy to do if we discover additional counterintuitive consequences that arise from the attribution of any robust kind of causal potency to dispositions. Block mentions one such additional consequence, according to which we must countenance "a bizarre systernatic overdetermination . For whenever a first-order property is causally relevant to an effect, there will be a causally relevant, second-order, dispositional property, namely, the one that consists in the having of some or other first-order property that is causally relevant to that effect. There will afso be a causally relevant, third-order, dispositional property, namely, the one that consists in the possession of a secondorder property that is causally relevant to that effect; and so on, ad i n f i n i t u m . Block is prepared to accept this regress of overdetermining causally relevant factors because it does not, in his opinion, exhibit the features that make overdetennination worrisome. According to hirn, we are usually wary of positing overdetermining causes "because it is wrong, other things equal, to postulate coin ci den cê."^^ For instance, if we know that Mort f e l l asleep because he 76' Block, "Can t h e Mind Change the World?" 158, 77 Block, 'Can t h e Mind Change the World?" 159. took a sleeping pill, we will be reluctant to endorse the claim that he, by coincidence, also fell asleep because he had had little sleep the night before. But since the abovementioned regress of overdetermination involves no such coincidence, B f ock does not f ind it ob jectionable 78 Others have found overdetermination to be problematic for reasons that Block does not take into consideration. For example, in a paper in which they argue for the causal impotence of dispositions, Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter and Frank Jackson rest their case centrally on the claim that if dispositions were causally potent, they would systematically overdetermine the effects in terms of which they are definedO7' These authors have no objection to overdetermination if it is simply a coincidence of several sufficient conditions. However, in their view, the overdetermination in which dispositions are implicated is not so innocuous; it is not simply a case of there being more than one antecedent sufficient condition for the effect. It is instead a case of the effectls having more Tim Crane adopts a similar view in Crane, "The Mental Causation Debate," 232. Strangely, Crane misinterprets Block as refusing to . contenance overdetermination (Crane, "The Mental Causation Debate," 233). But Block says, "We are normally reluctant to accept overdetermination because it is wrong, other tkings equal, to postulate coincidences. . . . But no . . , coincidence would be involved in the series of higher-and-higher-order causally efficacious properties 1 mentioned. If accepting such a series of causally efficacious properties is a price that must be paid for avoiding the problems to be mentioned, it can be paid" (Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?" 159) . 79 Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter and Frank Jackson, "Three Theses About Dispositions, " American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982) : 251-7 (at 255-6). t h a n one opera tive and Jackson do no t s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n P r i o r , P a r g e t t e r e l a b o r a t e on t h e i r no t ion o f a n "opera t ive" c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n , b u t t h e y s e e m t o have i n mind something l i k e t h e fo l l owing . An a s s a s s i n s l i p s a p i 1 1 i n t o t h e Genera l i s s imo ' s d i n n e r . The p i 1 1 can kill in two ways: it c o n t a i n s chemical 1, which can s t o p t h e h e a r t from pumping, and chemical 2 , which can s t o p t h e lungs from func t i on ing . These p r o p e r t i e s a r e each s u f f i c i e n t t o k i l l t h e Gerreralissimo, bu t one o f them w i l l "get t h e r e f i r s t f f * s o t o speak; t h a t is , one of them, Say, chemical 1, p r e c i p i t a t e s a cha in of effects t h a t cu lmina tes i n t h e G e n e r a l i s s i r n o ~ s dea th , t h u s c u t t i n g s h o r t t h e c h a h of effects t r i g g e r e d by chemical 2, which would have culrninated i n his d e a t h had it no t been cut s h o r t by t h e h e a r t a t t a c k . It might be thought p o s s i b l e f o r n e i t h e r c ausa l chain t o be c u t s h o r t , and f o r both c a u s a l sequences t o be s imul taneous ly o p e r a t i v e i n g e n e r a t i n g t h e effect . However, i t s e e m s t h a t t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y t h e t y p e of overde te rmina t ion t h a t Prior, P a r g e t t e r and Jackson a i m t o r u l e o u t . It i s u n c l e a r whether w e can r u l e o u t t h e very p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s kind of overde te rmina t ion , as P r io r , P a r g e t t e r and Jackson seem t o want t o do. After all, it seems prima facie p o s s i b l e f o r an effect t o have more t han one o p e r a t i v e cause. N e v e r t h e l e s s , on t h e basis o f t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e y are l i k e l y t o f i n d u n a c c e p t a b l y p r o b l e m a t i c t h e r e g r e s s of ove rde te rmin ing c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s t h a t B l o c k seems w i l l i n g t o countenance . For now t h e worry t h a t arises w i l l be n o t sirnply t h a t t h e r e are, i n a n y g i v e n case, i n f i n i t e l y many a n t e c e d e n t c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are s e v e r a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e effect; it is i n s t e a d t h a t there are, i n each case, i n f i n i t e l y many c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are â c t u a l l y o p e r a t i v e on t h a t o c c a s i o n i n b r i n g i n g abou t t h e effect . It may be a rgued t h a t t h i s p u t s a g r e a t e r s t r a i n on o u r i n t u i t i o n s t h a n t h e s o r t of o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t Block c o n s i d e r s . 1s it s o easy t o a c c e p t t h a t whenever t h e r e i s a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n , i n f i n i t e l y many, i n d i v i d u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f e a t u r e s o f t h e c a u s e a c t u a l l y corne i n t o p l a y ( o r become "ope ra t ive" ) i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e f f e c t ? V. H o u to Intezpret Blockrs Examples I t might be t h o u g h t t h a t B l o c k ' s a t t e m p t t o d i s p a t c h epiphenomenalism by a c c o r d i n g c a u s a l powers t o d i s p o s i t i o n s ( a n d by a c c e p t i n g a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l tes t o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e ) r e s u l t s i n a n o v e r l y h a s t y d i s m i s s a l of his own examples, which s e e m t o show t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s o n l y sometimes are, and o f t e n are n o t , c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e i r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . 8 O I n one example, h e a s k s u s t o suppose t h a t t h e r e d n e s s of a Blockt "Can the Mind Change the World?" 155-6. bullfighter's cape provokes a bull. The redness of the cape is thus causally relevant to the bullls anger. Now consider a second-order, dispositional property of the cause: the property of having some or other first-order property that provokes the bull; that is, the property of being provocative. Presumably, it is only the first-order property of redness that is causally relevant to the bull's anger, not the second-order property of provocativeness. After all, provocativeness does not itself provoke the bull. As Block says, "The bu11 is too stupid for that?' Now let us suppose that the bu11 is much srnarter (and very sensitive). The bu11 can conceptualise second-order properties, and realises that the cape is provocative, It still sees the redness of the cape and is angered by it, but now additionally takes affront at the fact that it is a provocative cape, and is angered still further. Provocativeness seems to have gained something here, and what it has gained seems to be best described as causal potency . The point can perhaps be made more clearly by contrasting (as Block does) the stupid bu11 with a member of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, who is Block, "Can the Mind Change the World?" 155. Of course, as Block notes, in real l i f e the redness is irrelevant, since bulls are colourblind . Ta avoid needless complications, 1 shall continue to focus on the fictional case in which the bu11 really is provoked by the cape's redness . angered by the provocativeness of the cape instead of being angered by its redness. Here again, provocativeness seems to have something that it lacks in the case of the stupid bull. It is plausible to characterise this 'something extra' as causal relevance. Block is willing simply to set aside these intuitions. 82 He does not, however, of fer any alternative proposais for how to assay them in a rnanner that does not require ascribing causal relevance to provocativeness only in the smart-bu11 (or SPCA) case and not in the stupid-bu11 case. In the absence of any such account, one might find the intuitions elicited by these cases less tractable than Block does. Indeed, it may even seem that Block loses sight of a distinction that marks a genuine difference, specifically, the difference between cases in which dispositions are efficacious and those in which they are not. Unless we can dispel this impression, we will have to acknowledge that dispositions are usually causally impotent, like provocativeness in the stupid-bu11 case. Only in those rare cases in which they are recognised by intelligent agents do dispositions possess any robust kind of causal relevance to their manifestations. And yet counterfactual accounts of causal relevance do not acknowledge this difference between the stupidand smart-bu11 cases, for on B l o c k , 'Tan the M i n d Change the World?" 157. a counterfactual account the cape's disposition to produce anger cornes out equally causally relevant (to the bullrs anger) in both scenarios: in both cases it is true that if the cape had not been provocative, the bu11 would not have become angry . These considerations are not conclusive, though, for there is another way of interpreting the srnart-bu11 case that does not accord efficacy to tne cape's provocativeness. This approach exploits a peculiarity that is shared by al1 the examples adduced by Block as putative instances of causally relevant dispositions. In each such case, the disposition is recognised by an intelligent agent, who then acts (or reacts) on the basis of this recognition. For instance, the smart bu11 and the SPCA are angered not by the provocativeness per se but rather by their belief that the cape is provocative. This b e l i e f might be thought to 'screen off' the provocativeness from the ensuing anger; that is, it might be thought to render the disposition irrelevant to the effect, since the sarne effect would have resulted even if the cape had not been provocative but the bu11 (or SPCA) had nevertheless believed (mistakenly) that it was. 83 On this reading, Block's examples are consistent with exactly the opposite of the view that he initially took them 13' My thanks to William Seager and Ronald de Sousa, who independently raised t h i s po in t . to illustrate. He initially took them to show that dispositions are causally relevant only when recognised by an intelligent agent, and are otherwise inefficacious, In light of the 'screening off' considerations, however, it seems to be precisefy when they are thus recognised that dispositions are impotent, for that is when they are screened off; and it is open to one to maintain thet they are otherwise efficacious. It is not clear, though, that the 'screening off' considerations have this result. To see why, note that in any causal chain that culminates in some effect ( E ) , the irnmediate cause of E screens off al1 earlier members of that causal chain from being causally relevant to E. For example, in the chain { C r D, E ) the properties of O screen off those of C from E: if D had occurred without having been produced by C--if, Say, D had been brought about by B instead--then E would still have occurred (assuming that D is causally sufficient for E). As a result, if we take screening off to be a definitive test of causal relevance, then only the properties of D can be causally relevant to the production of E . But this reasoning is surely unsatisfactory, as it would render even the redness of the cape causally irrelevant to the bull's anger. After all, the cape's being red is not the immediate cause of the bull's anger, for it only provokes the bu11 by causing light to be reflected in the manner in which red things typically do under normal conditions, which in turn causes a certain reaction in the bull's eyes, which in turn causes . . ., which in turn causes tne bullls anger, The cape's being red is screened off by each successive event in this causal chain. And yet, intuitively, we do not take this to deprive the cape's being red of its causal relevance to the bullrs anger. Similarly, in the srnart-bu11 case, the cape's provocativeness is not necessarily screened off from causal relevance to the bull's anger by subsequent factors in the causal chain that culminated in that anger, Still, the 'screening off' criticism draws our attention to a weakness in any argument that relies on Block's examples; for it exploits the fact that in each of those examples, a disposition appears to be efficacious only because an intelligent agent recognises it and acts on the basis of that recognition. This at least points to the possibility that the causal relevance does not penetrate back beyond the intelligent agent's recognition, al1 the way to the disposition. After all, the intelligent recognition of a l 1 rnanner of features can prompt various sorts of responses, without this entailing that the features recognised are themselves causally relevant to the response. F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t w o ' s being a n even number rnight lead m e t o act i n a c e r t a i n way , but it would be p r o b l e m a t i c ( t o Say t h e least) t o i n f e r t h a t t h i s abstract, ma themat i ca l f e a t u r e e x e r t e d any causa l i n f l u e n c e on my b e h a v i o u r . S i m i l a r l y , my r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a c e r t a i n d i s j u n c t i v e p r e d i c a t e had been satisfied c a n cause m e t o r e spond i n a c e r t a i n way (e.g., t o answer "yes" t o t h e q u e s t i o n whether it had been sa t is f ied) , and y e t , as W i l l i a m Seager and David Owens have m a i n t a i n e d , it is not clear t h a t unduly d i s j u n c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s can ever b e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o a n ~ t h i n g . ' ~ T h i s i s a l 1 by way o f s u g g e s t i n g t h a t a c t s of r e c o g n i t i o n by a n i n t e l l i g e n t a g e n t serve a s a s o r t o f b u f f e r a g a i n s t t h e b a c h a r d s p r o p a g a t i o n of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t o t h e f e a t u r e s t h e r e b y r e c o g n i ~ e d . ~ ~ I n l i g h t of t h i s , w e canno t s imply i n f e r from t h e s m a r t b u l l o r SPCA examples t h a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n therein r e c o g n i s e d ( v i z . , p r o v o c a t i v e n e s s ) is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o any o f t h e effects o f t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n (viz., t h e e n s u i n g a n g e r ) . Hence, it i s n o t clear t h a t w e shou ld e x p l i c a t e t h e i n m i t i v e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e s t u p i d and smart-bu11 cases by say ing t h a t t he '' William Seager, 'Disjunctive Laws and Supervenience," Analysis 51 (1991): 93-8; and David Owens, 'Disjunctive Laws?" Analysis 49 (1989) : 197-20285 Thus mental causation is puzzling *at both ends', so to speak. It is puzzling how the mental causes anything, and it is puzzling how the mental can be sensitive to features that are themselves utterly devoid of any causal clout, and cause certain things to happen on the basis of this sensitivity. disposition has causal relevance in the latter case but not in the former one. Even if provocativeness is causally relevant when it is recognised, this does not lend any credence to the daim that it is inefficacious when it is not thus discerned. There certainly is a difference between the smartand stupid-bu11 cases, but there is no reason to assume that the difference lies in the fact that provocativeness is efficacious only in the former case, ana not in the latter 022. Indeed, it seems more plausible to interpret the difference as consisting simply in the fact that in the smart-bu11 case an act of recognition is interposed between the cape's provocativeness and the ensuing anger, whereas for the stupid bu11 there is no such mediating act of recognition. It is open to one to maintain that in both cases the cape's provocativeness is causally relevant to the anger, and that the only difference is that the smart bu11 is aware of this causally relevant factor while the stupid bu11 is not. For these reasons, 1 will not rely on Blockfs examples, and his interpretation of them, in my case against according any robust kind of causal efficacy to dispositions. In fact, in what follows, 1 shall argue for a view that is inconsistent with the argument f rom Block s examples. For while Block a l lows t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s do sometimes have real e f f i c a c y (viz., when they are recognised) , I sha l l attempt t o show t h a t t hey never do. VI. Unwieldy D i s junctiona Frank Jackson den i e s e f f i c a c y t o d i s p o s i t i o n s on t h e grounds t h a t s i n c e f r a g i l i t y (e.g, ) is simply defined as 'being such as t o be d isposed t o break when struck ( o r dropped o r . . .),, t h e l i a b i l i t y t o break when struck is e s s e n t i a l t o being f r a g i l e ? But, as Hume t a u g h t us, none of a s t a t e ' s genuinely causa l powers is possessed by it e s s e n t i a l l y . *' Hence (Jackson concludes) , f r a g i l i t y i t s e l f has no causa l power wi th respect t o breaking. More genera l ly , no type of s t a t e t h a t i s defined i n terms of a causa l power ( i . e . , n o d i s p o s i t i o n a l s t a t e ) can i t s e l f be said t o bestow t h a t c a u s a l power upon i t s bearers." The causa l power with respect t o breaking, f o r exarnple, is 8 6 Jackson, "Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation," 257. '' Something like this premiss seems to be the motivation behind LePorers and Loewerrs condition iv. However, unlike condition iv, Jackson's reasoning does deny causal relevance to dispositions. This is because according to Jackson's premiss, a property is causally irrelevant to an effect if it is defined as a general tendency to produce effects of that type. By contrast, in condition iv, a property is irrelevant to an effectrs being thus-and-so if it is defined as that which makes that token effect to be thus-and-so. " Eli Hirsch takes a similar line. He writes, "A property defined dispositionally in terms of certain causal powers cannot itself be said to have those causal powers. Consider the property Q of being able to melt things, 1 assume that Q has no , . , causal power to melt things. Sornething has Q in virtue of having another property P that does have the power to melt things. , . , It is a necessary fact that anything that has Q is able to melt things but a contingent fact that anything that has P is able to melt things" (Eli Hirsch, Dividing Reality [New York: Oxford University Press, 19931, 62-3). c o n f e r r e d upon a vase by v i r t u e of i t s having a g i v e n m o l e c u l a r s t r u c t u r e , n o t by virtue o f i t s being f r a g i l e . So w e shou ld n o t number f r a g i l i t y arnong t h e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s that c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e b r e a k i n g of t h e vase. Jackson does n o t deny t h a t t h e r e are n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s t h a t p o s t u l a t e g e n u i n e l y c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s . For i n s t a n c e , it i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t t h e b r i d g e over t h e River K w a i w a s d e s t r o y e d by whatever d e s t r o y e d it; or , t o u s e J a c k s o n ' s example, it i s a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h t h a t f a t a l a c c i d e n t s cause 8 9 d e a t h . Note, however, t h a t i n t h e s e cases t h e n e c e s s i t y arises frorn the manner i n which t h e c a u s e is described. By c o n t r a s t ( c o n t i n u e s J a c k s o n ) , t h e n e c e s s i t y that a t t a c h e s t o t h e tendency of fragile t h i n g s t o break when s t r u c k i s not s imply a p roduc t of how w e choose t o refes t o f r a g i l i t y . Regard les s o f how w e c h a r a c t e r i s e t h e s ta te of b e i n g f r a g i l e , w e end u p t a l k i n g a b o u t something t h a t is, by d e f i n i t i o n , t y p i c a l l y connec ted t o b s e a k i n g when s t r u c k . T h i s s o r t of n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n , d e r i v i n g as it does from t h e s t a t o t h a t g e t s d e s c r i b e d rather t h a n from t h e mode o f d e s c r i b i n g it, cannot be c a u s a l i f Hume w a s r i g h t abou t t h e con t ingency o f t h e causal r e l a t i o n . Jackson ' s argument may s e e m conv inc inq as far as it goes , b u t i t can be q u e s t i o n e d whether it goes far enough. H e assumes that d i s p o s i t i o n s are d e f i n a b l e as second-order Jackson, "Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation," 257. p r o p e r t i e s t h a t i n v o l v e e x i s t e n t i a l q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o v e s f i r s t o r d e r p r o p e r t i e s , Thus Jackson i n t e r p r e t s , ' b e i n g such as t o be d i s p o s e d t o b r e a k when s t r u c k ' t o mean 'having t h e second-order p r o p e r t y o f hav ing some o r o t h e r f i r s t o r d e r p r o p e r t y t h a t t e n d s t o c a u s e breaking when s t r u c k ' . However, t h o s e who a d v o c a t e t h e c a u s a l e f f i c a c y o f d i s p o s i t i o n s are l i k e l y t u regard them as b e i n g more c l o s e l y wedded t o t h e i r c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t , f i r s t o r d e r bases t h a n t h i s mode1 2 l lows . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e y may f a v o u r d e f i n i n g e a c h d i s p o s i t i o n p u r e l y e x t e n s i o n a l l y , as t h e s i m p l e enurnera t ion o f i t s v a r i o u s c a u s a l bases, Thus, f r a g i l i t y i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e second-order p r o p e r t y o f hav ing p r o p e r t y F1 o r F2 o r . . . Fn, where FI-Fn a r e t h e e r n p i r i c a l l y p o s s i b l e c a u s a l b a s e s o f f r a g i l i t ~ . ~ ' The c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n t o breaKing when s t r u c k no l o n g e r f i g u r e s e s s e n t i a l l y i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f ' f r a g i l i t y r , b u t h a s i n s t e a d been downgraded t o t h e status of a handy r e f e r e n c e f i x e r t h a t i s u s e d f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s , FI-Fn. ' Being f r a g i l e r now arnounts t o no more t h a n h a v i n g one o f t h e s e f i r s t o r d e r p r o p e r t i e s . J a c k s o n ' s argument h a s no f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e c a u s a l e f f i c a c y of f r a g i l i t y t h u s construed. A f t e r all, 96 The grade of possibility here must be empirical, s ince if we included in our disjunction properties that serve as causal bases of fragility in non-actual worlds in which the laws of nature d i f i e r from the actual world's, then any state could serve as a causal basis of fragility. The same would hold for al1 other dispositions, so that every disposition would be defined by a disjunction that enumerates every possible state, and a l 1 dispositions would be identified with just this one disjunctive property; i . e , , there would be only one disposition. given that the extensional definition contains no mention of the causal connection to breaking when struck, and given that none of the properties that it lists ( F I F n ) is itself essentially a typical cause of breaking when struck, it is hard to see why fragility should be thought to be so. This view of dispositions is modelled on Jaegwon Kim's erstwhile view that each mental property is reducible to the dis j u n c t i o n of its empirically (or 'physically' ) possible 9 1 physical realisers. Unfortunately, once this parallel is noticed, it becomes evident that even though the strategy of extensional definition effects a tighter connection between dispositions and their causally relevant first-order bases, dispositions thus conceived do not inherit the causal status of their first-order realisers. This is because such 'wildly disjunctive' properties as the ones to which Kim would reduce mental features (and to which we have considered reducing dispositions) are not fit to appear in genuine causal laws and the causally significant counterfactuals that they support, and because appearance in such claims 91 Jaegwon Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience," in his Supervenience and Mind, 53-78. See also 3aegwon Kim, "Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept," in Supervenience and a n d , 131-160 fesp. 151-4). Kim seems to have forsaken this view in favour of narrower, species-specific, typetype reductions (Jaegwon Kim, "Multiple Realisation and the Metaphysics of Reduction, " in Supervenience and Mind, 309-35; see also Jaegwon Kim, "Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism," chap. 9 in his Philosophy of Mind [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 19961 esp. 218-21 and 233-6). would appear t o be a t least n e c e s s a r y (though--as 1 maintain--not s u f f i c i e n t ) f o r b e i n g c a u s a l l y relevant. I n s a y i n g t h i s , one need n o t d i s p u t e t h e c l a h t h a t d i s j u n c t i o n s o f p r o p e r t i e s , even i n f i n i t e l y long d i s j u n c t i o n s , are themse lves p r o p e r t i e s . The p o i n t i s r a t h e r t h a t even i f t h e y are p r o p e r t i e s , t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f them i n no way augments t h e c a u s a l powers of t h e i r bearers. For something can have t h e d i s j u n c t i v e p r o p e r t y , FI o r F2 o r . . . Fn ( t o which f r a g i l i t y h a s supposedly been r e d u c e d ) , o n l y by having one of t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t is cited i n i t s d i s j u n c t s , Say, t h e m o l e c u l a r s t r u c t u r e FI. But, i n s o f a r as w e a c c e p t t h i s d e b a t e ' s u n d e r l y i n g p remiss t h a t p r o p e r t i e s can be e f f i c a c i o u s , any s u c h t h i n g would a p p e a r t o have whatever c a u s a l t e n d e n c i e s it has o n l y because it i s FI. T h e fact t h a t it a l s o h a s t h e d i s j u n c t i v e p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g F1 o r F2 o r . . . Fn adds n o t h i n g to i t s c a u s a l powers. 9 2 I t might s e e m odd t o deny c a u s a l e f f i c a c y t o a d i s j u n c t i v e p r o p e r t y i n s p i t e of i t s appearance i n g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s t h a t s u p p o r t c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s and p r e d i c t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , none o f t h e g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s i n which a w i l d l y d i s j u n c t i v e p r o p e r t y appea r s can b e t a k e n t o 92 1 follow here the argument given by Terence Horgan in his criticism of Kim (Terence Horgan, 'Frorn Supervenience to Superdupervenience," Mnd 102 [19931 : 555-86 fat 576-71)Essentially the sane reasoning was given by D-M. Armstrong in D.M, Armstrong, A Theory of Universals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 20. Armstrong there wrote, "Suppose that a has P but lacks Q. The predicate ' P V Q t applies to a. Nevertheless, when a acts, it will surely act only in virtue of its being P. Its being P V Q will add no power to its am," assert a law-like, causal connection between events having the disjunctive property and anything else, for none of these claims is confirmable by its instances. The importance of confinnability as a test of lawhood has been emphasised by David ~wens.'~ He notes that while genuine laws are susceptible of confirmation by their instances, generalisations that invoke wildly disjunctive properties in their antecedents and non-disjunctive features in their consequents are not. For example, consider the generalisation, (P) For al1 x , if x has F1 or F2 or . . . Fn, then x breaks when struck. Suppose we observe something that has F1 and that breaks when struck, and that thus provides an instance of (P l . This instance does not count as evidence in favour of ( P ) , since it equally supports the following 'rivalf of ( P ) e . , a claim that yields predictions that are contrary to those yielded by [ P l ) : " David Owens, "Disjunctive Laws?" 197-202; see also William Seager, "Disjunctive Laws and Supervenience," 93-8. Owens is concerned to show that wildly disjunctive properties do not appear in causal laws. By contrast, Seager focuses on laws that are formulated with a biconditional and that support reductions. By showing that wildly disjunctive properties are not fit to appear in reductive laws, he thereby undermines Kim's attempt to reduce mental features to wildly disjunctive physical properties. 1 will not pursue this strategy with respect to t h e putative reduction of dispositions to the wildly disjunctive enumerations of their causal bases, but will instead argue that even if they could be so reduced, t h e y would not be causally relevant to any effects. By thus conceding, for the sake of argument, that dispositions are susceptible of such a reduction 1 hope to arrive at a negative verdict concerning recently proposed tests of causal relevance. (Q) For a l1 x, i f x h a s F1 then it breaks when s t r u c k , and i f x has F2 t h e n it d o e s n o t b r e a k when s t r u c k . But i f a n i n s t a n c e o f (P) g i v e s u s no more r e a s o n f o r b e l i e v i n g (P) t h a n one o f i t s rivals, t h e n it d o e s n o t c o n f i r m (P). I n s h o r t , w h i l e t h e fact t h a t something which is F1 is seen t o break when s t r u c k c e r t a i n l y l e n d s c r e d e n c e t o t h e g e n e r a l claim t h a t w h a t e v e r is F1 b r e a k s when s t r u c k , it g i v e s no i n d i c a t i o n as t o t h e b e h a v i o u r o f t h i n g s that are F2, and t n u s e q u a l l y s u p p o r t s any g e n e r a l i s a t i o n t h a t c o n j o i n s t h e d a i m t h a t F1 th ings b r e a k when s t r u c k w i t h any claim whatever c o n c e r n i n g t h e b e h a v i o u r of F2th ings . To g i v e e q u a l s u p p o r t t o a l 1 such g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s is t o c o n f i r m none o f them. Note t h a t s i n c e any g i v e n i n s t a n c e o f (P) w i l l c o u n t as such o n l y by v i r t u e o f i n s t a n t i a t i n g one of t h e d i s j u n c t s i n (P) 's a n t e c e d e n t (as w e l l a s t h e p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d i n [ P l ' s c o n s e q u e n t ) , w e c a n a lways i n l i k e manner c o n s t r u c t a r iva l of (Pl t h a t is e q u a l l y s u p p o r t e d b y t h a t i n s t a n c e , t h e r e b y showing t h a t the i n s t a n c e a t hand d o e s no t c o n f i r m ( P ) . S i n c e ( P ) i s n o t conf i rmed by a n y o f i t s i n s t a n c e s it i s not a c a u s a l l a w , and t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s t h a t it s u p p o r t s are n o t i n d i c a t i v e o f c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s . N e d Block d i s p u t e s t h i s r e s u l t . H e h a s a r g u e d t h a t d i s j u n c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s , such as jadehood and d o m i t i v i t y ( t o use h i s examples) , a r e p r o j e c t i b l e . 94 According t o Block, "Given t h a t s ecoba rb i to l and diazepam resemble one another i n one way, i n causing s leep , t h a t g i v e s us some reason t o expect t h a t t h e y resemble one another i n ano ther real proper ty . "95 For example, i f w e find t h a t s e c o b a r b i t o l is carcinogenic, t hen (says Block) w e w i l l have reason t o expect t h a t diazepam i s too. It is hard t o see why w e should expect t h e r e t o be this E u r t h e r resernblance between t h e two s e d a t i v e s , Granted, t h e y a l r eady resemble each o t h e r i n respec t of causing s l eep , But t h i s i s only a resemblance i n respec t o f an e x t r i n s i c f e a t u r e ( i e . , i n respect of what s o r t o f e f f e c t t h e y produce i n a c e r t a i n type of organism). Why should w e take t h i s t o be i n d i c a t i v e of aany f u r t h e r s i m i l a r i t i e s ? Af t e r a l l , two s e d a t i v e s may d i f f e r g r e a t l y i n t h e i r i n t r i n s i c na tu re s and i n t h e mechanisms by means of which they induce s l e e p i n human beings--a pharmaceutical Company does not corner t he market on a l 1 s eda t ives merely by t a k i n g out a pa t en t on secoba rb i to l , With t h i s s o r t o f o b j e c t i o n i n mind, Block s t r e s s e s that t h e c la im t h a t diazepam i s carc inogenic r ece ives only a small degree of confirmation from our d iscovery t h a t s ecoba rb i to l causes cancer .96 But does i t - -94 N e d B l o c k , " A n t i R e d u c t i o n i s m Slaps Back, " P h i 1 osophi cal Perspectives 11 (1997) : 107-32 (at 126-7). 95 B l o c k , "Anti-Reductionism S l a p s B a c k , " 127. 90 B l o c k , "Anti-Reductionism Slaps B a c k , " 127. receive even a s m a l l degree of conf i rmat ion? Block rests his case on t h e premiss t h a t , "Any rea l resemblance makes another r e a l resemblance a b i t more l i k e l y . But s u r e l y t h i s i s too s t rong . Secobarb i to l resembles e v e r y o t h e r substance i n some way o r o t h e r (more s o i f w e a r e t o c l a s s i f y a resemblance i n r e spec t o f e x t r i n s i c f e a t u r e s a s a " r e a l resemblance"); and ye t it would be ext remely c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e t o conclude from t h i s t h a t t h e d iscovery of i t s carc inogene i ty confirms (even t o a small degree) t h e c l a h t h a t a l 1 t h e s e o t h e r subs tances a r e ca rc inogenic t oo . Moreover, even i f w e w e r e t o fo l low Block i n saying t h a t i t confirms t h i s c l a i m t o some i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y sma l l degree, the degree of conf i rmat ion a t i s s u e is c l e a r l y i n s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e causa l re levance of t h e d i s j u n c t i v e p rope r ty involved. To r e v e r t t o an e a r l i e r example, t h e r ed b r i c k t h a t broke t h e window resembles t h e red c u r t a i n i n r e s p e c t of colour ; i f Block is r i g h t , t h i s l e n d s some smal l degree of conf i rmat ion t o t h e c l a im t h a t t h e c u r t a i n w i l l break t h e window; but even i f redness i s thus p r o j e c t i b l e , t h i s goes n o way towards e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c a u s a l re levance of t h e b r i ck ' s redness t o i t s break ing t h e window. 9 8 97 Block, "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back, " 127. 98 Block himself would be unperturbed by this result, since he wishes ultimately to sunder projectibility from causal relevance and takes Kim to task for not doing likewise (Blockt "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back," 129). Whichever route we take, then, we must acknowledge that the wildly disjunctive properties which we have been considering are not causally relevant. It is interesting to note that in spite of their lack of any interesting sort of causal relevance, wildly disjunctive properties do nonetheless appear in counterfactuals. For instance, (P) supports the claim that if the paperweight had been F1 or F2 or , . , Fn, then it would have broken when struck. (P) is also closely bound up with the counterfactual claim that if the glass had not been FI or F2 or . . . Fn, then it would not have broken when struck. Wildly disjunctive properties can appear in both these sorts of counterfactuals without thereby having their causal credentials authenticated, that is, without it being the case that they possess the sort of causal relevance that we take mental properties to have. This result is interesting even if we do not attempt to reduce dispositions to the disjunctions of their causal bases, because regardless of what we think about dispositions, the fact remains that some wildly disjunctive properties, in spite of their causal irrelevance, satisfy LePoref s and Loewer' s conditions i-iv. They t h u s afford another counterexample (in addition to dispositions) to the counterfactual criterion of causal relevance. V I X . Too R e m o t e To Matter There seems t h e n t o be no advantage i n i d e n t i f y i n g d i s p o s i t i o n s w i t h t h e d i s j u n c t i o n s of t h e i r f i r s t o r d e r realisers. Thus conce ived , t h e y become t o o d i s j u n c t i v e t o have any b e a r i n g on what s o r t s o f e v e n t s c a u s e what s o r t s of effects. Indeed, David L e w i s r e g a r d s d i s p o s i t i o n s as b e i n g t o o d i s j u n c t i v e t o matter even when we t h i n k of them as Jackson does , namely, as h i g h e r o r d e r e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s ( e . g . , as t h e property of hav ing some o r o t h e r f e a t u r e t h a t t y p i c a l l y causes b r e a k i n g when s t r u c k ) . Accord ing t o L e w i s , "The e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p e r t y , u n l i k e the v a r i o u s bases, i s t o o d i s j u n c t i v e and t o o e x t r i n s i c t o occupy any causal r01e."'~ It i s n o t clear whether Lewis i s r i g h t i n c l a i m i n g t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s , even when conce ived a s e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s , are t o o d i s j u n c t i v e t o be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t . However, he is r i g h t t o r ega rd them as be ing t o o e x t r i n s i c t o matter. What Lewis h a s i n mind h e r e can be better unde r s tood by c o n s i d e r i n g what h e h a s t o Say a b o u t a p u t a t i v e l y h ighe r - o r d e r p r o p e r t y t h a t i s no t a d i s p o s i t i o n : the p r o p e r t y of l o s i n g h e a t . L e w i s b e g i n s by a s k i n g u s t o suppose t h a t Heat i s whatever p r o p e r t y i t 3s t h a t occup ie s a c e r t a i n c a u s a l r o l e . . . . So t h e r e are many d i f f e r e n t ways t h a t t h e poker might l o s e h e a t , depending on w h a t s o r t o f world it i s i n . . . . Its m o l e c u l a r motion might d e c r e a s e , i n a wor ld where molecu la r motion i s what o c c u p i e s t h e r o l e ; 99 David Lewis, "Causal E~planation,'~ in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 2:214-40 (at 224) . or it might lose caloric fluid, in a world where caloric fluid is what occupies the role. . . . So it seems that losing heat is quite a disjunctive affair; and whatr s worse, extrinsic, since whether one property or another occupies the heat-role depends on what goes on throughout the world in question, not j u s t on the r e g i o n of it where the poker is. 100 According to Lewis, this militates against the view that the pokerr s losing heat is a genuine event which causes the pokerr s contraction. His reasoning is based on the assumption that causation is local. That is, what happens here and now depends on what happened h e r e recent ly; other, more remote factors (e . g . , factors that involve "what goes on throughout the world in question") cannot be the proximate cause of what happens here and now. Contemporary physics may offer counterexamples to this view,lo1 but none of these examples suggests that something as sweeping as what happens throughout the entire actual world is causally relevant to determining what happens in a given place at a given time. Lewis is willing to extend the same sort o f reasoning to cover dispositions, such as f ragility. 'O2 Roughly, a thing's being fragile is not sufficiently local to be ' O 0 David Lewis, "Events, " in his Philosophical Papers, 2 : 2 4 1-69 (at 267). 'O' 1 have in nind here the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen prediction, which was confirmed by John Stewart Bell. 'O' Lewis, "Events, " 268. c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o a n y t h i n g happening here and now (e .g . , t o t h e vasef s b r e a k i n g ) . L e w i s f s p o i n t s are r e l e v a n t t o t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f LePoref s a n d Loewerr s proposed test of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e ; f o r LePore a n d Loewer of fer t h e i r tes t a s a c r i t e r i o n o f t h e efficacy of p r o p e r t i e s , so t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s , s i n c e t h e y pass t h i s test, would i n sorne s e n s e have t o be e f f i c a c i o u s o r c a u s a l l y p o t e n t . But how c o u l d t h e y be, g iven t n a t t h e y are ( a s L e w i s n o t e s ) e x t r i n s i c ? I n what f o l l o w s , t h e s e p o i n t s w i l l be developed , a l t h o u g h no d a i m w i l l b e made t h a t L e w i s ' s r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g t h i s v i e w are t h e same as t h e r e a s o n s t h a t are offered here. L e t us suppose t h a t t h e vase has m o l e c u l a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n Cf and t h a t b e c a u s e o f t h i s i t b reaks when 1 d r o p i t . 1s it a l s o t r u e t h a t it b r e a k s because it i s f r a g i l e (assuming t h a t C is a c a u s a l b a s i s o f f r a g i l i t y ) ? No, no t i f it i s really t h e case t h a t what happens h e r e and now d i rec t ly depends o n l y on local c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s , a n d not on t h i n g s t h a t are f a r away or i n t h e remote p a s t . For t h e v a s e ' s b e i n g f r a g i l e i s i n t i m a t e l y bound up w i t h such f a c t o r s . I n fact , i t s b e i n g f r a g i l e c o n s i s t s p a r t l y i n how t h i n g s are i n t h e f u t u r e and i n nearby non-ac tua l wor lds . T h i s i s because i t s being f r a g i l e i s a matter of i t s s ta te ( i n t h i s case, C) b e i n g l i n k e d by the laws of nature to breaking-when-str~ck.'~~ h a t is, the laws of nature are part of what makes it true that the vase fragile; they help constitute this fact . 104 But i n s o f ar as the having of a disposition supervenes not only on local factors but also on causal laws, it supervenes on whatever it is that makes the causal laws true; thus, on the most plausible account of what makes causal laws true, it supervenes on how things are throughout the actual world and in nearby non-actual w o r l d s . But if this is so, then the having of a disposition is much too broad to be causally relevant. Surely what happens here and now does not causally depend upon w h a t happens throughout the actual world and in nearby non-actual worlds, To clarify, it is not being suggested that relational features cannot be causally relevant. (Surely the fact that I am standing in front of the firing squad is causally relevant to what happens next.) Instead, it is being argued that the vase's being fragile is an extremely broad state of ' O 3 Again, while t h i s may not be t h e s o r t o f reasoning t h a t Lewis has i n mind, he would agree a t l e a s t with t h i s premiss of the argument. In a more recent paper he says, "Dispositions a re an i n t r i n s i c rnatter. (Except perhaps i n so fa r a s they depend on the laws of na tureI myself would w i s h t o i n s i s t on t h a t exception. . . . ) " (David Lewis, "Finkish Dispositions," The Philosophical Q u a r t e r l y 47 [1997] : 143-58 [at 147- 811 - 'O4 D.M. Armstrong c a l l s t h i s a "Soft doctr ine of powers." H e says, "What we need i s t h a t t he p a r t i c u l a r should have t h e property Fr together with the t o t a l i t y of t h e relevant laws of nature. , . . These s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , . . a r e s u f f i c i e n t a s truthmakers f o r t ru ths of unmanifested powers and disposi t ions. For t h e unmanifested power would appear t o supervene upon these truthmakers" (D.M. Armstrong, A World o f States of Affairs [Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 19971, 8 2 ) . a f f a i r s , as b road as t h e s c o p e o f t h e l a w s t h a t connec t C t o b r e a k i n g when s t r u c k ; and t h a t it i s t h u s t o o b r o a d t o e x e r t any c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e on t h e here-and-now. It might b e objected t h a t t h e m e r e Eact t h a t t h e v a s e r s being f rag i l e depends upon c a u s a l l a w s s h o u l d n o t weigh a g a i n s t i t s be ing c a u s a l l y p o t e n t ; i f it did, t h e n no th ing would be e f f i c a c i o u s w i th r e s p e c t t o a n y t h i n g else, s i n c e t h e answer t o any q u e s t i o n a b o u t c â u s a l e f f i c a c y w i l l of c o u r s e depend ( a t least i n p a r t ) upon c a u s a l l a w s . Note, however, t h a t t h i s dependence i s n o t i t se l f c a u s a l b u t r a t h e r conceptual. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e laws o f n a t u r e h e l p u s t o see which l o c a l s tates are e f f i c a c i o u s w i t h r e s p e c t t o which s o r t s of effect; s o , t o b e s u r e , t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e h e l p u s t o d i s c e r n t h e r e l a t i o n s o f e f f i c a c y ; b u t what gets ( o r b e a r s ) t h e e f f i c a c y a r e t h e l o c a l states, no t t h e l a w s of n a t u r e themse lves . I n s h o r t , t h e c a u s a l l a w s are r e l e v a n t t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f what i s c a u s a l l y p o t e n t , bu t it i s the local states t h a t are said t o be c a u s a l l y p o t e n t . But t h i s would n o t b e t h e c a s e i f w e a l l o w e d t h e hav ing o f a d i s p o s i t i o n t o be c a u s a l l y p o t e n t ; f o r , s i n c e t h e having o f a d i s p o s i t i o n c o n s i s t s ( a t least i n p a r t ) i n t h e c a u s a l l a w s b e i n g s u c h as t h e y are, t h i s would r e n d e r t h e l a w s t h e m s e l v e s ( a l o n g w i t h t h e remote factors on which t h e i r truth depends) causally ef f i c a c i o u s w i t h respect t o t h e eff ect . It may be questioned w h e t h e r t h e h a v i n g of a d i s p o s i t i o n really i s extr insic . To i l l u s t r a t e t h a t it i s , consider t h e same vase ( o r one o f i t s counterpar t s ) w i t h t h e s a m e i n t r i n s i c makeup, i n c l u d i n g C, i n a wor ld where t h e l a w s of n a t u r e are d i f f e r e n t . Accord ing t o t h e s e o t h e r - w o r l d l y laws, t h e v a s e w i l l n o t break i f s t r u c k . I n fac t , t h e l a w s i n t h i s o t h e r worfd are s u c h t h a t almost n o t h i n g c a n b r e a k the vase. 1s t h e o t h e r w o r l d l y vase f r a g i l e ? It is hard t o see how it could be a c c u r a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d as s u c h . And yet it has p r ec i s e ly t h e s a m e i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e as t h e vase i n t h e a c t u a l w o r l d . T h e r e f o r e , being f r ag i l e i s n o t part of t h e a c t u a l vase's i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e . It i s instead an extremely broad feature of t h e v a s e , one t h a t i n v o l v e s t h e c a u s a l l a w s that associate t h e v a s e ' s i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e w i t h b reak ing-when-s t ruck . Any state t h a t is t h i s b r o a d is t o o e x t r i n s i c t o m a t t e r . 105 - - -- -- . -- - 'O5 The views considered i n t h i s sect icn are c lear ly a t odds with the posi t ion of Sydney Shoemaker and others, who identify every genuine property w i t h whatever causal powers it confers upon i ts bearers. On t h i s view, every property is disposi t ional , and instead of each disposi t ion having a categorical basis , i t ' s dispositions ' a l1 the way d o m f , so to speak. For shoemakerrs statement oft h i s view, see sydney Shoemaker, "Causality and Properties, " in T i m e and Cause, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1 9 8 0 ) , 109-35. See also Sydney Shoexnaker, "Properties, Causation, and Project ib i l i ty , " i n Applications o f Inductive Logic, ed. L. Jonathan Cohen and Mary Hesse (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 291-312. Chris Swoyer favours Shoemakerrs view i n Chris Swoyer, "The Nature of Natural Laws," The A u s t r a l a s i a n Journal o f Philosophy 60 (1982): 203-23. If Shoemaker is r ight , then the reasoning presented i n t h i s section would imply t h a t no propert ies are causally relevant. But Shoemaker is not r ight . I agree A c r i t i c rnay d o u b t t h a t t h e vase r e a l l y would r e t a i n C i n worlds i n which t h e l a w s of nature are d i f f e r e n t . For, g i v e n t h a t C is the vasers i n t r i n s i c mo lecu la r c o n f i g u r a t i o n , it i s h a r d t o see how C cou ld be h e l d c o n s t a n t w h i l s t t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e are varied t o such a n e x t e n t t h a t t h e vase, w i t h t h a t i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e , rernains v i r t u a l l y i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . S u r e l y t h i s derangernent of t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e would r a m i f y t h r o u g h t h e laws of m o l e c u l a r bonding, s o t h a t t h e vase's i n t e r n a 1 molecu la r c o n f i g u r a t i o n would i t se l f d i f fe r i n t h e s e non-ac tua l wor lds . 106 There a r e two ways i n which t h i s o b j e c t i o n might be met. F i r s t , i n s t e a d o f c o n s i d e r i n g p o s s i b l e w o r l d s i n which u n i v e r s a l laws o f n a t u r e d i f fe r f r o m those o f t h e a c t u a l wor ld , c o n s i d e r wor lds i n which none o f t h e l a w s have u n i v e r s a l scope . I n some such w o r l d t h a t c o n t a i n s mere ly a patchwork o f 'gappyr r e g u l a r i t i e s , it rnay j u s t be a b r u t e fact t h a t a v a s e w i t h m o l e c u l a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n C ( t h e i n n e r s t r u c t u r e o f which is d e s c r i b e d by o n e set of g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s ) does n o t b r e a k when dropped o r s t r u c k . Admi t ted ly , w e are h e r e c o n s i d e r i n g b i z a r r e , rernote wor lds , b u t w e a r e n o t , af ter a l l , do ing s o i n o r d e r t o s e t t l e q u e s t i o n s abou t n a t u r a l o r nornological p o s s i b i l i t i e s . w i t h t h e c r i t i c i sms of his v i e w t h a t have been offered by Richard Swinburne in Richard Swinburne, "Propert ies , Causation, and P r o j e c t i b i l i t y : Reply t o Shoernaker, " i n Applications of Inductive Logic, ed. Cohen and Hesse, 313-20; and by Stephen Yablo in Yablo, "Mental Causation," 263-4 n. 39. ' O 6 M y thanks t o W i l l i a m Seager for r a i s i n g this objection. I n s t e a d , w e are rnere ly t r y i n g t o decide a c o n c e p t u a l q u e s t i o n ( v i z . , w h e t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n s are e x t r i n s i c ) . It seems p e r m i s s i b l e t o venture further afield i n t o b i z a r r e and r emo te worlds when o n l y c o n c e p t u a l i s s u e s are a t s t a k e . Secondly , even i f t h e o b j e c t i o n succeeded when a p p l i e d t o f r a g i l i t y , t h e r e are o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t c a n s t i l l be u s e d t o show t h a t a t least some d i s p o s i t i o n s are t o o broad t o b e c a u s a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . Fo r example , t h e opium's i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e c a n be he ld c o n s t a n t w h i l e v a r y i n g o t h e r fac tors s u f f i c i e n t l y so t h a t t h e opium is no l o n g e r d o r m i t i v e . T h i s t i m e , however, t h e v a r i a t i o n i n o t h e r f a c t o r s need n o t i n v o l v e changes to a n y c a u s a l l a w s . I n s t e a d , w e n e e d o n l y change t h e human body 's c o n s t i t u t i o n j u s t enough so t h a t opium no l o n g e r t r i g g e r s i n it a series of r e a c t i o n s t h a t c u l m i n a t e s i n s l e e p . These changes l e a v e t h e o p i u m untouched; it r e t a i n s t h e s a m e o ld i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e , b u t d u e t o changes wrought e l s e w h e r e (viz., i n the human body) i t no 107 l o n g e r c o u n t s as a d o r m i t i v e a g e n t . S i n c e w e c a n t h u s take away opium's d o r m i t i v i t y m e r e l y b y changing t h i n g s t h a t are e x t e r n a l t o opium, t h e d o r m i t i v i t y must itself be a very 1 Of This is an interesting, but seldom noted, difference between dispositions like fragility and those like dormitivity. The difference seems to arise from the fact that in the case of dormitivity, but not in the case of fragility, the manifestation of the disposition-lies outside the bearer of the disposition, so that it is possible to take the disposition away frorn its bearer by rnaking changes in the locus of the disposition's manifestation rather than in its bearer. broad feature of opium, one that is too broad to be ef f icacious . The foregoing considerations provide an additional reason for denying that (at least some) dispositions are causally potent, even though they pass the counterfactual test. They also suggest more directly that mental states, as conceived by the functionalist, are too broad to be causally efficacious with respect to anything. The point is not limited to content; it is not the old worry about externalism--that is to Say, the old worry that if content is broad (in the ways that Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge have suggested), then it is hard to see how it can contribute to my am's raising. It is instead a worry that pertains to al1 mental states insofar as we adopt the functionalistr s account of them. For if mental properties are higher-order functional states that consist in the having of lower-order features that realise a certain causal role, then they too (like dispositions) would seem to ernbrace not only the lower-order intrinsic features that realise them, but also the laws that connect those lowerorder intrinsic features to their causes and effects. =II. What We Really Want 1 have thus f a r criticised those attempts to overcome the threat posed by epiphenomenalism that rely on an appeal t o a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test o f c a u s a l r e l evance ( t a k i n g LePorefs and Loewer's account as t h e clearest example o f such a t t e m p t s ) . M y c r i t i c i s m s have taken t w o forms. F i r s t , 1 have claimed t h a t even i f rnental p r o p e r t i e s pass t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test , t hey may be (and--according t o funct ional i sm--are) , l i k e d i s p o s i t i o n s , h igher -o rder p r o p e r t i e s t h a t have a t b e s t o n l y a weak form of c ausa l - exp lana to ry re levance , and t h a t t h u s corne out looking causally d e f i c i e n t i n some c r u c i a l r e spec t , s i n c e it seems t h a t only t h e f i r s t o r d e r r e a l i s i n g p r o p e r t i e s t h a t serve as t h e i r c a u s a l bases e n j o y t h e f u l l f l e d g e d e f f i c a c y t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s deba t e have i n mind. Secondly, 1 have argued t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s and c e r t a i n w i l d l y d i s j u n c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s are not c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t i n any r i c h o r i n t e r e s t i n g sense , b u t do n o n e t h e l e s s pass t h e coun t e r f ac tua l test , and are t h e r e f o r e counterexamples t o LePoref s and Loewer's c l a im t h a t t h i s t e s t i s a test of t h e c a u s a l r e l evance t h a t w e take menta l p r o p e r t i e s t o have. 1 would l i k e now t o a s k why it i s t h a t c o u n t e r f a c t u a l c r i t e r i a f a i l as genuine t es t s o f t h e s o r t of c a u s a l re levance t h a t w e r e g a r d menta l f e a t u r e s as having. I n a n u t s h e l l , t h e answer is t h a t p a s s i n g a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test a t best on ly shows t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n is necessary for t h e p r e d i c t i o n of a given t y p e of effect t o be w a r r a n t e d ; i t does n o t show t h a t h a v i n g t h a t p r o p e r t y is a l o n e s u f f i c i e n t t o y i e l d t h a t p r e d i c t i o n . Indeed , it a p p e a r s t h a t p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s t h a t c l e a r l y are s u f f i c i e n t i n t h i s s e n s e , a n d t h a t t h e r e f o r e clearly are c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o it, a c t u a l l y f a i l t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l tes t . These p o i n t s c a n be i l l u s t r a t e d by means o f a n example t h a t was proposed by Douglas E h r i n g , E h r i n g asks u s t o c o n s i d e r 'a c o l o u r d e t e c t o r t h a t a c t i v a t e s a t t h e p r e s e n c e of a c e r t a i n p r e c i s e s h a d e o f red, s ~ a r l e t . " ~ ~ ~ Accord ing t o Ehr ing , t h e detector does n o t a c t i v a t e i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a n y o t h e r s h a d e of red. I n t h i s case, t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l criterion yields t h e r e s u l t t h a t the p r o p e r t y "being scarlet" i s causally r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e t e c t o r ' s a c t i v a t i o n ; f o r i f t h e i t e m t h a t i s b e i n g scanned by t h e detector ( s a y , a c h a i r ) had n o t been scarlet , t h e n t h e machine would n o t have been activated. But t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l c r i t e r i o n also y i e l d s t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y of b e i n g red is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c t i v a t i o n , for i t i s a l so t r u e t h a t if t h e chair had n o t been red, t h e d e t e c t o r would n o t have been 'Oa For s impl ic i ty , 1 s h a l l he rea f t e r cal1 a p r o p e r t y r s su f f i c i ency t o support t h e pred ic t ion o f an e f f e c t ( s t rong ly enough f o r t he p red i c t i on t o be j u s t i f i e d l i t s causal sufficiency f o r t h a t effect; s i m i l a r l y , a p rope r ty r s mere n e c e s s i t y f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a p red i c t i on will be its causa l necessity f o r t h e given e f f e c t . Also, i t i s assumed t h a t i n each of t h e following examples, w e have a l ready observed whether each of t h e p rope r t i e s t o be considered is i n fact followed by the e f f e c t whose p red i c t i on is i n quest ion; s o t h a t some of the p r o p e r t i e s t o be considered do not (given our background knowledge) j u s t i f y t h e r e l evan t p red ic t ion . 109 Douglas Ehring, "Mental Causation, Determinables and Propert y Ins tances ," Nous 30 (1996) : 461-80 ( a t 466) . activated. The same c a n be said as w e move f u r t h e r u p t h e c h a i n of d e t e r m i n a b l e s away from t h e d e t e r m i n a t e s h a d e , scarlet, so t h a t even t h e p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g c o l o u r e d t u r n s o u t t o be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o the machine ' s a c t i v a t i o n : i f t h e c h a i r had n o t been c o l o u r e d , t h e device would n o t have been activated, Now w h i l e t h e s e i n c r e a s i n g l y d e t e r m i n a b l e f e a t u r e s ( b e i n g red, etc,) are i n çome sense c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o the machine ' s a c t i v a t i o n , 2 t i s o n l y i n t h e v e r y weak s e n s e of b e i n g r e q u i r e d o r c a u s a l l y n e c e s s a r y f o r t h a t effect . E h r i n g a p p a r e n t l y t a k e s t h i s t o be t h e m a r k of t h e s o r t of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t i s a t i s s u e i n t h e m e n t a l c a u s a t i o n debate, b u t i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o see t h a t it i s n o t what w e have i n mind when w e s e e k t o v i n d i c a t e the c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e o f t h e men ta l . A f t e r a l l , even t h o u g h "be ing red" i s c a u s a l l y r e q u i r e d i n order t o a c t i v a t e t h e d e t e c t o r , i t is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o do s o ; i f t h e c h a i r had been c r imson , the d e t e c t o r would n o t h a v e been a c t i v a t e d . When w e set o u t t o v i n d i c a t e t h e c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e o f t h e m e n t a l , w e h a v e i n mind some th ing s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e weak form o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t is s h a r e d by t h e p r o p e r t i e s of b e i n ç red o r b e i n g c o l o u r e d i n t h i s example . W e want t o d e f e n d t h e c l a i m t h a t m y desire f o r a Coke, coup l ed w i t h m y be l ief that t h e r e i s Coke i n t h e f r i d g e , i s i n i tself s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e c l a i m t h a t I w i l l o p e n t h e f r i d g e . One problem, t h e n , w i t h a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e (such as t h e one p roposed by LePore and Loewer) i s t h a t it tracks a form of r e l e v a n c e t h a t i s w e a k e r t h a n what w e seek f o r m e n t a l properties, f o r it o n l y t r a c k s p r o p e r t i e s t h a t are r e q u i r e d f o r a c e r t a i n outcome rather t h a n p r o p e r t i e s t h a t are s u f f i c i e n t w i t h respect t o i t . Worse s t i l l , the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test t a k e s u s away f rom c a u s a l s u f f i c i e n c y a n d towards mere c a u s a l n e c e s s i t y i n t h e added s e n s e t h a t many c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t p r o p e r t i e s f a i l t o s a t i s f y itTo see t h a t t h i s is so , c o n s i d e r t h e case i n which I t i p t h e scales b e c a u s e 1 weigh 1 5 0 pounds, a n d i n which a n y t h i n g t h a t weighs more t h a n 120 pounds a l s o t i p s t h e scales. Does my p r o p e r t y of weigh ing 150 pounds pass t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l t e s t ? A p p a r e n t l y no t , f o r it seerns t o be fa lse t h a t i f I had n o t weighed 150 pounds, 1 would n o t have t ipped t h e scales. T h i s i s because it seems l i k e l y t h a t i n t h e n e a r e s t non -ac tua l worlds i n which I do n o t weigh 1 5 0 pounds 1 i n s t e a d weigh 151 pounds, o r some s i m i l a r w e i g h t , which is e q u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t t o tip t h e scales. O r c o n s i d e r t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e p a t t e r n o f n e u r o n a l f i r i n g i n my b r a i n c a u s e d my a m t o r ise. 1s i t t h e case t h a t i f j u s t that a c t u a l , Eully d e t e r m i n a t e p a t t e r n had n o t been realised i n my brain, t h e n my a m would n o t have r i s e n ? Again , it s e e m s t h a t t h e answer must be "no", f o r i n t h e n e a r e s t n o n a c t u a l w o r l d s i n which my neurons do n o t realise p r e c i s e l y t h a t p a t t e r n , t h e y i n s t e a d realise an almost e x a c t l y s imi la r p a t t e r n (with t h e d i f f e r e n c e a f f e c t i n g o n l y one o r two b r a i n cells) t h a t i s a l so sufficient t o c a u s e rny a m t o r i se . I n s h o r t , i f w e w e r e t o adop t t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , we would arr ive a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t f e w ( i f a n y ) o f t h e f u f l y d e t e r m i n a t e f e a t u r e s t h a t are a c t u a l l y on hand t o h e r a l d t h e arriva1 o f an effect are i n fac t r e l e v a n t t o it, s i n c e t h e y are n o t a c t u a l l y required for t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h a t effect , g i v e n t h a t o t h e r , s i m i l a r p r o p e r t i e s would e q u a l l y have s u f f i c e d for it. And y e t , s u r e l y , t h e f u l l y d e t e r m i n a t e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a re a c t u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t w i th r e s p e c t t o an effect are i n some s e n s e c a u s a l l y relevant t o i t , T h i s is t h e sor t o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t w e r e g a r d m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s as h a v i n g . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t c o u n t e r f a c t u a l c r i ter ia f a i l t o track t h i s s o r t of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , t h e y f a i l t o addresç t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t w e have i n mind when w e i n q u i r e a b o u t t h e c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e of m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s , It might be objected t h a t t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l t e s t p r o f f e r e d by L e P o r e and Loewer can readily be supplemented i n a w a y t h a t c a p t u r e s t h e s t r o n g e r k i n d of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e that w e s e e k f o r m e n t a l f e a t u r e s . One c o u l d simply Say t h a t a p r o p e r t y is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o a given effect i f it passes the counterfactual test, or if some determinable of it does. This wonf t work, though, because it would render burgundy causally relevant to the detectorrs activation, since one of this shader s determinables (viz, , red) passes the counterfactual test: if the chair (which is in fact scarlet) had not been red, the detector would not have been activated. But burgundy is clearly not causally relevant to the activation of the machine. This difficulty cannot be remedied by stipulating that the property that is being assessed for causal relevance must at least be one that the chair actually has, for the same problem arises if w e suppose that the chair is part burgundy and part scarlet. We want a test of causal relevance according to which the detector is activated because the two-tone chair is scarlet, not because it is burgundy. The amended counterfactual criterion that we are considering does not yield this result. It might also be thought that the two cases described above (involving the fully determinate pattern of neuronal firing in my brain and my weighing 150 pounds respectively) are just examples of the sort of 'screening offr worry that LePore and Loewer address.'" To Say that one feature (P) 'screens off' another property (M) is to Say that the cause in question has both P and Mr and that even if it had lacked lia LePore and Loewer, "Mind Matters, " 638-40. M b u t r e t a i n e d P, it s t i l l would have p r o d u c e d t h e same effect t h a t it a c t u a l l y p roduced . L e P o r e and Loewer e n t e r t a i n t h e p r o p o s a 1 t h a t w e add as a fifth c o n d i t i o n on c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e z t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t no p r o p e r t y t h a t i s s c r e e n e d of f from a g i v e n t y p e of effect is r e l e v a n t 2 t o i t . They reject this p r o p o s a 1 on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t it would r e n d e r c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t c e r t a i n properties t h a t o b v i o u s l y are r e l e v a n t . I t s h o u l d be e v i d e n t t h a t m y above a rgument d o e s n o t s i m p l y r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e ' s c r e e n i n g o f f f worries t h a t LePore and Loewer have already addressed. For n o t i c e t h a t i n o r d e r f o r t h e r e t o be a g e n u i n e case of ' s c r e e n i n g o f f f , t h e c a u s e must a c t u a l l y p o s s e s s b o t h t h e s c r e e n i n g o f f and t h e s c r e e n e d o f f p r o p e r t i e s . However, i n t h e case i n which 1 t i p t h e scales by we igh ing 150 pounds, t h e p r o p e r t y t h a t ' t akes over' ( s o t o speak) i n t h e n e a r e s t n o n a c t u a l wor ld ( i n which 1 d o n o t w e i g h 150 pounds) a n d g u a r a n t e e s t h e same effect i s n o t one t h a t 1 a c t u a l l y p o s s e s s . For it i s none o t h e r t h a n t h e p r o p e r t y of we igh ing 151 pounds , which 1 do n o t p o s s e s s i n t h e a c t u a l w o r l d . Pe rhaps it will be o b j e c t e d t h a t rny a rgument i s , n o n e t h e l e s s , j u s t t h e same o l d s c r e e n i n g o f f worry ( t h a t L e P o r e and Loewer have a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d ) i n d i s g u i s e . For w h i l e 1 may n o t a c t u a l l y weigh 151 pounds , 1 do a c t u a l l y p o s s e s s t h e d e t e r m i n a b l e f e a t u r e of we igh ing more than 120 pounds; a n d ( t h e c r i t i c may add) it i s t h i s d e t e r m i n a b l e p r o p e r t y that, i n t h e above example , s c r e e n s o f f my p r o p e r t y of we igh ing 150 pounds from b e i n g c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o my t i p p i n g t h e scales. It might t h u s a p p e a r t h a t m y argument really does o n l y amount t o t h e s c r e e n i n g o f f wor ry t h a t LePore a n d L o e w e r have a l r e a d y t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , w i t h t h e added t w i s t t h a t i n my example w e have a d e t e r m i n a b l e f e a t u r e eff ect . To s c r e e n i n g o f f one o f i t s own d e t e r m i n a t e s f r o m t h e see why t h i s is no t s o , recall t h a t i n t h e s o r t o f case t h a t LePore and Loewer discuss, w e are t o c o n s i d e r the claim t h a t t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t realise a g i v e n m e n t a l f e a t u r e would have p roduced t h e same effect ( e g . , would have c a u s e d my a m t o raise) even i f t h e y had n o t been accompanied by t h a t m e n t a l p r o p e r t y , and t h u s s c r e e n off t h e m e n t a l p r o p e r t y . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a t i s s u e h e r e i s n o t s i m p l y o f t h e form o f L e P o r e r s a n d L o e w e r f s crucial third c o n d i t i o n on r e l e v a n c e 2 . The c o u n t e r f a c t u a l i n t h e i r t h i r d c o n d i t i o n had t h e f o l l o w i n g form: ( a ) -Mc > -Be. I n t h e case t h a t LePore and L o e w e r d i s c u s s , t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l t h a t has t h i s form is, "If 1 had n o t been i n m e n t a l s tate M, my a m would not have risen." I n their view, t h i s c o u n t e r f a c t u a l is t r u e ( a n d this i s what--in t h e i r o p i n i o n - e s t a b l i s h e s t h e c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e o f t h e m e n t a l ) , f o r i n t h e n e a r e s t n o n a c t u a l w o r l d s i n which I a m n o t i n s tate M rny a m d o e s n o t raiseNote, however, t h a t i n those n e a r b y non-ac tua l worlds i n which 1 a m n o t i n M 1 a l s o do n o t h a v e t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l p r o p e r t i e s t ha t realised M i n t h e a c t u a l world; f o r M s t r o n g l y s u p e r v e n e s on t h o s e n e u r o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e s , from which i t follows t h a t i n a n y nea rby w o r l d i n which 1 lack M, 1 a l s o l a c k t h o s e n e u r o l o g i c a l p r o p e r t i e s ( and any o t h e r f e a t u r e s on which M s t r o n g l y s u p e r v e n e s ) ."' The p o i n t of a l1 t h i s is s i m p l y t h a t i n t h e case t h a t LePore and L o e w e r c o n s i d e r , i n which w e a s k what would happen i f I had those sme n e u r o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e s without h a v i n g t h e m e n t a l p r o p e r t y M, w e c a n n o t sirnply be a s k i n g w h a t happens i n t h e nearest n o n a c t u a l worlds i n which I l a c k M; f o r , g i v e n t h e s t r o n g s u p e r v e n i e n c e o f M on t h o s e n e u r o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e s , t h e nearest non-actual wor lds i n which 1 l a c k M are p r e c i s e l y w o r l d s i n which 1 a l s o lack A very similar point was made by A.C. Ewing in response t o the claim that epiphenomenalism implies that a zombie (who is devoid of consciousness) could have written Hamlet. Ewing counters that, "Even on [the epiphenornenalist's] view, since mental processes inevitably result when the physiological brain-processes have attained a sufficient degree of complexity, and very complex brain-processes are undoubtedly needed for the production of such works, they could not be produced without complex mental processes also" (A. C . Ewing, Value and Reali ty [London: George Allen d Unwin Ltd., 19731, 77-8) . Unlike LePore and Loewer, Ewing does not take this to establish the efficacy of mental processes , and hence regards it as being p a r t of the epiphenornenalist's position, t h o s e n e u r o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e s ; so w e must be going f u r t n e r a f i e l d , t o more d i s t a n t non-actual worlds , u n t i l w e reach one t h a t i s ( s o t o speak) beyond t h e o r b i t o f worlds t h a t d e f i n e t h e a c t u a l w o r l d r s s t r o n g supervenience r e l a t i o n s , a worfd i n which t h o s e same n e u r o l o g i c a l p r o p e r t i e s do appear wi thou t be ing acconpanied by M."' I n t h i s s o r t o f case , then , w e are n o t s imply e v a l u a t i n g a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l o f t h e form o f ( a ) . I n s t e a d , t he c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a t i s s u e has the f orm (b) (-Mc 6: Pc) > Be. 113 A s has been noted, LePore and Loewer r e j e c t the proposa1 t h a t any p r o p e r t y t h a t c a n be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r M i n (b) (Le., any p r o p e r t y t h a t is s i m i l a r l y screened off from e ' s b e i n g B) should be barred from being c a u s a l l y relevant2 t o e r s be ing B. I t should be c l e a r though that i n t h e s o r t of c a s e t h a t w a s d e s c r i b e d i n my ear l ier argument, 1 was no t i l l i c i t l y ( c o n t r a r y t o LePore f s and Loewer's wishes) t r e a t i n g t h e "' This is what David Lewis has in mind when he speaks of 'a logical peculiarity of counterfactuals: their 'variable strictness'. It can happen that two counterfactuals If it were that p, it would be that not-q If it were that p and q, it would be that r are true together, and that the truth of the second is not merely vacuous truth. Because the first counterfactual is true, the supposition that p and q is more far-fetched, more 'remote from actuality', than the supposition just that p. But we are not forbidden to entertain a supposition merely because it is cornparatively far-fetchedVariable strictness means that some entertainable suppositions are more Earfetched than others" (Lewis, "Finkish Dispositions, " 150) . This is (SI in LePore and Loewer, "Mind Matters, " 639. truth of (b) as a bar t o M r s c a u s a l relevance* For i n t h a t argument w e r e a l l y are c o n f i n i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e nearest non-actual worlds i n which 1 l a c k t h e p r o p e r t y of weighing 150 pounds, Thus, w e r e a l l y a r e e v a l u a t i n g a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l t h a t h a s t h e form of ( a ) (Le., t h e form o f t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l i n LePorer s and Loewerr s c r u c i a l t h i r d c o n d i t i o n on c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e z ) , f o r w e are simply c o n s i d e r i n g what would have happened i f 1 had lacked t h e p r o p e r t y of weighing 150 pounds; and it seems q u i t e p l a u s i b l e t h a t i n t h e n e a r e s t wor lds i n which 1 l a c k t h i s p r o p e r t y , 1 have some very s i m i l a r p r o p e r t y ( e g . , weighing 151 pounds) t h a t ' t a k e s over ' and g u a r a n t e e s t h e sarne effect t h a t w a s produced i n t h e a c t u a l wor ld by m y weighing 150 pounds. A s a r e s u l t , t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l , 'If 1 had n o t weighed 150 pounds, 1 woula n o t have t ipped t h e sca lesfU i s f a l s e . So i f w e a c c e p t L e P o r e r s and Loewerfs c o u n t e r f a c t u a l t e s t of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , t h e n my weighing 150 pounds is n o t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o my t i p p i n g t h e scales, Note t h a t t h i s r e a s o n i n g can be g e n e r a l i s e d t o app ly t o many o t h e r f u l l y d e t e r m j n a t e f e a t u r e s , f o r it derives from t h e manner i n which d e t e r m i n a b l e s o f t e n s c r e e n off t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t e s from a g i v e n effect . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , it s e e m s t h a t i f w e s u b s t i t u t e a d e t e r m i n a t e p r e d i c a t e f o r 'M" i n ( a ) and (b) and a d e t e m i n a b l e p r e d i c a t e for 'Y i n ( b ) , t h e n ( u s u a l l y ) ( a ) and (b) are e q u i v a l e n t , f o r t h e i r a n t e c e d e n t s come out t r u e i n t h e same wor lds ; t h a t i s t o Say, t h e n e a r e s t wor lds i n which t h e a n t e c e d e n t of (b) i s t r u e j u s t a r e t h e n e a r e s t wor lds i n which ( a ) ' s a n t e c e d e n t i s t r u e ; s o t h a t , u n l i k e t h e s c r e e n i n g off case t h a t LePore a n d Loewer c o n s i d e r , w e need n o t v e n t u r e f u r t h e r af ie ld t o more d i s t a n t wor lds i n e v a l u a t i n g (b) t h a n w e do i n e v a l u a t i n g a ) . But t h e n , since t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l that w e are c o n s i d e r i n g is e q u i v a l e n t t o one t h a t h a s t h e form o f (a), and s i n c e L e P o r e a n d Loewer accept t h a t sort of c o u n t e r f a c t u a l as t h e i r c r u c i a l t h i r d c o n d i t i o n on c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e 2 , t h e y canno t a v o i d t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t rnany f u l l y d e t e r m i n a t e p r o p e r t i e s (e. g. , t h e d e t e r m i n a t e p a t t e r n of n e u r o n a l f i r i n g i n m y b r a i n ) are n o t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t , T h i s is a compel l ing r eason f o r abandoning t h e i r test , i f w e a c c e p t (as w e s u r e l y must ) t h a t s u c h d e t e r m i n a t e p r o p e r t i e s as t h e a c t u a l p a t t e r n of n e u r o n a l f i r i n g i n my b r a i n a r e r e l e v a n t t o the p r o d u c t i o n of c e r t a i n effects, and a r e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t i n t h e s t r o n g s e n s e o f b e i n g c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r them. 3. S t i l l Looking . . . For example, a particular point of grammar is present in the soul, which is the subject, but is not said of any subject, and a particular whiteness is present in a body (for every colour is in a body) , which is the subject, but is not said of any subject. . . . And without qualification, that which is an individual and numerically one is not said of any subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being present in a subject; for a particular point of grammar is present in a subject but is not said of any subject. 1. Relevance Reclaimed? I n t h e s econd chapter David Lewis ' s w r i t i n g s w e r e c i t ed i n s u p p o r t o f t h e v i e w t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n s are c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . L e w i s h a s never seemed e n t i r e l y p l e a s e d w i t h t h i s r e s u l t . I ndeed , he has called it a " d i s a g r e e a b l e ~ d d i t y " ~ ~ ~ t h a t must be d i s p a t c h e d i f t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f d i s p o s i t i o n s w i t h s econd -o rde r p r o p e r t i e s is t o w i n o u r u n e q u i v o c a l s u p p o r t . I n a recent p a p e r , h e takes himself t o 11 6 have done j u s t t h a t . H e b e g i n s by saying t h a t , "Sometimes, a n e v e n t . . . is a h a v i n g of a c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y by a c e r t a i n thing"; and s o m e t i m e s , he c o n t i n u e s , "Two d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s are had i n t h e same s i n g l e e v e n t . "ln Cons ide r , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e e v e n t t h a t c o n s i s t s i n t h e "hav ing o f t h e Aristotle, Categories, chap. 2, in Aristotle: Selected Works, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gerson (Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1982), 29-30. My thanks to Ronald de Sousa for calling this passage to my attention. "5 Lewis, "Causal Explanation,' 224. Lewis seems more willing to affim the inefficacy of dispositions in his later paper (Lewis, "Events," 268). Lewis, "Finkish Dispositions, " 151-2. 117 Lewis, "Finkish Dispositions," 152. [f i r s t o r d e r ] c a u s a l b a s i ~ " ~ l * o f t h e g l a s s f s d i s p o s i t i o n t o break when s t r u c k . Acco rd ing t o L e w i s , " T h i s same e v e n t is a having o f t h e s econd -o rde r p r o p e r t y , " ( v i z . , f r a g i l i t y ) . 119 That is , t h e g lass ' s p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e rno lecu la r s t r u c t u r e which serves as t h e c a u s a l b a s i s of i t s f r â g i l i t y i s a l 1 t h e r e is t o i t s being f r a g i l e , The ' hav ings f of t h e s e t w o p r o p e r t i e s are o n e and t h e same e n t i t y . Thus, s i n c e t h e g l a s s ' s p o s s e s s i o n of t h a t m o l e c u l a r s t r u c t c r e i s a c a u s e of i t s b reak ing , s o t o o is i t s f r a g i l i t y . Cyn th i a and G r a h a m Macdonald have a d o p t e d a similar s t r a t e g y t o v i n d i c a t e t h e causai relevance of t h e m e n t a l . The Macdonalds couch t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n i n tems o f " p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s " , but t h e i r p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s are t h e same so r t s of e n t i t i e s as L e w i s ' s e v e n t s . Accord ing t o t h e Macdonalds, " D i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s may be i n s t a n t i a t e d i n t h e same ' i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y ' ", 120 where an ' i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y f i s an i n s t a n c e of a n a t t r i b u t e by a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g . Cons ide r , for example, a scarlet sweater. I ts be ing red is n o t someth ing o v e r and above i t s b e i n g scarlet . Ra the r , i t s p o s s e s s i o n o f tne p r o p e r t y of b e i n g scarlet i s a l 1 there is 121 t o i t s b e i n g red. I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, t h e ' h a v i n g s f 'le Lewis, "Finkish Dispositions, " 152. Lewis, "Finkish Dispositionsr " 152, 120 Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, "Mental Causes and Expfanation of Action, " in Mïnd, C a u s a t i o n and Action, ed. L. Stevenson, R. Squires and J. Haldane (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 35-48 (at 38) . "' In the Macdonalds' words, 'To be an exemplification of the former just is, in this case, to be an exemplification of the latter, despite o f t h e s e two p r o p e r t i e s a r e o n e and t h e same e n t i t y . Thus, t h e two d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s , being r e d and being scarlet, are had i n t h e same s i n g l e p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e . Suppose now t h a t t h e sweater's b e i n g scarlet i s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c t i v a t i o f i of a c o l o u r d e t e c t o r . Acco rd ing t o the Macdonalds, o n c e w e see t h a t t h e sweater's b e i n g scarlet is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e detectorrs a c t i v a t i o n w e must acknowledge t h a t s o t o o i s i t s b e i n g red. A f t e r a l l , s i n c e t h e s w e a t e r ' s b e i n g red and t h e s w e a t e r r s b e i n g scarlet a r e o n e and t h e same p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e , its b e i n g red i s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t whenever i ts b e i n g scarlet i s . 122 It is t h e Macdonaldsr v i e w t h a t t h e c o n n e c t i o n between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l phenornena is i n some ways p a r a l l e l t o the r e l a t i o n t h a t d e t e r m i n a b l e s ( s u c h as red) bear t o t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t e s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e y m a i n t a i n t h a t even though m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s c a n n o t be r e d u c e d t o p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s , each m e n t a l p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e i s i d e n t i c a l with a p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e , a n d t h a t m e n t a l p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s are t h u s e f f i c a c i o u s w i t h r e s p e c t t o b e h a v i o u r a l effects whenever t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s w i t h which - -- -- the distinctness of the properties themselves" (Macdonald and Macdonald, "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action, " 39) . '''AS the Macdonalds put it, "Any causally efficacious case in which a more determinate f o m of that property [viz . , colour] is exemplified is a case in which the exemplification of colour i t s e l f îs efficacious, by the extensionality of the causal relation" (Macdonald and Macdonald, "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action," 39) . (Emphasis in the original) they are i d e n t i c a l are e f f i c a c i o u s . A s the Macdonalds put it, An instance of t he property, being a b r a i n event Br can be an i n s t a n c e of the mental p r o p e r t y , b e i n g a pain. Moreover, if an i n s t a n c e of the former i s causally e f f i c a c i o u s , t h e n so is the lat ter . 123 This approach indicates an initially p r o m i s i n g s t r a t e g y for e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c a u s a l relevance of p r o p e r t i e s whose c a u s a l s i g n i f i e a n c e has been impugned. Lewis applies i t t o dispositions. The Macdonaldsf work i l l u s t r a t e s that it can equally w e l l be a p p l i e d t o any s u s p e c t p r o p e r t y (e-g., d e t e r m i n a b l e s and m e n t a l f e a t u r e s ) , s o l ong as that property i s realisea by o r supervenes upon basic physical features whose causal relevance i s not i n q u e s t i o n . "' Macdonald and Macdonald, "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action, " 39. It is unclear whether, at the t h e at which their paper was written, the Macdonalds regarded the relation between mental and physical properties as a species of the determinable-determinate relation. In the passage from which the above quote was taken, they write, "Mental properties correlate in a one-many way with physical properties (though in no systematic way), with the consequence that any instance of the former is an instance of one or another of some more determinate physical property. Just as to be red is to be coloured, one might Say, to be an instance of the property, being a brain event B, is to be an instance of the mental property, being a pain. " (Emphasis added) The parenthetic denial of a "systematic" correlation between mental and physical properties militates against the claim that physical properties are determinates of mental features. However, the text that 1 have emphasised suggests the contrary view. This discrepancy is remedied in a later paper, in whFch the Macdonalds repudiate the daim that mental features have physical properties as their determinates (Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, "How to be Psychologically Relevant, " in Philosophy of Psycho1 ogy, vol. 1 of Deba tes on Psychological Explana tion, ed. Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19951, 60-77 [at 74 n. 101 ) . They nonetheless continue to belieae that mental and physical properties share the same property instances. XI. The Mer i ts of the Macdonalds' V i e w Befo re r e a c h i n g a verdict on t h e Macdonalds ' app roach it w i l l h e l p t o c l a r i f y t h e issues i f w e p a u s e b r i e f l y t o compare t h e i r p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s t r a t e g y t h a t w a s examined i n t h e second c h a p t e r . U n l i k e LePore a n d Loewer, t h e Macdonalds d o n o t b e g i n by f o r m u l a t i n g a c r i t e r i o n of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e and by t h e n a t t e r n p t i n g t o show t h a t m e n t a l f e a t u r e s meet t h a t s t a n d a r d . I n s t e a d , t h e y t r y t o d e m o n s t r a t e that t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t i n t u i t i v e l y are c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t are c l o s e l y enough wedded t o m e n t a l s t a t e s f o r t h e l a t t e r p r o p e r t i e s (more a c c u r a t e l y , t h e i r i n s t a n c e s ) t o p a r t a k e i n t h e e f f i c a c y o f t h e p h y s i c a l f e a t u r e s . T h i s a p p r o a c h is s i m i l a r t o a s t r a t e g y t h a t w a s c o n s i d e r e d i n the second c h a p t e r , namely, t h e a t t e m p t t o c o n f e r c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e upon d i s p o s i t i o n s by i d e n t i f y i n g them w i t h t h e d i s j u n c t i o n s of t h e i r c a u s a l bases. Both s t r a t e g i e s a i m t o b r i n g t h e p r o p e r t i e s whose causal s t a t u s i s i n doubt ( e . g . , d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s ) c l o s e r t o t h e i r obviously c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t p h y s i c a l realisers, i n the hope t h a t t h e y c a n t h e n i n h e r i t t h e e f £ i c a c y of t h e i r p h y s i c a l bases. However, t h e t w o s t r a t e g i e s are i m p o r t a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . For w h i l e t h e view t h a t w a s c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e s e c o n d c h a p t e r p r o c e e d e d a t t h e level o f properties and the i d e n t i t i e s t h a t may o r may n o t h o l d among them, t h e Macdonaldsr view imposes no r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e r e l a t i o n s t h a t m a y o r rnay n o t o b t a i n among t h e p r o p e r t i e s i n v o l v e d . I n s t e a d , they l i m i t t h e i r claims t o i d e n t i t y r e l a t i o n s t h a t o b t a i n among instances o f p r o p e r t i e s . It i s thus open t o a Dav idson ian t o t a k e t h i s r o u t e , f o r it is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e anomalous m o n i s t r s r e j e c t i o n of s y s t e m a t i c c o n n e c t i o n s among men ta l a n d p h y s i c a l types.124 An a d d i t i o n a l n o v e l t y o f t h e Macdonaldsr approach derives from i t s b r o a d e r s cope : it is more a m b i t i o u s i n t h e r a n g e of w o r r i e s t h a t i t a ims t o combat . To see why t h i s is s o , recal l t h a t t h e conternporary debate c o n c e r n i n g t h e p rob lem o f menta l c a u s a t i o n a r o s e w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f criticisms of D a v i d s o n f s anomalous rnonism. The w o r r y w a s n o t s i m p l y t h a t i n t h e wor ld depicted by anomalous monism, m e n t a l f e a t u r e s t u r n o u t , as a matter of fact , t o be i n e f f i c a c i o u s . I n s t e a d , the conce rn w a s t h a t i f anomalous monism is t r u e , t h e n i t i s n o t c l e a r how men ta l p r o p e r t i e s even could be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o a n y effect. Given t h e i r a b s e n c e f rom s t r i c t l a w s o f n a t u r e , i t seerns t h a t t h e y are j u s t n o t t h e sorts o f p r o p e r t i e s t h a t c o u l d ( even i n - -12 ' Indeed, in their 1986 paper the Macdonald~ were specifically concerned to arrive at a demonstration of the causal relevance of mental features consistently with their own endorsement of anomalous monism (Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action, "1 . It is doubtful, though, that Davidson himself would be sympathetic to their approach. p r i n c i p l e ) e n j o y any c a u s a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Accordingly , t h o s e who g r a p p l e w i t h t h e problem as it arises i n t h e c o n t e x t of anomalous monism b e g i n by p ropos ing a g e n e r a l test of c a u s a l r e l evance , which they t h e n claim is m e t by men ta l f e a t u r e s - I t may be o b j e c t e d , however, t h a t w h i l e t h e y may t h u s show t h a t men ta l p r o p e r t i e s are a t least f i t f o r c a u s a l r e l evance , t h a t is, tha t t h e r e is n o t h i n g i n t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f such p r o p e r t i e s that p r e v e n t s them f rom being e f f i c a c i o u s , it remains t o be seen whe the r t h e y are i n f a c t c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o any a c t u a l e v e n t . One might , f o r example, c r i t ic ise t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l tes t of e f f i c a c y on the grounds t h a t it d o e s not s u f f i c e f o r c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , s i n c e t h e p u t a t i v e e f f i c a c y o f t h e m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t s a t i s f y t h i s test may y e t be p rec luded by c e r t a i n g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of t h e a c t u a l world. For i n s t a n c e , it migh t be prec luded by t h e (alleged) c a u s a l c l o s u r e of t h e p h y s i c a l realm, o r by the c a u s a l completeness of t h e p h y s i c a l world t o g e t h e r w i t h the absence of p e r v a s î v e ove rde te r rn ina t ion . Jaegwon K i m has d i r e c t e d t h i s s o r t of c r i t i c i s m a t LePore and Loewer (among o t h e r ~ ) . ~ ~ ~ According t o K i m , i f mental p r o p e r t i e s are d i s t i n c t from p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s (as non-reduct ive p h y s i c a l i s t s m a i n t a i n ) , and i f t h e p h y s i c a l realm i s c a u s a l l y c l o s e d , t h e n it seems tha t men ta l lZ5 Jaegwon Kim, "Explanatory Exclusion and the Problern of Mental Causation, " i n Information, Seman tics and Epistemology, ed. Enrique Villanueva (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 36-56 (at 43-51. p r o p e r t i e s are not c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o any phys i ca l e f f e c t s ; f o r , accord ing t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of c losure , only phys ica l even t s and p r o p e r t i e s c o n t r i b u t e c a u s a l l y t o t h e product ion of p h y s i c a l events , and, accord ing t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f d i s t i n c t n e s s , menta l p r o p e r t i e s a r e no t phys ica l p r o p e r t i e s . It might be felt t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of c lo su re is t o o s t r o n g , and shou ld be r e p l a c e d by t h e more modest p r i n c i p l e o f completeness, accord ing t o which f o r every phys i ca l even t , t h e r e are phys i ca l even t s and p r o p e r t i e s t h a t w e r e s u f f i c i e n t t o produce i t , o r a t l e a s t t o f i x t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of i t s occurrence . This more modest p r i n c i p l e a l lows t h a t t h e r e might indeed be o ther , nonphys ica l f a c t o r s i n a phys i ca l e v e n t f s c a u s a l h i s t o r y , as long as t h e y w e r e mere ly overdetermining causes t h a t d i d n o t b r ing about any r e s u l t ( o r y i e l d any p r o b a b i l i t y o f an outcome) t h a t w a s n o t a l r eady f i x e d by t h e pure ly phys i ca l elements i n t h e c a u s a l c h a i n . Unfor tuna te ly , t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s no t a promising b a s i s for an account of mental causa t ion . For even i f overdeterminat ion is pos s ib l e , i t is s u r e l y not a s pe rvas ive as it would need t o be i n o rde r f o r every human a c t i o n t o be a n effect both of phys ica l and mental an teceden t s . Thus w e f a c e t h e problem of according causa l potency t o t h e mental i n a world i n which a l 1 t h e causal w o r k h a s a p p a r e n t l y a l r e a d y been done by p h y s i c a l states. When c o n f r o n t i n g t h i s worry it is no he lp t o a p p e a l t o a p u t a t i v e test o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e ( e .g . , t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l o r t h e nomological tests) and c l a i m t h a t men ta l p r o p e r t i e s p a s s t h a t test , f o r , whatever test w e adop t , it will ( a t leas t ) e q u a l l y welf be sa t i s f ied by p h y s i c a l f e a t u r e s . W e w i l l t h u s be thrown back i n t o t h e dilema o f e i ther a c c o r d i n g c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e e x c l u s i v e l y t o one set o f p r o p e r t i e s (e i ther t o t h e menta l o r t o t h e p h y s i c a l features) o r countenanc ing t h e rampant o v e r d e t e n n i n a t i o n O£ human a c t i o n s by bo th m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l s tates. If w e a f f i r m the c a u s a l c l o s u r e of t h e p h y s i c a l realm, o r a t least its c a u s a l comple t enes s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e d e n i a l o f rampant o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e n t h e i n e l u c t a b l e consequence i s t h e impotence of t h e m e n t a l . Unl ike t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s t r a t e g y , the Macdonalds' approach does a t least p u r p o r t t o a l l a y t h e s e fears. For once w e make p r o p e r t y instances ( r a t h e r t h a n p r o p e r t i e s t hemse lves ) t h e u n i t s o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , w e r e n d e r unprob lema t i c t h e a s c r i p t i o n o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t o menta l states, so l o n g as t h o s e states a r e held t o b e i d e n t i c a l w i t h p h y s i c a l t o k e n s . T h i s i s not t an tamount t o t h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s o p e r a t i n g on the p h y s i c a l system, f o r t h e mental instances t h a t are said t o be e f f i c a c i o u s j u s t are p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s . Moreover, it does not r e q u i r e overdeterminat ion , s i n c e i n any g iven ca se t h e r e i s on ly one thing (one p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e ) that is s a i d t o be o p e r a t i v e i n b r i ng ing about the effect. Granted, this s i n g l e p rope r ty i n s t ance is d e s c r i b a b l e i n a p l u r a l i t y of ways (e .g . , as a n i n s t a n c e of a phys i ca l p r o p e r t y and as a n i n s t a n c e of a menta l f e a t u r e ) , b u t t h a t should n o t be taken t o imply that t h e r e i s a p l u r a l i t y o f en t i t i e s (more s p e c i f i c a l l y , p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s ) acting o n t h i s occasion. It is i n i t s response t o t h e problem of overdeterminat ion t h a t the ch i e f v i r t u e of t h e Macdonaldsr 12 6 and L e w i s ' s approach i s thought t o lie. T h e worry w a s that t h e a s c s i p t i o n of causal re levance t o su spec t p r o p e r t i e s (such a s mental a n d d i s p o s i t i o n a l f e a t u r e s ) i m p l i c a t e s t h e m i n an implaus ib ly ub iqu i t ous overde te rmina t ion . The response i s t h a t by making t h e u n i t s o f c ausa l r e levance property i n s t a n c e s ( o r L e w i s ' s "events") and by i d e n t i f y i n g a l 1 such i n s t a n c e s with i n s t a n c e s o f phys i ca l f e a t u r e s , w e can a s s i g n causa l re levance t o any p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e under any IZ6 It is interesting to note that in his most xecent discussion of the issue, Lewis sumarizes the positive case for the impotence of dispositions exclusively in terms of an argument from overdetermination (Lewis, "Finkish Dispositions, " 152) ; and yet, in his earlier papers (Lewis, "Causal Explanation, " 224 and Lewis, 'Events, " 268) , he does not even mention overdetermination when presenting the reasons for t a k i n g dispositions to be everywhere idle. description while retaining an ontology and causal story that is as austere as w e like. 1x1 . The Xdentity of &avings Douglas Ehring has objected that the Macdonalds overlook one of the conditions for the identity of property instances construed as exemplifications of universals. 127 To wit, they have failed to see that exemplifications of universals are identical only if they are exemplifications of the same property. AEter all, a property exemplification is simply a having of a property by a given object at a given time. A l 1 three of these items (the property, the object, and the time) are essential "components" of the property instance and should figure in its identity conditions .12' So, contrary to what the Macdonalds claim, the sweaterf s being red is not the same property instance as its being scarlet. Ehring concludes that if we wish to regard an instance of a determinable as being identical with an instance of one of its determinates, and as inheriting the latter's efficacy, then we shall have to forsake the ontology of particulars exemplifying universals in favour of the nominalistr s tropes (and resernblance classes thereof) in 12' Ehring, 'Mental Causation, Determinables and Property Instances, " 463. 12' "Exemplifications will have various 'components' including universals and it is hard to see how exemplifications with different universal 'components' could be identical" (Ehring, "Mental Causation, Determinables and Property Instances," 463). order to find claims . While we a suitable metaphysical grounding for our can agree that the properties that are instanced should figure in the identity conditions of exemplifications, it is not clear why E h r i n g believes t ha t a property exemplification must be an instance of only one property. Why canft we j u s t opt for more coarse-grained property instances, each of which is an instance of more than one feature? We should of course acknowledge that if a and b have different components, then a is not identical with b. But this does not preclude there being one property instance that is at once an exemplification of both redness and scarlet, so that it (that one exemplification) has both of t h e s e "component" properties among its identity conditions. Such an exemplification is not simply a rednessinstance or a scarlet-instance. It is rather a redness-andscarlet -instance; nothing could be it without being an instance of both of those properties. 12 9 There is some intuitive support for these cozrsergrained property instances. There is clearly a sense in '" Tim Crane takes this to be what distinguishes the Macdonalds' property instances from facts (on at hast sorne conceptions of factsl; thus, while the fact that 1 am in pain at t is different from the fact that I am in brain state B at t (assuming that being in pain is not the same property as B), "What the Macdonalds mean is that a single property instance has as 'components' a mental property and a physical property" (Crane, "The Mental Causation Debate," 222). As will soon be explained, this is a misinterpretation of the Macdonalds if by calling both properties "components" Crane means that they are both constitutive of the event in question. which what makes t h e sweater red is n o t t h e very same t h i n g as what makes it s i z e e i g n t o r a t u r t l e n e c k , but is t h e same t h i n g as w h a t rnakes it scar le t . Its b e i n g scarlet is a l1 there i s t o i t s b e i n g red, b u t i s n o t a l 1 there is t o i t s b e i n g s i z e e i g h t . Moreover, t h i s manner of s p e a k i n g is n o t restricted t o s t a n d a r d examples of t h e d e t e r m i n a t e - d e t e r m i n a b l e r e l a t i o n , f o r w e are i n c l i n e d t o Say s i m i l a r t h i n g s about d i s p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r r e a l i s a t i o n s . Ehr ing ' s o b j e c t i o n can be m e t by a d o p t i n g t h i s s t r a t e g y . As it happens , though, t h e Macdonalds are u n l i k e l y t o t a k e t h i s app roach , f o r it is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h w h a t Cyn th i a Macdonald h a s said i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f E h r i n g ' s c r i t i ~ i s r n . ' ~ ~ Acco rd ing t o h e r , w e must d i s t i n g u i s h "between c o n s t i t u t i v e and c h a r a c t e r i s i n g p r o p e r t i e s . . . o f events."131 While it is t r u e t h a t e v e r y e v e n t is a p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c i n g , and t h u s h a s as one of i t s c o n s t i t u t i v e ( i . e . , e s s e n t i a l ) components a p r o p e r t y o f which it is a n i n s t a n c i n g , i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t e v e r y p r o p e r t y f i g u r e s as a n e s s e n t i a l cornponent i n t h e e v e n t s which serve a s i t s i n s t a n t i a t i o n s . T h a t is t o Say, n o t a l 1 of t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a r e e x e m p l i f i e d i n a g i v e n p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e f i g u r e i n t h e i d e n t i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h a t i n s t a n c e ; some of them are i n e s s e n t i a l t o t h a t e v e n t . Acco rd ing t o Macdonald, a n y g i v e n "O Cynthia Macdonald, Mind-Body Iden fi t y Theories (London : Routledge, l989), 143-55. 13' C. Macdonald, Mind-Body I d e n t i t y Theories, 1 4 7 . mental property will be inessential to the events that are its instantiatioñ.'~~ Thus, such events are merely characterised, but not constituted, by mental features. It is interesting to note that Lewis has similarly downgraded dispositional and mental properties to the status of inessential aspects of their iñtantiations.'~~ ~ i s reason for doing so is that a l 1 such properties are definable in terms of causal roles. If we assume that one and the same event could have occupied any number of different causal roles, then the occupation of any given causal role is inessential to that event. Hence, if mental and dispositional features are to be conceived of in terms of causal roles, then any event that is a having of a mental or dispositional property could have occurred without being a having of that propert y. 134 It must be concluded that both Lewis and the Macdonalds have ready answers to Ehring's criticism, and that even if one finds their answers implausible (because it does not -- " 2 As she says, "The view that mental properties of persons are constitutive of the events that are exemplifyings of t h e m (hence that mental properties of events are essences of them) is at best dubious and arpably false on the view of essences favoured by many" ( C Macdonald, Mind-Body Ident i ty Theories, 152) . 133 Lewis, "Events, " 268, lx In Lewis's words, 'There is a genuine event which is accidentally classifiable in tems of fragility; essentially, however, it is a possession of such-and-such molecular structure. . . . And if 1 am right to think that mental States are definable as occupants of causal roles, then no genuine event is essentially classifiable as my being in pain. There are pain events, no doubt of it; but they are pain events only accidentally. . . , Essentially, the events are firings of neurons" (Lewis, "Events, " 268) . It should be noted that these are not Macdonald's reasons for holding this view. seem that pain, e . g . , could be anything less than essential to its instantiations), one can reply to Ehring in the manner described at the beginning of this section. It seems then that instances cannot be the identification of mental and physical property is a viable metaphysical option. At least, it ruled out on the basis of Ehringrs criticism. W. An Equivocation The crux of the Macdonalds' strategy is their claim that causal relevance is a relation between particulars (viz,, property instances) rather than types. Setting aside for the montent the question whether this claim is true, it seems that the Macdonalds' defence of it involves an equivocation by means of which they draw conclusions-about causal relevance from a consideration of the nature of causality. The equivocation seems clearest in the following passage : If we do insist that causality is a relation between token events , and that it is instances of properties associated with event types which are causally efficacious, then the "Principle of the Nomological Character of Causally-Relevant Properties" should be amended so as to finish ". . . Causally-Relevant Instances of Psopertiesr8. 13' Their point is that instead of taking causal relevance to be a relation between properties, we ought to regard it as a ''' Macdonald and Macdonald, "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action, " 37. (Emphasis added) r e l a t i o n between t h e tokens o f t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s . C l e a r l y , though, t h e (emphasised) p r e m i s s tha t i s supposed t o rnotivate t h i s v i e w is a d a i m o n l y about c a u s a l i t y . No c o n c l u s i o n s about c a u s a l relevance can be drawn w i t h o u t f u r t h e r argument--unlessr o f cou r se , t h e Macdonalds t a k e t h e r e l a t i o n s o f c a u s a l i t y and c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t o be t h e same r e l a t i o n ; but i n t h a t c a s e w e shou ld s i m p l y rest c o n t e n t w i t h Davidsonrs anomalous monism, f o r t h e problem of t h e causal r e l e v a n c e o f t h e m e n t a l would s i m p l y not arise. John H e i l s k e t c h e s a v i e w similar t o tnat of t h e Macdonalds. Unfo r tuna te ly , h i s d i s c u s s i o n , l i k e t h e i r s r r i n v o l v e s a c o n t i n u a 1 running t o g e t h e r of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e and c a u s a t i o n . This i s p e r h a p s most e v i d e n t when H e i l t e l l s u s t h a t , D i s c u s s i o n s of m e n t a l c a u s a t i o n are especially prone t o typetoken confus ions . In consider ing events a s p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c a u s a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , f o r i n s t a n c e , w e are concerned, not w i t h t y p e s o f e v e n t , but wi th token events, d a t e d , nonrepea tab le , p a r t i c u l a r o c c u r r e n c e s . 136 Again, it i s c l e a r from t h e emphasised t e x t t h a t H e i l is s p e a k i n g about e v e n t s s t a n d i n g i n t h e r e l a t i o n of c a u s a t i o n . 137 However, g iven t h e c o n t e x t , he seems t o b e l i e v e t h a t h e i s 13' Heil , The Nature o f True Minds, 136. (Emphasis added) There i s also an a s i d e i n which He i l says, "For s imp l i c i t y , 1 s h a l l follow Sea r l e and speak he r e of p rope r t i e s o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s caus ing and being caused, though, s t r i c t l y , it is instances of p r o p e r t i e s o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t have a e t i o l o g i c a l s ignificance*' (Hei l , The Nature of T r u e Minds, 127 n. 22) . (Emphasis i n t h e o r i g i n a l ) 137 I n l i g h t of what Hei l says e a r l i e r i n h i s chap t e r on t he problem of mental causat ion, it is c l e a r that he takes t h e problem t o be t h e n o t s imply making a n u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o i n t a b o u t t h a t r e l a t i o n , b u t is i n s t e a d a r r i v i n g a t a more d i t i o u s a n d i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t abou t t h e n a t u r e of t h e causa l relevance r e l a t i o n , t o w i t , t h a t it t o o must be a r e l a t i o n between p a r t i c u l a r s r a t h e r t h a n t y p e s . H e i l c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r s as " p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s o r e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n s - - Platof s 'moving formsf , D. C. Wi l l iamsf s ' t r o p e s r . "138 While n o t i d e n t i f y i n g men ta l a n d p h y s i c a l t r o p e s w i t h each o t h e r , W e i l does r e g a r d each m e n t a l t r o p e as being " r e a l i s e d " by a p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e , where t h i s means t h a t t h e l a t t e r i n s t a n c e c o n s t i t u t e s t h e f o r m e r one and t h a t t h e menta l p r o p e r t y ( c o n s i d e r e d as a t y p e ) supe rvenes on t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y . 139 Whatever t h e merits of t h i s accoun t might be, it must be s a i d t h a t Weil's d e f e n c e of it i n v o l v e s t h e same s o r t o f legerdemain t h a t w e s a w i n t h e Macdonalds' r e a s o n i n g , by means of which q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e p o i n t s abou t c a u s a t i o n a r e s u b t l y t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e d i f f e r e n t ( a n d s o f a r rnys te r ious ) r e l a t i o n o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e . Moreover, it canno t be t h e c a s e t h a t H e i l s imp ly takes t h e r e l a t i o n s o f c a u s a t i o n a n d c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t o be o n e a n d t h e same, f o r he a g r e e s t h a t question whether mental properties are causally relevant, and not merely the question whether mental tokens cause anything (see esp. Heil, The Nature of True Minds, 104-7 and 121-2) . L38 Heilf The Nature of True Minds, 138. L39 "The liquidity of Clara's soup is realised by its molecular structure only if liquidity supervenes on molecular structure and the former 'trope1 is constituted by the latter" (Heil, The Nature of True Mnds, 138). Davidsonr s a c c o u n t is not enough . T h a t is t o Say, he agrees t h a t even i f mental t o k e n s are c a u s e s , t h e r e r ema ins a ,140 further q u e s t i o n as t o whether t h e y are c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t , and he regards h i s trope accoun t as b e i n g c r u c i a l t o answer ing t h i s further q u e s t i o n . lP1 But t h i s f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n wou ld n o t e v e n a r i s e i f c a u s a t i o n and c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e w e r e t h e same r e l a t i o n . H e i l ' s a rgument , t h e n , i n v o l v e s the c o n f l a t i o n o f w h a t he h imse l f t a k e s t o be t w o d i s t i n c t r e l a t i ons . H e , l i k e t h e Macdonalds, relies on a n equivocation. V. Countereramples to the Txope Account H e i l does not believe that his remarks abou t tropes are i n themselves s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l a y t h e fear that epiphenomenal ism might be t r u e . 14' H e denies t h a t t h e mere r e a l i s a t i o n of a m e n t a l p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e by a causally r e l e v a n t physical p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e is enough t o g u a r a n t e e t h e causal relevance of t h e men ta l t r o p e . T o i l l u s t r a t e this ' ' O This i s e spec ia l ly c l e a r £rom Heil, The N a t u r e of True Minds, 122. L q i This i s ev ident from Heil , The Nature of True Minds, 123, where it i s suggested m a t only a trope account can make sense of the f a c t tha t a supervening property ( i n t h i s case, being l i qu id ) "matters causally, " i , e . , i s causa l ly relevant. Pierre Jacob adopts a similar approach i n Pierre Jacob, What Minds Can D o (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l997), 218-9lC2 It i s thus s t range t o f ind Heil repeatedly c i t e d as a proponent of t h e trope so lu t ion . E.g., he is charac te r i sed as such i n Crane, "The Mental Causation Debate," 222 n. 23; i n Robb, "The Propert ies of Mental Causation," 188 n, 21; and i n Paul Noordhof, "Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation?" The Philosophical Quarterly 4 8 (1998) : 221-26 ( a t 222 n. 5 ) . More recently, Heil has offered a response t o t h e problem of epiphenomenalism tha t (desp i te h i s p ro te s t a t ions t o the contrary) appears t o be e l imina t iv i s t (John Heil, Philosophy of Mind [London: Routledge, 19981, 200-1) . p o i n t , he a p p e a l s t o the well-worn example i n which E l l a s h a t t e r s a g l a s s by s i n g i n g , "Break n o t my heart."'43 C l e a r l y , h e r s i n g i n g c a u s e s t h e g l a s s t o break , b u t it does n o t produce t h i s effect i n v i r t u e of be ing a s i n g i n g o f "Break n o t rny heart"; t h i s c o n t e n t i s c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . This is so i n s p i t e of t h e fact t h a t i t s token i n t h i s i n s t a n c e i s r e a l i s e d ( a c c o r d i n g t o H e i l ) by E l l a r s s i n g i n g a t j u s t t h a t p i t c h and a m p l i t u d e , a n d i n s p i t e of t h e fact t h a t t h i s l a t t e r p h y s i c a l t o k e n is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e effect . A sirnilar example h a s been s u g g e s t e d by James Robert Brown.144 Having a g iven s t r u c t u r e rnay be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e v a s e r s b reak ing . Moreover, i t s d e l i c a t e s t r u c t u r e rnay b e what makes t h e v a s e b e a u t i f u l . I t s beauty , t h e n , is realised i n i t s s t r u c t u r e . I t does n o t fo l low, however, t h a t t h e v a s e ' s b e a u t y i s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t whenever i t s s t r u c t u r e i s . Rega rd le s s of whether w e have h e r e two t r o p e s related by t h e r e a l i s a t i o n r e l a t i o n (as i n H e i l ) , o r one p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e o r e v e n t t h a t f a l l s under two d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s ( a s i n t h e Macdonalds and L e w i s ) , i t i s s imply "3 Heil, The Nature of True Minds, 139-40. The example was first given in Fred Dretske, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 19881, 79. "' The example was given in James Robert Brown, commentary on "Does Anything Break Because It 1s Fragile?" by Paul Raymont (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ontario Philosophical Society, Toronto, Ont - , October 1997) . n o t t h e case t h a t these c o n n e c t i o n s u n d e r w r i t e t h e t r a n s f e r of c a u s a l relevance f rom t h e vase's s t r u c t u r e t o its b e a u t y . S tephen Yablo advances a similar coun te r example a g a i n s t t h e Macdonalds' a c c o u n t t o show t h a t t w o p r o p e r t i e s can s h a r e t h e same p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e w i t h o u t b o t h b e i n g c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o t h a t i n s t a n c e l s effects Yablof s c r i t i c i s m has t h e added v i r t u e o f b e i n g e q u a l l y effective even if t h e p r o p e r t i e s i n v o l v e d are related t o each o t h e r n o t j u s t by s u p e r v e n i e n c e b u t by t h e more i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n . So, f o r example , s u p p o s e t h a t 1, weigh ing 165 pounds, t i p t h e scales, and t h a t anyone weigh ing more t h a n 120 pounds would a l so t i p them. C l e a r l y , rny having t h e p r o p e r t y o f w e i g h i n g 165 pounds is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o m y t i p p i n g t h e scales, as is m y d e t e r m i n a b l e p r o p e r t y of weighing more t h a n 1 2 0 pounds . B y c o n t r a s t , my we igh ing less t h a n 180 pounds i s s u r e l y n o t c a u s a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t effect, d e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t it t o o i s a d e t e r m i n a b l e of weighing 165 pounds . Thus, e v e n t hough i n my case t h e p r o p e r t i e s of w e i g h i n g 165 pounds and of weighing less t h a n 180 pounds are had i n t h e same s i n g l e p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e , and even though these f e a t u r e s are related t o each o t h e r as d e t e r m i n a t e t o d e t e r m i n a b l e , t h i s does n o t g u a r a n t e e t h a t t h e y w i l l b o t h be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t whenever one of t hem is . 14' Yablo, "Mental Causation," 259 n. 32. To clarify, the criticisrn is not directed at the claim that the property instance of my weighing less than 180 pounds is a cause of rny tipping the scales. It would be wrong to deny this claim, since its truth follows from the identity of the aforesaid property instance with the event of my weighing 165 pounds (which really did cause the scales to tip), together with the extensionality of the causal relation. Instead, the criticism is intended to show that it is not in virtue of its being an instantiation of the property of weighing less than 180 pounds that the event causes the scales to tip; and that its being a having of ihis property is therefore causally irrelevant to that effect. In short, the Macdonaldsr (and Lewis's) willingness to countenance property instances that incorporate more than one property leaves them open to a similar objection to the one that confronts Davidson, namely, that not al1 of those properties need be relevant to the property instance's effects. VI. Responses to Yablo The Macdonalds consider Yablors counterexample in a recent ~aper.'~~ Their response seems to be that while the counterexample illustrates the futility of their strategy as a means for establishing the causal relevance of mental properties, it does not undermine their claim that mental 14' Macdonald and Macdonald, "How to be Psychologically Relevant," 68. prope r ty instances are causes. Moreover, t h e y on ly had t h i s l a t t e r c la im i n mind when t hey set o u t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e "ef f icacy" o f t h e mental, Thus, e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c a u s a l re levance of mental p r o p e r t i e s i s a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t a s k from t h e one t h a t concerned them i n t h e paper t h a t Yablo c r i t i c i s e s . F a i r enough, one wants t o rep ly , b u t i f t h i s i s how w e a r e t o have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i r earlier paper, t hen i t s e e m s once a g a i n t h a t t h e i r s t o r y abou t p rope r ty i n s t a n c e s makes no p rog re s s beyond Davidsonfs account and is , a t best, merely a t r a n s p o s i t i o n o f h i s view i n t o a metaphysics i n which t h e c a u s a l relata are more f i ne -g ra ined t h a n h i s even t s . W e cannot by t h i s manoeuvre escape t h e worry t h a t conf ron t s Davidsonfs t heo ry , namely, t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h a t not al1 of a cause* s f e a t u r e s a r e r e l e v a n t t o i t s product ion of a g iven e f f e c t , s o t h a t t h e causa l r e levance of mental p r o p e r t i e s i s not e s t a b l i s h e d merely by showing t h a t t h e y c h a r a c t e r i s e even t s that are causes . 1 4 7 David Robb has a b o l d e r response t o Y a b 1 0 . l ~ ~ According t o Robb, Yablofs p u t a t i v e counterexample i n f a c t i l l u s t r a t e s one of t he c h i e f v i r t u e s of t h e p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s t r a t e g y , narnely, t h e i n s i g h t t h a t t h e b e a r e r s o f c ausa l r e levance are '" I t is a lso hard t o s e e how t h e Macdonaldsf 1986 paper could have met i ts s t a t e d aim of responding t o Ted Honderich's cr i t ic isrns of Davidson, since Honderich seems t o have been concerned w i t h the causal relevance of mental proper t ies i n Davidsonf s account, and not simply with the question whether mental events are causes (Honderich, "The Argument f o r Anornalous Monism, ") , "' Robb, "The Proper t ies of Mental Causation," 191-4. p a r t i c u l a r s ( v i z . , p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s o r tropes, t o u s e h i s pref erred rather types. Robb h a p p i l y t h e t r u t h of b o t h (i) 1 t i p p e d t h e scales i n v i r t u e of we igh ing 165 pounds , and (ii) 1 t i p p e d the scales i n v i r t u e of we igh ing less t h a n 180 poundsBoth o f these claims are t r u e , i n Robbr s v i e w , becauçe , d e s p i t e a p p e a r a n c e s , what f o l l o w s ". . i n v i r t u e o f . . . I f i s a s i n g u l a r t e r m t h a t refers t o a p a r t i c u l a r p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e . Only t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r s , and not t h e t y p e s t o which t h e y b e l o n g , c an be said t o be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t . Acco rd ing ly , s t a t e m e n t s (i) and (ii) a re b o t h true because t h e y e a c h pick o u t t h e same trope ( v i z . , rny we igh ing 165 pounds) and Say of it t h a t it i s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o rny t i p p i n g t h e scales. The manner o f i t s d e s c r i p t i o n does n o t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r it, t h a t p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e , i s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t . O n Robb' s app roach , t h e n , \\ . . i n v i r t u e of . . ." is a n e x t e n s i o n a l c o n t e x t : it d o e s n o t matter how w e refer t o t h e t r o p e , f o r as l o n g as w e d o succeed i n r e f e r r i n g t o it , o u r c l a i m w i l l be t r u e ( i f i n fact t h a t t rope w a s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t ) . Robb uses t h e term ' t rope ' where t h e Macdonalds use 'property ins tancer . H e g ives ' t rope* a much broader usage than Ehring and the Macdonalds allow it. Whereas they regard t ropes as t h e exclusive preserve of nominalists , Robb t r e a t s t h e usage of ' t rope' as being neu t r a l between nominalism and realism with respect t o universals ( see esp. Robb, "The Proper t ies of Mental Causation," 186). VXI. The Trouble W i t h T r o p e s Robbf s a c c o u n t of (i) and (ii) d o e s n o t accurately r e p r e s e n t t h e f o r c e o f '. . . i n v i r t u e o f . . ." clairns, C l e a r l y t h e p o i n t of s u c h clairns is n o t t o express some f e t i s h i s t i c a t t a c h e n t t o a p a r t i c u l a r trope, a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e scales t i p p e d because o f t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h a t t o k e n . T h e p o i n t is rather t o assert t h a t t h e scales t i p p e d because t h e c a u s e was of a c e r t a i n t y p e , so t h a t o t h e r t o k e n s of t h e same type can be e x p e c t e d t o p roduce t h e same s o r t o f effect. I n s h o r t , what f o l l o w s t h e '. , . i n v i r t u e o f , . .'' i s n o t a s i n g u l a r terni b u t i s i n s t e a d a g e n e r a l term s p e c i f y i n g a type. Robbrs d e n i a l of t h i s severs t h e l i n k between c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e a n d e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e r e b y r e n d e r i n g t h e f o r m e r n o t i o n devoid o f c o n t e n t . To see why, c o n s i d e r how meaning a c c r u e d t o t h e n o t i o n of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . W e tested f o r c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i n terms of w h a t i s e x p l a n a t o r y , and it w a s because n o t every way o f p i c k i n g o u t the c a u s e w a s e x p l a n a t o r y t h a t w e conc luded t h a t n o t a l 1 o f i t s p r o p e r t i e s w e r e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t . For example, p i c k i n g o u t t h e h u r r i c a n e as "The e v e n t r e p o r t e d on page f o u r of t h e Times" goes no way towards e x p l a i n i n g t h e fa ta l i t ies , so t h e h u r r i c a n e ' s h a v i n g b e e n r e p o r t e d i n t h e T i m e s is not c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t t o this effect . S i m i l a r l y , i t i s t h e explanatory impotence of Our c h a r a c t e r i s i n g t h e b r i c k ' s impact on the window as "The windowfs t o u c h i n g a red object" t h a t l e a d s us t o deny t he relevance of t h e b r i c k ' s redness t o i t s b r e a k i n g of t h e window. I n v i e w o f t h i s , t h e c o n t e x t s t h a t e x p r e s s r e l a t i o n s of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e a p p e a r t o be i n t e n s i o n a l , f o r c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e a t leas t r e q u i r e s b e i n g e x p l a n a t o r y and can t h u s be born o n l y by p a r t i c u l a r s under descriptions ( o r under t y p e s ) and not sirnply by p a r t i c u l a r s i n and of thernselvesA f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s from Robbrs a t ternpt t o account f o r Our i n c l i n a t i o n t o r e g a r d (ii) as be ing false. According t o him, w e are s o i n c l i n e d n o t because (ii) really is false but i n s t e a d because it p r a g m a t i c a l l y i m p l i e s a f a l sehood . Whereas ( i) irnpl ies t h e t r u t h t h a t weighing 165 pounds i s s u f f i c i e n t t o t i p t h e scales, (ii) irnpl ies t h e f a l sehood t h a t weighing less t h a n 1 8 0 pounds is also s u f f i c i e n t t o y i e l d t h i s effect. More accurately, it implies that having a weighing-less-than-180-pounds t r o p e is s u f f i c i e n t t o t i p t h e s ~ a l e s . ~ ~ ~ I t i s u n c l e a r , though, how (ii) can irnply any such p e r f e c t l y g e n e r a l clairn, a d a i m abou t t h e b e h a v i o u r o f other t r o p e s of t h a t t y p e , if t h e scope of i ts ". , . i n v i r t u e of . , ." c l a u s e r e a l l y i s l i m i t e d t o o n e p a r t i c u l a r token (the one t h a t is i d e n t i c a l w i t h my we igh ing 165 p o u n d s ) . This i s because an e x p l a n a t i o n 15" Robb, "The Properties of Mental Causation," 193. that just appeals to some particular thing in itself (without the manner of the thing's description figuring crucially in the explanation) implies no claims about the behaviour of anything other than that very particular. If 1 Say, "He did it because of Carol," 1 say nothing about what people other than Carol rnight have caused hirn to do. If there is any implication at al1 (even a pragmatic one) about what others might cause him to do, it must De by way of some other explanation of the same effect that does not simply appeal to a particular (in this case, Carol) . For exzrnple, it must be by w a y of the claim that he did it because of Carol's intelligence, or because of her sadness, or whatever. And Carol's sadness in turn implies nothing about what other states of minci might have led him to do if it is considered solely as a particular trope, as a token belonging to disparate physical and mental types, and not in terms of its being a token of sadness, of that type. 1 take this to be true of explanations generally: without the requisite generality, they carry no implication about the causal propensities of other things. If this is true, then Robb's account of our inclination to regard (ii) as being false is inconsistent with (ii)'s alleged ascription of causal relevance to a particular trope instead of to a type. For if the only point of (ii) is to ascribe causal r e l e v a n c e t o a t r o p e (and not t o a t r o p e under a d e s c r i p t i o n ) , t h e n it is hard t o see how (ii) c o u l d even pragrna t i ca l ly imply any th ing about t h e behaviour o f o t h e r t r o p e s ( i n c l u d i n g o the r weighing-1 ess-than-280-pounds t r o p e s ) , unless a t some p o i n t w e m a k e a c l a i m a b o u t the behaviour o f t h e t r o p e qua i t s be ing a t rope of t h e p r o p e r t y of weighing less than 180 pounds, But t h i s is p r e c i s e l y t h e s o r t of d a i m t h a t Robb w i l l no t al low. The f o r e g o i n g arguments a g a i n s t t h e a s c r i p t i o n of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t o t r o p e s o r o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r s s h a r e t h i s gu id ing i n s i g h t : r e l e v a n c e i s a denizen o f l o g i c a l space . J u s t as things c a n n o t e n t a i 1 o r be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o t h e r th ings , li k e w i s e p a r t i c u l a r s i n themsel ves cannot be r e l e v a n t o r i r r e l e v a n t t o o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r s . T h e i r r e l e v a n c e i s e n t i r e l y a m a t t e r of how t h e y are d e s c r i b e d . B y c o n t r a s t , Robb rega rds t r o p e s as being c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t independen t ly o f how t h e y a r e c h a r a c t e r i s e d . For h i m , a t r o p e i s n o t r e l e v a n t qua be ing a t r o p e of t h e type "weighing m o r e t h a n 120 pounds" o r qua b e i n g a t r o p e of t h e t y p e "weighing l e s t h a n 180 pounds". A s he says , 'Tropes a r e not r e l e v a n t qua t h i s o r t h a t , t h e y are c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t ( o r n o t ) , p e r i o d . B u t no thing i s j u s t " r e l e v a n t , pe r iod , " for r e l evance i s i n h e r e n t l y quasa l : o n l y t h i n g s under d e s c r i p t i o n s can p r o p e r l y be said t o be r e l e v a n t ( o r n o t ) . 15' Robb, "The Prope r t i e s of Mental Causation," 191. VIZI. The Moral of the Stozy One l e s s o n tha t can be drawn f rom a l1 of t h i s i s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i s a n u n s t a b l e compound t h a t p l a c e s compet ing a n d i r r e c o n c i l a b l e demands o n i ts bearers. On t h e one hand, t h e Macdonalds a n d H e i l are o n t 0 someth ing : c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i s s u p p o s e d t o be ( a t least i n p a r t ) e f f icacy; t o be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t is t o be e f f i c a c i o u s . However, as t h e y r i g h t l y p o i n t o u t , abstracta a n d i n t e n s i o n a l i t e m s ( e . g . , manners o f d e s c r i p t i o n ) s i m p l y c a n n o t f u l f i l t h i s requirement f o r b e i n g c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t . These i t e m s are j u s t n o t t he r i g h t s o r t s o f t h i n g t o cause a n y t h i n g t o happen; t h e y are n o t p a r t of t h e c a u s a l f l u x , a n d hence are n o t g e n u i n e l y e f f i c a c i o u s w i t h r e s p e c t t o a n y t h i n g . C o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s , s u c h as m e n t a l o r p h y s i c a l t o k e n s , c an make t h i n g s happen . Abstract o b j e c t s and modes of p r e s e n t a t i o n c a n n o t . On the o t h e r hand, exarnples l i k e t h e o n e i n v o l v i n g t h e red b r i c k (where it seems t h a t t h e b r i c k ' s r e d n e s s is c a u s a l l y i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e window's b r e a k i n g ) seem t o i l l u s t r a t e a d i f f e r e n t r e q u i r e m e n t on c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , narnely, t h a t c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i s a s p e c i e s o f e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e , so t h a t t o b e c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t i s t o be e x p l a n a t o r y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e o n l y t h i n g s t h a t can meet t h i s dernand are p r e c i s e l y t h e o n e s t h a t c a n n o t f u l f i l t h e first requi rement , t o w i t , i n t e n s i o n a l i t ems- th ings under d e s c r i p t i o n s ; f o r c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s are n e v e r j ust " r e l e v a n t period" b u t can i n s t e a d only be r e l e v a n t u n d e r a n a s p e c t . (Yablovs counterexample i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s same p o i n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o f i n e g r a i n e d particulars s u c h as t r o p e s and p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s - ) Has t h e f irst requi re rnent ( t h e requi rement of e f f i c a c y ) been m i s i n t e r p r e t e d ? After a l l , it i s n o t c l e a r t h a t when w e Say t h a t a p r o p e r t y is c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t w e are t h e r e b y comrnitted t o t h e c l a i m t h a t it a c t u a l l y caused a n y t h i n g ; w e may i n s t e a d o n l y be c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n i s t h a t i n virtue of which t h e c a u s e caused w h a t e v e r i t caused . R e g r e t t a b l y , though, t h i s u s e o f t h e p h r a s e , " t h a t i n v i r t u e of which", m e r e l y r e c a p i t u l a t e s t h e dilemma. For e i t h e r t h i s p h r a s e means something l i k e the active ingredient, the vi t a 1 component that gave rise t o the effect, o r it means t he crucial aspect that a c c o u n t s for why the effect happened. O n t h e f i r s t r e a d i n g , ' t h a t i n v i r t u e of which" picks o u t a f i n e g r a i n e d cause , w h i l e , on the second r ead ing , t o be tha t i n virtue o f which t h e c a u s e produced i t s effect j u s t is t o be e x p l a n a t o r y o f tha t effect. Yablo's counterexarnple shows t h a t t h e t h i n g s t ha t are p icked o u t by " t h a t i n v i r t u e o f which" on i t s f irst i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( v i z . , t r o p e s o r p r o p e r t y i n s t a n c e s ) c a n be cited i n u n e x p l a n a t o r y ways, and t h u s are n o t t h e i t e m s t h a t t h e p h r a s e p i c k s o u t when it is read i n t h e s e c o n d way. T h i s i s j u s t what o n e would expect, s i n c e t h e f o r m e r e n t i t i e s are p a r t i c u l a r s ( c a u s e s ) w h i l e t h e l a t t e r ones are i n t e n s i o n a l i t e m s (ways of c h a r a c t e r i s i n g c a u s e s t h a t e x p l a i n why t h e i r effects ensued ) Hence, e v e n when i n t e r p r e t e d b y means o f t h e phrase " t h a t i n v i r t u e of which", c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t u r n s o u t t o be a n u n s a t i s f i a b l e concep t : n o t h i n g c o u l d p o s s i b l y m e e t t h e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e demands t h a t it e n c a p s u l a t e s , f o r n o t h i n g c o u l d be both a p a r t i c u l a r t h rowing i t s weigh t a r o u n d i n t h e c a u s a l f l u x and a n e s s e n t i a l l y e x p l a n a t o r y way o f c h a r a c t e r i s i n g t h e c a u s e . It must be conc luded t h a t t h e v e r y n o t i o n o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i s a n u n s t a b l e compound t h a t r u n s t o g e t h e r e l e m e n t s of t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n of c a u s a t i o n w i t h t h e p r a g m a t i c o r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n o t i o n of e x p l a n a t i o n . Under c l o s e r s c r u t i n y , t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h i s m i x t u r e i n e v i t a b l y s e p a r a t e o u t i n such a w a y t h a t t h o s e who w i s h t o r e t a i n t h i s concep t are tugged i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s , s p e a k i n g now of p a r t i c u l a r s c a u s i n g t h i n g s t o happen and now of p r o p o s i t i o n a l i t e m s e x p l a i n i n g o n e a n o t h e r , u n d e r t h e p r e t e n c e t h a t t h e y are i n fact t a l k i n g a b o u t j u s t one r e l a t i o n ( " c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e " ) whose re la ta a re a t once c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s and p r o p o s i t i o n a l e n t i t i e s . It may be t hough t t h a t t h i s is t o o hasty. S u r e l y , one may o b j e c t , t h e o n l y l e s s o n t o be drawn a t t h i s p o i n t i s t h a t c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e , wha teve r it is, i s n o t a r e l a t i o n between p a r t i c u l a r s ; it may ye t t u r n o u t t o be a me taphys i ca l r e l a t i o n between t h e redlist's p r o p e r t i e s T h i s seems u n l i k e l y , though, f o r much t h e sarne r e a s o n as w a s g i v e n ear ly i n t h e p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n : t o c o n c e i v e of causal r e l e v a n c e as b e i n g any t y p e of me taphys i ca l r e l a t i o n is t o sever t h e link between causal r e l e v a n c e and e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e r e b y r e n d e r i n g t h e f o r m e r n o t i o n devoid o f c o n t e n t A f t e r a l l , each of t h e real ist 's p r o p e r t i e s iç i tself s u s c e p t i b l e of more t h a n one d e s c r i p t i o n , and n o t a l 1 of t h e s e d e s c r i p t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i s e t h e p r o p e r t y i n such a way as t o p r o v i d e in fo rma t ion a b o u t why t h e effect i n q u e s t i o n occu r red . L i k e Robbr s t r o p e s , t h e n , any such p r o p e r t y can be p i c k e d out i n unexp lana to ry ways. T h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t t h e realist 's p r o p e r t i e s are n o t t h e b e a r e r s of c a u s a l r e l evance , f o r something i s c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t o n l y i f it i s e ~ p l a n a t o r y . " ~ T h e p o i n t is n o t s imp ly t h a t a b e a r e r o f c a u s a l r e l evance must be e x p l a n a t o r y under some description o r o t h e r . Ra ther , t h e p o i n t i s t h e s t r o n g e r c l a i m t h a t a b e a r e r of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e must b e e x p l a n a t o r y f u l l s t o p , lS2 In Chapter 2, sec . III (the "flagging" s e c t i o n ) , 1 s a i d t h a t something can be explanatory wi thout having the s o r t of re levance t h a t w e regard mental prope r t i e s as having. Here 1 wish only t o deny t h e converse: it is no t t h e case t h a t something can have that s o r t o f relevance without being explanatory. such t h a t m e r e l y t o c i te it i s t h e r e b y t o e x p l a i n . Of c o u r s e , t h i s assimilates it t o t h e manner i n which t h e c a u s e is cited, which, a g a i n , is t o r e n d e r it a n intensional i t e m . T h i s p u t s c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e c l e a r l y i n t o t h e f i e l d o f ep i s t emology a n d p r a g m a t i c s . I t i s i n no s e n s e a m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n . One migh t remain unconvinced. A f t e r a l l , a c r i t i c may a s k , why n o t simpfy a l l o w tha t when 1 Say, " H e opened t h e f r i d g e i n v i r t u e o f hav ing t h e p r o p e r t y ment ioned on p a g e f i v e , " 1 a m i n fac t c i t i n g a c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t y , b u t i n a way t h a t i s n o t e x p l a n a t o r y ? Why n o t j u s t a l l o w t h a t someth ing c a n be c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t w i t h o u t t h i s g u a r a n t e e i n g t h a t t h e mere c i t a t i o n o f it w i l l a lways b e e x p l a n a t o r y ? The s h o r t answer i s tha t i f t h i s i s s o , t h e n c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e g e t s u s no f u r t h e r than c a u s a t i o n , f o r t h e s e are j u s t t h e s o r t s o f claims t h a t Davidson makes abou t c a u s a t i o n ( v i z . , t h a t someth ing c a n be a cause w i t h o u t t h e m e r e c i t a t i o n o f it b e i n g e x p l a n a t o r y ) . The whole p o i n t of i n t r o d u c i n g t h e n o t i o n of c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e was t o do j u s t i c e t o t h e f e e l i n g t h a t o n l y some ways of r e f e r r i n g t o t h e c a u s e are e x p l a n a t o r y . So if i t t u r n s o u t t h a t o n l y some ways of r e f e r r i n g t o a c a u s a l l y r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t y are e x p l a n a t o r y , have w e made any p r o g r e s s by i n t r o d u c i n g t h i s n o t i o n ? If one r e p l i e s t h a t t h e mere p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e f e r r i n g t o c a u s a l l y relevant properties in unexplanatory ways is not a genuine problem that'should compel us to seek a remedy, then why not simply agree with Davidson when he says much the sarne thing about the possibility of referring to causes in unexplanatory ways? Perhaps we should simply have heeded his advice and refrained from the quest for a remedy which led us to posit relations of causal relevance in the first place. Or, at least, if we do see a legitimate role for talk of causal relevance, then it must be as talk about an epistemological or pragmatic relation rather than a metaphysical relation between things in the world (whether they be tropes or properties). In short, then, whatever causal relevance turns out to ber the rnanner of description is decisive for its obtaining between any two relata. This was just the lesson of the previous section, namely, that causal relevance can only obtain between things under descriptions, not between things in themselves. If we knew thoroughly the nervous system of Shakespeare . , . we should be able to show why . . . his hand came to trace on certain sheets of paper those crabbed little black marks which we . . , cal1 the manuscript of H a n l e t . We should understand the rationale of every erasure and alteration therein . . . witnout in the slightest degree acknowledging the existence of the thoughts in Shakespeare's mind. The words and sentences would be taken, not as signs of anything beyond themselves, but as little outward facts, pure and simple. William ame es"' What is left entirely unexplained is j u s t the play of Hamlet, as such. The play, as such, is not merely the material thing which we describe as constituted by certain black marks on certain sheets of paper. It is rather the meaning of these marks and of their arrangement. . . The only possible explanation is that the thought and will of Shakespeare expressed themselves in and through the written characters. G.F. tout'^' What I called jottings would not be a renderi of the text, not sa to speak a translation with another symbolism. The text would not be stored up in the jottings. And why should it be stored up in our nervous system? 1. Beyond The Woxld of L i t t l e O u t w a s d Facts The above quotations of James and Stout represent one of the most sopular, and venerable, ways in which to account for the explanatory r o l e of appeais to mental states. This strategy had its inception in the parallelism of Leibniz and various Cartesian philosophers, who were g r a p p l i n g w i t h t h e apparent idleness of rnind i n a world i n which al1 motions were to be explained in mechanical terms only. Their 153 James, The Principles of Psychology, 1:132. 3' G.F. Stout, A Manual of Psychology (London: W.B. Clive, 18991, 99100 . 15' Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscorube and G,H. von Wright, trans, G.E.M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California, 1967) 612. solution was to posit two synchronised, but independent, causal chains, one mental, the other mechanical: never the twain shall meet, but always shall agree. This view, though it may seern a desperate expedient, prescinds frorn the perhaps equally desperate postulation of physical gaps that are plugged by mental forces. James and Stout offer their own brand of parallelism, according to w l r i c h what stands outside of, and parallel to, the physical world are meanings. Moreover, meaning-bearers, insofar as they are meaningful, are not arnenable to a merely 4 physical explanation. Thus, Hamlet, the play as such, cannot be explained simply by reference to the workings of Shakespeare3 physiology. Al1 that we can thereby explain are "those crabbed little black marks" on the paper, taken as purely physical markings ("little outward facts") rather than as meaningful expressions. Moreover, al1 human behaviour has this double aspect, whereby it can be regarded either as mere bodily motion or as meaning-saturated action, susceptible of being interpreted in a variety of ways. Of course, this bifurcation between meaningful and meaningless aspects pertains to the explanans as well as the explanandum. If the meanings of Hamlet are not "stored up" (to use Wittgenstein's phrase) in the little black marks on the paper, neither are they to be found in the little grey m a r k s i n t h e b r a i n . T h e p a r a l l e l i s m is complete: on one side w e h a v e phys io logy and t h e m e r e b o d i l y mot ions t h a t it can be called upon t o e x p l a i n , w h i l e on t h e o t h e r s ide w e have S h a k e s p e a r e r s mean ingfu l " thought a n d w i l l " (as S t o u t s a y s ) , which i s not s t o r e d up i n h i s phys io logy , md which a l o n e c a n e x p l a i n h i s a c t i o n s . The c e n t r a l claim i n this view is t h a t o u r a c t i o n s are i n d i v i d u a t e d e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e rms o f t h e i s meanings, and t h a t , as such, t h e y are w h o l l y a b s e n t from the p h y s i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . They do n o t a p p e a r i n t h e world as d e s c r i b e d by t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , f o r t h e language of t h o s e s c i e n c e s i s s i m p l y n o t equipped t o register the p r e s e n c e o f i n t e n t i o n a l phenornena (qua i n t e n t i o n a l ) , i n c l u d i n g meaningful t h o u g h t s and a c t i o n s . T h i s h a s been a p r e v a l e n t therne th roughou t t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , One o f i t s more well-known e x p r e s s i o n s i n a n a l y t i c ph i losophy c a n be found i n Roderick Ch i sho lmfs a n d P e t e r Geachf s criticisms of b e h a v i o u r i ~ r n . ~ ~ ~ Chisholm and Geach argued t h a t t h e a t t e m p t by t h e b e h a v i o u r i s t t o a n a l y s e m e n t a l S t a t e s e x c l u s i v e l y i n terms of b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s founder s on t h e r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t the c o n d i t i o n a l s t h a t e x p r e s s t h e d i s p o s i t i o n s must , i f t h e y are t o be even p l a u s i b l e , make r e f e r e n c e i n t h e i r a n t e c e d e n t s t o . 'ô Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving ( I thaca , NY: Corne11 University Press, 19571; and Peter Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 8, menta l background c o n d i t i o n s . S i n c e t h e y t h u s always presuppose i n t e n t i o n a l l o c u t i o n s , t h e c o n d i t i o n a l s i n q u e s t i o n cannot provide a n e x h a u s t i v e a n a l y s i s o f a l 1 such language. The upshot is t h a t i f w e w e r e t o c o n f i n e o u r s e l v e s t o t h e b e h a v i o u r i s t f s language o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and m e r e b o d i l y motions (e-g., sound waves produced by t h e v i b r a t i o n o f t h e voca l c o r d s ) , t h e n t h e r e c o u l d be no hope of c a p t u r i n g t h e s e n s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l language. I n s h o r t , w i t h i n t h e b e h a v i o u r i s t f s p u r e l y physical p e r s p e c t i v e , menta l phenornena do not appear . A s i m i l a r c r i t i q u e of John Watson's behaviourism w a s o f f e r e d t h i r t y y e a r s e a r l i e r by t h e s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t , Will iam MãDougal l . '~ ' MacDougall ma in ta ined t h a t behaviourism i s s e l f d e f e a t i n g , s i n c e t h e v e r y d a t a t h a t it p u r p o r t s t o account f o r (viz., i n t e n t i o n a l behav iour ) cannot even be "desc r ibed i n t e l l i g i b l y and p r o f i t a b l y " i f w e restrict o u r s e l v e s t o t h e c a t e g o r i e s of t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s . According t o MacDougall, psychology, as one of t h e Geisteswissenschaften, is an autonomous s c i e n c e t h a t dep loys a conceptua l apparatus t h a t i s fundamenta l ly a l i e n t o t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s . 157 John B. Watson and William MacDougall, The Battle of B e h a v i o r i s m (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1929), 91-2. MacDougaU says that he earlier presented his criticism of behaviourism in William MacDougall, Presidential Address to the Psychological Section of the British Association, Toronto, 1924. I n f raming t h i s c r i t i q u e , MacDougall w a s i n f l u e n c e d by German s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s , such as Wilhelm D i l t h e y and Max Weber. For them, t h e d i s t i n c t i v e mark o f t h e human s c i e n c e s i s t h e i r concern w i t h rneaning. lS8 T h i s f i x a t i o n on meaning desives from t h e c e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e human s c i e n c e s of a c t i o n . "Action," a c c o r d i n g t o Weber, "is r a t i o n a l l y e v i d e n t c h i e f l y when w e a t t a i n a c o m p l e t e l y clear i n t e l l e c t u a l g r a s p o f t h e ac t ion -e l emen t s i n t h e i r i n t e n d e d c o n t e x t o f meaning . Act ions , t h a t is , c a n o n l y be i d e n t i f i e d by g r a s p i n g t h e i r meaningsFor example, when w e i d e n t i f y t h e man's s u p p o r t i n g the r i f l e a t s h o u l d e r l e n g t h as h i s aiming t h 2 r i f l e , w e e x p l o i t t h e same s o r t o f c a p a c i t y t h a t is a t w o r k when w e i d e n t i f y a facia l p a t t e r n a s an e x p r e s s i o n of anger.'60 I n bo th cases, w e e x h i b i t a " d i r e c t observat i o n a l unde r s t and ing o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e meaning o f a g iven a c t as such . "la Beyond t h i s , w e have a c a p a c i t y no t o n l y t o i d e n t i f y b u t a l s o t o e x p l a i n a c t i o n s i n t e rms of t h e i r '" 1 rely here on Max Weber's methodological essay, "Basic Sociological Terms," in Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, original translation by Talcott Parsons (1947) revised by Roth and Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 3-62; originally published in 1922; as well as on Martin Hollisfs summary, "Philosophy of Social Science, " in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, ed, Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 358-87 (at 368-70). Weber refers to neo-Kantians (Heinrich Rickert, Ferdinand Toennies and Georg Simmel) as precursors of his own view (Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms, " 3-4) . However, as Hollis notes (Hollis, "Philosophy of Social Science," 368), Dilthey himseff claimed to be following Hegel in expounding his views on the Geisteswissenschaften. lS9 Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms, " 5. ' ' O These examples are borrowed from Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms," 8. 16' Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms," 8. (Emphasis added) Weber adds that we make use of this same sort of understanding whenever we interpret verbal utterances. meanings. "This," says Weber, "is rational understanding of motivation, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning. "16' Weber briefly considers the possiblity that, "Future research may be able to discover non-interpretable [Le., non-intentional] uniformities underlying what has appeared to be specif ically meaningful action. However, this would not, in his view, undermine the social sciences. This is because, "The recognition of the causal significance of such factors would not in the least alter the specific task of . . . sociological analysis or , . . the other sciences of action, which is the interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning. Thus, the social sciences cannot be displaced by the physical sciences, since the former sciences invoke a unique Eorm of understanding that enables us to identify the intention and meaning behind the agent's behaviour. Without this kind of understanding, the agentf s behaviour can only be understood as mere behaviour, mere bodily motion. This is how the agent's behaviour appears through the lens of the physical sciences. In the human sciences, by contrast, we apply a new set of categories, 16' Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms, " 8. (Emphas is added) Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms, " 7-8. '64 Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms," 8. It is not clear why Weber continually incfudes the modifier "subjective", since he denies the existence of "an objectively 'correct' meaning or one which is ' t r u e ' in some metaphysical sense" (Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms," 4 ) . including the concepts of purpose and value, which enable us to see bodily motions as m e a n i n g f u l actions. Once aqain, then, our actions are said to be identifiable as actions only in terms of their meanings, and are thus held to be absent from the physical perspective. Moreover, actions, as explananda standing outside of the physical sciences, may plausibly be thought to have explanations that are themselves alien to those sciences. We thus have sorne real explanatory work that can be done by (in this case) the human sciences. This therne in the social sciences is, in some respects, very similar to t h e strategy adopted by James and Stout. In both cases, we start with a mental or social explanans that is individuated in terms of its meaning, and that thus becomes problematic. How can meanings explain, given that they have no legitimate place in the physical sciences? The solution is to distinguish between two kinds of explananda that are often run together in our talk about behaviour: there is mere bodily motion, which can be explained exclusively in physical terms; and there is action, which must be identified in terms of its meaning, and which thus also stands outside of physics, chernistry and biology. As such, actions become the proprietary concern of folk psychology and the hurnan sciences. II. Recent Applications of This Strategy Acceptance of this approach does not r e q u i r e some vague metaphysical notion of causal relevance, since al1 this talk about giving psychology some explanatory work to do can be cashed out exclusively in terms of explanatory relevance. This strategy also involves no commitrnent to dualism. James and Stout were in fact responding to old-fashioned epiphenomenalism, and may w e l l have assumed the dualisrn implicit in that doctrine. It should be clear, though, that a proponent of this sort of approach need not deny the identity of mental (i.e., meaning-bearing) and physical events, but may instead insist only on the irreducibility of properties concerning meaning to physical types. With these clarifications in minci, it is interesting to note that variants of James's strategy have recently been proffered in an attempt to delimit the manner in which mental facts explain. Ausonio Marras, for example, believes that mental features owe their explanatory power to the fact that, "Explanatory contexts . . . are nonextensional and con text-dependent . Whether something is a good explanation depends on how we type-identify both the cause and the event to be explained, and this in turn depends upon the context. To use Marrasr s example, rny getting a drink of 16' Ausonio Marras, "The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties," Philosophia 25 (1997) : 389-400 (at 397) . (Emphasis in the original) water may be identical with a sequence of bodily movements, but these aspects of my behaviour, "Though tokenable by the same event on a given occasion, are obviously distinct types of event, and cal1 for distinct explanations. "la For Marras, intentional explanations of behaviour simply do not cornpete with physical accounts of the same events, for although the same event figures in the explananda of these two explanations, it appears under different descriptions in each one. Thus, since "an event is an explanandum only as described, "16' the mental and physical explanations are explanations of different explananda. In this way, Marras believes, we can overcome worries about explanatory exclusion: as explananda that are couched in the language of folk psychology, actions are the exclusive preserve of intentional explanations. These explanations are the only ones available to us when the explanandum at issue is an action. They have no explanatory rivals. Lynne Rudder Baker suggests a sirnilar approach. She puts her case in terms of an example involving the collapse of a savings and loan institution. Suppose we identify the bad investment that prompted its collapse. Cal1 the rnicrophysical states that constitute the bad investment a U166 M a r r a s , 'The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties," 398. 167 Marras, "The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties," 398. (Emphasis in the original) Ise Lynne Rudder B a k e r , Explaining Attitudes ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambridge University Press, l995), 134-5, and 148-50. s ta te . Baker rejects the claim that the explanations of the bank failure respectively in terms of the bad investment and in terms of the U-state are in competition with one another, and that the latter explanation displaces or invalidates the former one in the way that explanations that appeal to oxygen came to replace explanations that appeal to phlogiston. According to Baker, the explanations appealing to phlogiston and oxygen are in competition with each other because they "share a single e~planandum."~~~ By contrast, "The U-state explanation and the investment explanation explain different thingsrr;'70 for the U-state explanation at best only explains the microphysical phenomena that constitute the bank failure, whereas "the investment explanation explains the bank failure as a bank failure. "17' Like Marras, then, Baker maintains that when the event to be explained is characterised in intentional tems, only an intentional explanans can meet Our explanatory needs.17* Also like Marras, s h e stresses considerations having to do with how we count explananda. Given the nonextensionality of explanation, it is just not true that explanations of the same event will always share the same explanandm and thus 16' Baker, Explaining Attitudes, 134. Baker, Explaining Attitudes, 134-5. 17' Baker, Explaining Attitudes, 135. (Emphasis in the original) "' Baker is clear about the intectional nature of the explanation of the bankruptcy. She says, "Nothing is a bankruptcy or an investment in a world without complex economic practices, practices that could not exist in a world without attitudes" (Baker, Explaining Attitudes, 128) . be i n co rnpe t i t i on w i t h each o t h e r . Hence, w e can affirm the i d e n t i t y o f e a c h a c t i o n w i t h a p h y s i c a l t o k e n and s t i l l i n s i s t t h a t a c t i o n s as such remain t h e e x c l u s i v e p r o p r i e t a r y c o n c e r n of i n t e n t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s , a n d are n o t e x p l a i n e d by t h e p h y s i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e p h y s i c a l l y described t o k e n s w i th which t h e y are i d e n t i c a l . J e n n i f e r Hornsby i s a t h i r d r e c e n t p roponent of J ames ' s ~ t r a t e g y . ' ~ ~ Hornsby d e n i e s t h a t a c t i o n s are accessible f rom t h e impe r sona l p o i n t of v i e w , and t a k e s t h i s t o show t h a t t h e y cannot be e x p l a i n e d by b e i n g located i n t h e l a w - gove rned wor ld of t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s . For h e r , a n a c t i o n c a n o n l y be e x p l a i n e d b y c i t i n g t h e a g e n t ' s r e a s o n s f o r so a c t i n g . III. Monism Preserved Unl ike Marras a n d B a k e r , Hornsby d e n i e s t h a t a c t i o n s , and t h e r e a s o n s t h a t e x p l a i n them, are i d e n t i c a l w i t h p h y s i c a l t ~ k e n s . ' ~ ~ She t a k e s Davidson t o t a s k f o r h i s monism, imply ing t h a t t o be a rnonist a t a l 1 (even a n anomalous m o n i s t ) is t h e r e b y " t o v iew t h e m e n t a l i r n p e r ~ o n a l l ~ " ' ~ ~ and t o r e n d e r a c t i o n s "accessible f rom t h e impe r sona l p o i n t o f viê.""^ T h i s , however, is n o t a f a i r c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f anomalous monism, and i n v o l v e s a n l i 3 Jennifer Hornsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation," in M e n t a l Causation, ed. Heil and Mele, 161-88. 1 7 4 Hornsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation, " 169-74. 175 Hornsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation, " 171. 17' Homsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation, " 169. e x p l o i t a t i o n of a n ambigui ty i n t h e phrase , " t h e presence of a c t i o n s t o a n impersonal p o i n t o f view.""' Hornsby reads t h i s e x p r e s s i o n de re, such t h a t a c t i o n s are said t o be present t o t h e impersonal p o i n t o f view a s l o n g as t h e y are i d e n t i c a l w i t n i t e m s t h a t can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d i n any terms whatever ( e .g . , i n p u r e l y p h y s i c a l t e rms) w i t h i n the impersonal p e r s p e c t i v e . On t h i s r ead ing , Davidson af f i r m s , and Hornsby d e n i e s , t h a t a c t i o n s are p r e s e n t t o t h e impersonal p o i n t o f v i e w . However, a Davidsonian can s t i l l deny t h a t a c t i o n s a r e r e c o g n i s a b l e a s actions w i t h i n t h e impersonal p e r s p e c t i v e . T h i s approach a l lows f o r t h e i d e n t i t y of a c t i o n s w i t h p h y s i c a l tokens , b u t ernphasises t h a t those t o k e n s on ly count as a c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e h o l i s t i c and normative d i s c o u r s e o f folk psychology. They do not r e g i s t e r a s a c t i o n s from t h e impersonal p o i n t o f view, w i t h i n t h e d i s c o u r s e of t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s . I n t h i s sense , Davidson can r e t a i n h i s monisrn whi le denying t h a t he t h e r e b y views t h e mental impersonal ly , o r m a k e s a c t i o n s a c c e s s i b l e from t h e impersonal p o i n t o f view, A s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s p o i n t , c o n s i d e r what would be involved i n rna in ta in ing t h a t a c t i o n s are a c c e s s i b l e from t h e impersonal p e r s p e c t i v e , i n t h e s t r o n g s e n s e of being recogn i sab le as a c t i o n s from t h a t vantage p o i n t . This v e r y c l a i m i s made by t h o s e who a r e e x e r c i s e d by a p u t a t i v e Hornsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation, " 169. problem i n o u r c o n c e p t i o n of agency . The problem was c l e a r l y articulated by Thomas Nage1.l7* I t i n v o l v e s a n a p p a r e n t d i s s o l u t i o n o f agency when t h e a g e n t a n d h e r actions are viewed "from an objective o r e x t e r n a l ~ t a n d p o i n t . " " ~ Accord ing t o Nagel, when a c t i o n i s t h u s viewed, Some of i t s mos t i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s seem t o v a n i s h u n d e r t h e o b j e c t i v e gaze. Actions seem no l o n g e r a s s i g n a b l e t o i n d i v i d u a l agents as s o u r c e s , b u t become i n s t e a d components of t h e f l u x o f e v e n t s i n t h e world. o f which t h e agent i s a p a r t . 180 On t h i s model, a c t i o n s a re t h o u g h t t o be d i s c e r n i b l e as a c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e objective v i e w p o i n t . The a g e n t as a s o u r c e o f a c t i o n fades from view, b u t h e r a c t i o n s r e m a i n . They are j u s t there, happenicg r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g done by someone. They are thus h e l d t o be i d e n t i f i a b l e as a c t i o n s w i t h o u t there b e i n g any i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a n a g e n t whose a c t i o n s t h e y a r e . homa mas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 110-20. "' Nagel, The View Prom Nowhere, 110. le* Nagel/ The View From Nowhere, 110. Similar thoughts may be at work in Ludwig Wittgenstein, hil los op hic al Investigations (Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell, 1953), sections 611-632 (esp. at 611 and 620). Interestingly, section 611 contains an allusion to Schopenhauer. According to Christopher Janaway, Schopenhauer, like Nagel, was perplexed by this juxtaposition of rny action as something that 1 do with my action as an event that merely happens or occurs (Christopher Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19891, 246-7) . Schopenhauer expounded a dual-aspect position, in which the subjective view of the mind (for which ~consciousness" is fundamental) is contrasted with the objective view that is offered by the empirical sciences (chiefly zoology and physiology). In his words, "On the purely objective path, w e never attain to the inner nature of things, but if we attempt to f ind their inner nature from outside and empirically, this inner always becomes an outer in our hands" (Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as W i l l and Representation, trans . E . F. J. Payne [New York: Dover, 19691, 2: 273-4) . (Second emphasis added) It is t h i s assumpt ion ( t h a t t h e r e c a n be r e c o g n i t i o n o f a n a c t i o n a n t e c o d e n t l y t o t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a n a g e n t ) t h a t g e n e r a t e s t h e problem c o n s i d e r e d by Nagel, and t h a t Hornsby wishes t o reject. According t o her, "See ing someth ing as an a c t i o n r e q u i r e s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a person."181 Moreover, a person i s a " c a u s a l l y complex ~ h o l e " ~ * ~ t h a t e x h i b i t s a r a t i o n a l p a t t e r n by conforming t o c e r t a i n norms o f c o n s i s t e n c y and cohe rence . I t is o n l y by v i r t u e of t h i s approx ima t ion t o a n ideal o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t t h e behav iour of t h e c a u s a l l y complex sys t em c a n b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r m s of such c o n c e p t s as belief, desire, i n t e n t i o n and action. Thus, w i t h o u t t h e backdrop of a complex system conforming ( a t least r o u g h l y ) t o t h e i d e a l o f r a t i o n a l i t y , t h a t is , wi thout a pe r son , t h e c o n c e p t of action s imply has no a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s i s , of c o u r s e , j u s t what a Davidsonian would S a y , and i n s a y i n g it, h e would side w i t h Hornsby, a g a i n s t Nagel, i n c l a i m i n g t h a t a c t i o n s do not appear i n t h e sub-persona1 framework. I n s a y i n g t h i s , h e means tha t n o t h i n g coun t s as a n a c t i o n , o r a belief, o r a desire, a n t e c e d e n t l y t o o u r a t t a i n r n e n t of t h e pe r sona1 l e v e l , a t which t h e norms of r a t i o n a l i t y apply . A t h i n g o n l y takes on any o f t h e s e d e s i g n a t i o n s i n s o f a r as it c o h e r e s w i t h t h e no rma t ive and '" Hornsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation," 174. l e z Hornsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation, , 1 7 2 . holistic network of intentional states that the agent is interpreted as having. And if it fits into that web, then it is identifiable as that agent's action, and not as some state that can somehow (like the srnile of the Cheshire cat) float free of the agent whose action it is while remaining recognisable as that action. Davidsonians and Hornsby agree on this much. Their disagreement arises £rom Davidsonrs monistic claim that actions, like beliefs and desires, are events or processes that fa11 under physical as well as psychologicaf descriptions. Moreover, of al1 the considerations that Hornsby adduces to establish the absence of actions from the impersonal viewpoint, only one militates against this monistic claim.la3 She asks us to consider al1 of the events that appear in the impersonal view and that are likely to be thought of as antecedents, parts or consequences of the action. T h e s e will include "a whole collection of events leading from some happening in the depth of Peterfs brain al1 the way to an event beyond his body in which his desirer s be ing satisf ied consists. "184 According to Hornsby, it is impossible to delimit precisely the actionf s boundaries in terms of these events. There is simply no way in which to specify exhaustively which of these events the la' H ~ r n s b y ~ "Agency and Causal Explanation," 174-5. la' Hornsby, "Agency and Causal Explanation, " 174. a c t i o n c o n s i s t s o f . From t h i s she c o n c l u d e s that t h e a c t i o n i tself is a b s e n t f rom t he i m p e r s o n a l v i e w p o i n t , i n the s t r o n g s e n s e o f n o t b e i n g i d e n t i f i a b l e i n a n y t e r m s w h a t e v e r ( n o t n e c e s s a r i l y as a n a c t i o n ) f r o m t h a t p e r s p e c t i v e . The series of events i n i t i a t e d w i t h i n P e t e r r s b r a i n a n d emana t ing o u t w a r d s f r o m h i s b o d i l y movernents i n h a b i t "an impe r sona i p o i n t o f v i e w , f rom which it is i m p o s s i b l e t o i o c a t e actions, ' r '85 T h i s s t r o n g c o n c l u s i o n does n o t fo l low f rom H o r n s b y f s argument . G r a n t e d , a c t i o n s have fuzzy b o u n d a r i e s , b u t t h e n so t o o do r i o t s and s t o r m s . These latter h a v e t h e i r p l a c e i n t h e i m p e r s o n a l view, e v e n though t h e y t o o l a c k p r e c i s e s p a t i a l and t e m p o r a l b o u n d a r i e s . More g e n e r a l l y , t h e f u z z i n e s s o f mac ro -phys i ca l e n t i t i e s d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e t h e i r b e i n g p h y s i c a l and t h u s p r e s e n t t o t h e i m p e r s o n a l view. Moreover, Hornsby h e r s e l f directs o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i r npe r sona l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n ( w i t h which a c t i o n s a l l e g e d l y cannot be i d e n t i f i e d ) by a s k i n g u s t o c o n s i d e r b o t h t h e e v e n t s "which t h e a c t i o n caused"le6 and t h e " c a u s a l antecedents"18' o f t h e a c t i o n . T h i s s u g g e s t s , t hough , t h a t we have a l r e a d y l o c a t e d t h e a c t i o n i n t h e impe r sona l m a t r i x i n which t h e s e e v e n t s are p r e c i p i t a t e d . A f t e r a l l , it i s h a r d t o see what o u r t a l k o f " l o c a t i n g g f some th ing i n t h e le5 Hornsby, 'Agency and C a u s a l Explanation," 175. Hornsby, "Agency and C a u s a l Explanation, " 174. i87 Hornsby, "Agency and C a u s a l Explanation," 1 7 4 . impersonal v i e w can amount t o u n l e s s it j u s t means f i n d i n g a p l a c e f o r it on one s t r e t c h o f t h e impersona l c a u s a l c h a i n , such t h a t it can be p i c k e d o u t by r e f e r r i n g t o causal a n t e c e d e n t s and outcomes that are i d e n t i f i a b l e on t h a t cha in . W . Anomalous Monism and the Jamesian Strategy To reiterate, a p a r t f r o m t h i s d i f f e r e n c e between Davidson and Hornsby, Davidsonians s h o u l d f i n d Hornsbyfs ou t look t o be q u i t e c o n g e n i a l t o t h e i r own. They can a g r e e t h a t a c t i o n s are n o t i d e n t i f i a b l e as a c t i o n s u n t i l w e r e a c h t h e pe r sona1 l e v e l . They c a n a l s o a g r e e t h a t t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , a d d r e s s i n g as t h e y do o n l y t h e sub-persona1 l e v e l s , s imply do n o t conce rn themselves w i t h t h e explananda t h a t occupy u s when w e set o u t t o e x p l a i n a c t i o n s . These s c i e n c e s a t b e s t o n l y e x p l a i n t h e e v e n t s and p r o c e s s e s , which are t h e a c t i o n s , under sub-persona1 ( v i z . , p h y s i c a l ) d e s c r i p t i o n s . To do s o is n o t t o e x p l a i n them a s actions, and i s t h u s t o leave a s i d e the explananda which are t h e focus o f f o l k psychology. I n t h i s way, anomalous monism might s e e m t o be the n a t u r a l h e i r t o t h e s t r a t e g y a r t i c u l a t e d by James and Stout. Read i n this way, the t h e o r y a s s i g n s a n e x p l a n a t o r y r o l e t o i n t e n t i o n a l f e a t u r e s by dernarca t ing a r a n g e of i n t e n t i o n a l explananda, actions, t h a t o n l y r e a s o n s can e x p l a i n . However, t h e r e are two reasons why Davidsonians should eschew t h i s s t r a t e g y . F i r s t , t h e Jarnesian s t r a t e g y concedes t oo much t o t h e epiphenomenalis t . There is a whole range of explananda t h a t w e t y p i c a l l y expla in i n mental terms but t h a t Hornsby, Baker and Marras represen t as being beyond t h e pa le , exp la inab le i n t h e terms o f t h e p h y s i c a l s c i ences only. For example, i f 1 open t h e r e f r i g e r a t o r t o ge t a Coke, t h e r e f r i g e r a t o r door w i l l be open, t h e con ten t s of t h e pop b o t t l e w i l l have been diminished, and the b o t t l e w i l l occupy a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n on t h e r e f r i g e r a t o r shelf a s a r e s u l t of my a c t i o n . While t h e a c t i o n may not i t s e l f be desc r ibab le a s a n a c t i o n wi thin t h e terms of t h e phys ica l sc iences , it seems t h a t each of t h e s e explananda can be captured i n t hose terms, Moreover, t h e s e p h y s i c a l l y cha rac t e r i s ed explananda a r e outcornes of my a c t i o n , and can be exp la ined a s such. Why does t h e b o t t l e now occupy t h i s p o s i t i o n in s t ead of t h e one i t had ten minutes ago? It would s e e m to be a p e r f e c t l y satisfactory answer t o Say t h a t a f t e r 1 poured myself a d r ink , 1 left the b o t t l e t h e r e . I n sho r t , a c t i o n leaves i t s mark on the world, and t h i s r e m a i n s t r u e when t h e world of which w e are speaking i s t h e world o f " l i t t l e outward fac t s" . Our conception of agency derives i n l a r g e measure from t h i s c a p a c i t y o f our ac t ions t o r eve rbe ra t e through t h e subp e r s o n a 1 levels of d e s c r i p t i o n and to r e s h a p e t h e wor ld as described i n t h o s e t e rms . T h i s much of our agency i s n o t protected by t h e James ian s t r a t e g y . T h e second r e a s o n f o r r e j e c t i n g t h e Jamesian s t r a t e g y i s t h a t it b e l i e s a n a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e p i c t u r e t h a t g i v e s rise t o w o r r i e s abou t " e x p l a n a t o r y exc lus ion" , I n s e e k i n g t o demarcate some domain o f explananda which c a n t h e n b e h e l d o u t as t h e e x c l u s i v e p r o p r i e t a r y conce rn o f i n t e n t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s , w e are a l r e a d y s u b s c r i b i n g t o t h e v i e w t h a t i n o r d e r f o r p r o p e r t i e s t o be e x p l a n a t o r i l y r e l e v a n t , t h e y must s t a k e a claim t o some r a n g e of explananda which t h e y a l o n e c a n e x p l a i n , Here, e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e conce ived as r ivals, c o n t e n d i n g w i t h e a c h o t h e r f o r t h e r i g h t s t o any g i v e n explanandum. They must s o contend , it is t hough t , b e c a u s e a n y e x p l a n a t i o n o f e x p l a n a n d m E e x c l u d e s a l 1 o t h e r s ; i f a n e x p l a n a n s couched i n t h e l anguage o f t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s h a s already explained E, t h e n i n t e n t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s must "shove off" ( s o t o s p e a k ) a n d f i n d some o t h e r f a c t t o e x p l a i n . If w e a c c e p t t h i s p i c t u r e , t h e n it makes s e n s e t o s tar t l o o k i n g f o r some g r o u p o f explananda t h a t e l u d e t h e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , and for t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of which i n t e n t i o n a l S t a t e s t h u s face no p l a u s i b l e r iva l s . We can s t a r t t o undermine t h e v i e w t h a t e x p l a n a t i o n s compete a g a i n s t each o t h e r b y n o t i n g f i r s t that it c a n ga in no support f rom worries about overdetemination. Overdetermination is only ob jectionable when it requires ontological profligacy, and it is only implicated in such excess when it is overdeterminatiorr by causes, rather than merely by the descriptions under which the causes fall. Only this latter kind of overdetermination is at issue in the present context, for here we are only considering explanational (as opposed to causal) overdetermination, that is, the possibility that multiple properties of the cause are explanatorily relevant to the effect, and not that a plurality of things (e.g., tropes or some other kind of cause) are present and acting to bring about the effect. In short, there is no violation of Ockhamf s razor, for we are not multiplying entities but only the properties of thern that might, in a given context, stand out as being particularly salient to the explanatory task at hand. There are additional, more positive reasons that can be mobilized against the view that explanatorily relevant properties are rivals that must compete against each other for their explanatory relevance. These considerations can be brought into clearer focus by investigating more thoroughly the implications of the conclusion of the previous chapter, namely, the denial that causal-explanatory relevance is any kind of extensional, metaphysical relation at all. V, Why There is No C o a p e t i t i o n for Explanatory Relevance B r i a n McLaughlin does n o t t a k e t h i s r e s u l t t o have much b e a r i n g on t h e debate a b o u t men ta l c a u s a t i o n . '88 H e t a k e s Davidson t o t a s k f o r hav ing claimed t h a t t h e e x t e n s i o n a l n a t u r e of c a u s a t i o n undermines t h e view t h a t a n e v e n t c a u s e s i t s effects " i n v i r t u e of" i t s p r ~ p e r t i e s . " ~ According t o McLaughlin, e x t e n s i o n a l accounts o f c a u s a t i o n do n o t have t h i s r e s u l t , That is, it is p e r f e c t l y c o n s i s t e n t for us t o affirm t h a t t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n o b t a i n s o n l y between nona b s t r a c t , p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s , and t h a t i f e v e n t c c a u s e s e v e n t e, t hen d caused e i f d is i d e n t i c a l w i t h c, w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t c caused e i n v i r t u e o f c e r t a i n of c f s p r o p e r t i e s . l g O McLaughlin sets o u t t o m o t i v a t e t h i s claim by means of a n ana logy . The ana logy i n v o l v e s t h e r e l a t i o n , weighing less than. T h i s r e l a t i o n is e x t e n s i o n a l : i t t o o o b t a i n s between non-abs t r ac t p a r t i c u l a r s , and weighing-lessthan c o n t e x t s m e e t t h e s t a n d a r d set by t h e i n t e r s u b s t i t u t i v i t y o f C O r e f e r e n t i a l terms. None the le s s , McLaughlin adds, i f a weighs less t h a n b, it w i l l d o s o i n virtue o f one of i t s p r o p e r t i e s , narnely, i t s we igh t . S i m i l a r l y , causes o n l y c a u s e t h e i r effects i n virtue of s o m e le8 McLaughlinf "On Davidsonf s Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism," 27-40. lBg Donald Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in Mental Causation, ed. Heil and Mele, 3-17. McLaughlin, Davidsonf s Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism, " 30-1 . of their properties. Contrary to what Davidson says, this in no way conflicts with the view that causation is extensional. If we follow McLaughlin in saying this, then we shall once again have to face the worry that the features in virtue of which causes cause their effects are defined in such a way as to exclude mental properties from causalexplanatory relevance. To clarify, McLaughlin (unlike Sosa and others) is not claiming that it is really crs-being-F (rather than simply c) that causes the effect. He accepts the Davidsonian view that just as it is only concrete particulars thac can weigh less than other things, so too is it only concrete particulars (events in this case) that can cause or be caused. McLaughlin merely wishes to point out that these extensional relations obtain only because the particulars involved have the properties that they have. To return to his analogy, "If a weighs less than b, then a has some weight, wl, and b has some weight, w2, w1 is less than wz, and a weighs less than b in virtue of thi~."'~' This still contravenes the spirit, at least, of Davidsonr s response to his critics, for it involves a hypostatisation of weights, and takes their interrelation to be primary: first we have the abstracta, wl and WZ, and it 19 ' McLaughlin, "On Davidson' s Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism, " 3 1. i s o n l y because of t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o e a c h o t h e r t h a t a s t a n d s i n t h e weighingless than r e l a t i o n t o b. I t is a t least as p l a u s i b l e t o c o n j e c t u r e t h a t t h e o r d e r o f e x p l a n a t i o n r u n s i n t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n : a and b t a k e on t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e weight d e s i g n a t i o n s o n l y i n v i r t u e o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e weigh ingl e s s than r e l a t i o n . Tha t i s t o Say, t h e r e l a t i o n between t h e s e t w o concrete p a r t i c u l a r s is pr imary , and t h e p r o p e r t i e s (we igh t s i n t h i s case) i n v i r t u e o f which it a l l e g e d l y h o l d s i n f a c t derive frorn it. T h i s more pars imonious approach a v o i d s r e i f y i n g we igh t s . I t a v o i d s t r e a t i n g thern as real t h i n g s t h a t s t a n d i n c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s t o each o t h e r . M o r e p e r t i n e n t l y , it a v o i d s t r e a t i n g them a s t h i n g s the i n t e r r e l a t i o n o f which is t h e founda t ion o f r e l a t i o n s between real c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s . T h i s route c e r t a i n l y seems more c o n g e n i a l t o Davidson 's o u t l o o k , e s p e c i a l l y i n i t s r e f u s a l t o countenance a network of a b s t r a c t o b j e c t s which somehow u n d e r g i r d s and d e t e r m i n e s t h e way t h e wor ld i s ( e g . , a f s weighing less t h a n b) .19' Moreover, it al lows Davidson t o reject McLaughl inrs d a i m t h a t a weighs less t h a n b in virtue o f some r e l a t i o n between wl and wz. 19 ' Indeed, t h e i n s p i r a t i o n f o r t h i s paragraph is Davidson's remark t h a t , 'It is events t h a t have the power t o change t h ings , not Our va r ious ways of desc r ib ing them" (Davidson, "Thinking Causes, " 12 [Emphasis i n t h e o r i g i n a l 1 1 . klso , "For me, it is even ts t h a t have causes and ef f e c t s . Given t h i s ex t ens iona l i s t view of causa l r e l a t i o n s , it makes no l i t e r a l sense . . . t o speak of an e v e n t causing something a s mental, or by v i r t u e of i t s mental p rope r t i e s , or as desc r ibed i n one way o r another" (Davidson, "Thinking Causes, " 13) . Abstracta are inef f icac ious . They d o n o t make o n e t h i n g weigh m o r e than a n o t h e r . N o r do t h e y make o n e event c a u s e a n o t h e r . Tha t i s t o Say, t h e c a u s e does n o t c a u s e i t s effect i n v i r t u e o f any of i t s p r o p e r t i e s , n o t e v e n i ts s t r i c t l y nomic ones ; rather, p r o p e r t i e s f i g u r e i n s t r i c t o r hedged g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s o n l y because t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s between c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s are s u c h as they are. Wi l l i am C h i l d h a s p u t t h i s v i e w w i t h a d m i r a b l e c lar i ty . lg3 While he does n o t frame h i s d i s c u s s i o n as a r e s p o n s e t o McLaughlin, h e does t a k e h i m s e l f t o be d e v e l o p i n g t h e Dav idson ian p o s i t i o n i n s u c h a way as t o undermine t h e p u t a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e " i n v i r t u e of" t a l k t h a t McLaughlin and o t h e r s t r y t o e x p l o i t . Accord ing t o Ch i ld , "Causa t ion i s a b a s i c , n a t u r a l [ e x t e n s i o n a l ] r e l a t i o n between e v e n t s . "lg4 It i s basic i n t h e s e n s e t h a t it "does n o t o b t a i n , o r h o l d , i n virtue o f a n y t h i n g e l ~ e . " ~ ~ ~ Tf 1 i n t e r p r e t him c o r r e c t i y , p a r t o f C h i f d f s m o t i v a t i o n fo r h o l d i n g t h i s view is h i s r e f u s a l t o a s s i g n p r i o r i t y t o p r o p e r t i e s , and t h e r e l a t i o n s between them, as somehow s h a p i n g t h e a g g r e g a t e of c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s i n t o a c a u s a l l y ordered series. 196 Childr Causality, Interpretation and the Mïnd, 189. "Qhildr Causality, Interpreta tion and the Mind, 189. lg5 Child, Causality, Interpretation and the Mind, 189. Ig6 Child draws an analogy to the relation of temporal precedence (instead of weighing less than) to illustrate this point about natural relations generally: "When a precedes b, that temporal relation does not hold in virtue of anything else more basic; its holding is itself a basic fact" (Child, Causality, Interpretation and the and, 189) . It is i n t e r e s t i n g t o note that F r e d e r i c k S t o u t l a n d , one o f Che f i r s t to a r g u e that Davidson i s committed to epiphenomenalism, now shares t h i s r e l u c t a n c e . I n h i s r e v i e w of Child' s book, h e c o n c u r s w i t h C h i l d ' s verdict, s a y i n g , 'This seems t o m e (now) t h e r i g h t r e sponse : i f e v e n t s are c a u s a l l y related, t h e r e is a ( p h y s i c a l ) l a w which t h e e v e n t s i n s t a n t i a t e , b u t t h e y are n o t c a u s a l l y related i n virtue of i n s t a n t i a t i n g t h a t l a w . "Ig7 T h i s approach s t i f l a l l o w s nomic p a t t e r n s t o be s i g n i f i c a n t as i n d i c a t o r s of a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between two e v e n t s . After a l l , even t h o u g h i t i s fa l se t h a t two e v e n t s are c a u s a l l y related t o e a c h o t h e r i n v i r t u e of some nomic c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s , it remains t h e case t h a t whenever two e v e n t s are c a u s a l l y i n t e r r e l a t e d , some o f t h e c a u s e ' s f e a t u r e s w i l l i n fact be nomica l ly l i n k e d t o some of t h e effectf s f e a t u r e s . W e c a n , t h e n , s t i l l u s e nomic c o r r e l a t i o n s a s a g u i d e t o l o c a t i n g c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s by t a k i n g t h e s e c o r r e l a t i o n s as s i g n s t h a t i n d i c a t e t h e p r e s e n c e of a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between two e v e n t s . That is, w e can r e l y on them as symptoms, b u t n o t s o u r c e s , o f c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s between p a r t i c u l a r s . But i f lg7 Frederick Stoutland, critical notice of C a u s a l i ty, Interpretation and M n d , by William Child, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998) : 711-15 (at 713). (Emphasis in the original) Stoutland retains his old view, similar to Meldenrsr that reasons are not causes. His position has only changed in respect of Davidson's alleged commitment to epiphenomenalism. nomic connec t ions between p r o p e r t i e s are o n e k i n d of upshot o f c a u s a t i o n , t h e r e s u r e l y are o t h e r s as well. For i n s t a n c e , a c o u n t e r f a c t u a f dependency can i n d i c a t e t h e p r e s e n c e o f a c a u s a l connec t ion , and t h e r e seems t o be no r e a s o n t o deny t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l l y l i n k e d f e a t u r e s o f beliefs, desires and a c t i o n s are n o t i n t h e i r own way i n d i c a t o r s of a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e s e e v e n t s and s ta tes . O f cou r se , t h e s e l a t t e r "sense-making" f e a t u r e s are h i g h l e v e l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t o n l y show up (and s i g n a l t h e p r e s e n c e of c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s ) i n those h i g h l y complex systems towards which it i s f r u i t f u l t o adopt t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t a n c e . But t h e r e seems t o be no good r eason f o r denying t h a t some o f the symptoms o f c a u s a l connec t ions a r e o n l y t o be found i n some, bu t n o t a l l , o f t h e cases i n which c o n c r e t e p a r t i c u l a r s are causally i n t e r r e l a t e d , t h a t is, t h a t some o f t h e r e l a t i o n s between p r o p e r t i e s t h a t i n d i c a t e t h e p r e s e n c e o f a c a u s a l l i n k need no t be on hand e v e r y tirne t h e r e i s such a connec t ion . Here, then , is room f o r a r o b u s t p l u r a l i s m i n t h e s p i r i t o f Davidson. For t h i s kind o f c a u s a l s i g n i f i c a n c e (by way of i n d i c a t i n g t h e p r e s e n c e o f c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s ) g i v e s no h i n t o f be ing a s c a r c e comrmdity o v e r which p r o p e r t i e s must compete; t h a t is, there is no r e a s o n t o suppose t h a t i t l e n d s i tself t o any o f t h e "exc lus ion" w o r r i e s . After a l l , why cannot it be t h e case t h a t several of the cause's proper t ies a r e i n d i c a t i v e o r symptomatic of t h e causa l r e l a t i o n t h a t ob ta ins between t h e i r bea re r and some o the r event? Why should one i n d i c a t o r of a causa l connection exclude any other? Clearly t h e r e is room f o r a causa l r e l a t i o n t o be simultaneously made evident by a p le thora of r e l a t i o n s between the proper t ies of t h e cause and effect, r e l a t i o n s which can r e l i a b l y be taken t o be s i g n s of a causal connection. I n conclusion, the explanatory pluralism envisaged by James, Stout, Weber, Hornsby, Baker and Marras is a t t a i n a b l e without having t o dernarcate a special realm of explananda which a r e held t o be the exclusive preserve of i n t e n t i o n a l explanations. If w e take t h e above perspec t ive , from which physical proper t ies no longer appear t o be p r i v i l e g e d explainers t h a t a lone can l a y d a i m t o causa l s igni f icance , we thereby remove t h e motivation f o r t r y i n g t o provide mental Eeatures with some explanatory w o r k t o do by pr iv i leg ing them with respect t o some narrow range of explananda. Mental p roper t i e s can par take of causal- explanatory relevance without Our having t o h i t upon some non-physical explananda a s t h e i r p ropr i e t a ry concern. V I , C o n t e 1s E v e z y t h i n g It will be noticed that the weak form of causal significance described in the previous section is enjoyed by dispositions. True enough, metaphysically speaking, dispositional features really are on a par with mental and physical properties. When we get beyond dispositional features to consider their lower-level, realising properties we do not thereby get closer to the cause, for the cause is the event, not any of its properties. Instead, we approach lower-level properties that carry their own new (to us) informational load, where this new information affords us a greater opportunity for explanation, prediction and control. So, quite often, lower-level physical and mental properties do offer us something more than merely dispositional features offer, but this "something more" is not metaphysical. Instead, it is only to be understood in terms of pragrnatics, for it can only be cashed out in terrns of explanatory relevance, a relation that entails no exclusion principle. Let us examine a little more closely the informational impoverishment of appeals to dispositions. We tend to feel dissatisfied with appeafs to dispositional properties because they seldom provide us with a basis for abstracting sufficiently far from the present context to allow for the formula t ion o f new and i n t e r e s t i n g p r e d i c t i o n s and c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s . For example, when M o l i e r e f s c h a r l a t a n d o c t o r tries t o account f o r t h e tendency o f opium t o induce s l e e p by s a y i n g t h a t it has a d o r m i t i v e v i r t u e , h e a t least succeeds (as has been noted) i n l o c a t i n g p a r t o f the cause . H e a l s o g i v e s us a n i n d i c a t i o n o f where t o look i n o r d e r t o d i s c e r n some of t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t w e are l i k e l y t o f i n d in fo rmat ive ( i n t h e l i g h t of t h e e x p l a n a t o r y and p r e d i c t i v e tasks a t h a n d ) . He does not , though, g i v e u s an e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t enables u s t o d e p a r t ve ry f a r from t h e a c t u a l c i rcumstances when w e set out t o i n f e r new p r e d i c t i o n s and c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s . On t h e b a s i s of h i s claim t h a t t h i s powder has a d i s p o s i t i o n t o p u t people t o s l e e p , we may o n l y conclude t h a t people who t a k e t h i s powder w i l l f a 1 1 a s l e e p , and t h a t i f 1 had i n g e s t e d this powder, 1 t o o would have f a l l e n a s l e e p . Tnus, h i s exp lana t ion o n l y t e l l s u s w h a t t h i s particular ( o r something e x a c t l y s i m i l a r t o i t ) is c a p a b l e of doing. I t does n o t allow us t o i n f e r t h a t anything else , anyth ing t h a t differs from t h e opium i n some ways b u t that resembles it i n a c r u c i a l r e s p e c t , can a l s o be e x p e c t e d t o put normal human b e i n g s t o s l e e p . T h a t i s t o Say, it does no t give u s t h e power t o a b s t r a c t away f r o m t h i s p a r t i c u l a r lump of powder (the a c t u a l cause) i n Our subsequent p r e d i c t i o n s and e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h e c h a r l a t a n , t h e n , i s a quack not because he has failed to adduce some previously unknown metaphysical connection between the powder and its effect, something called "causal relevance". Rather, he is a quack because his explanation carries no novel predictive and explanatory power. As was earlier noted, the charlatan's explanation merely repeats information that was already in (or presupposed by) the question he was trying to answer. Thus, since the why-question that sets the standard for evaluating his answer is a feature of the context, context is everything. So (as was suggested in connection with Rey' s discussion of the Moliere case) if the question put to the charlatan had not been, "Why does opium put people to sleep?" but rather, "Why have these people fallen asleep?", then his answer would not have been so clearly vacuous, for it would have imparted some new information (viz., that the opium had something to do with their falling asleep). As Rey suggests, it would have been a perfectly good answer if our background knowledge had not included the claim that people generally do get sleepy after taking opium, so that (for al1 we know) these people might have Eallen asleep due to an allergic reaction to the powder. Or consider the claim that the cord stretched because it was elastic. In some contexts this will be a relatively uninformative explanation, but in o t h e r s i t w i l l c a r r y a more s a l i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n a l l o a d . If w e do n o t a l r e a d y know t h a t t h e c o r d is elast ic , t h e n w e may f i n d it a p e r f e c t l y good e x p l a n a t i o n t o Say t h a t t h e co rd did n o t ho ld t h e broom u p r i g h t because it w a s elastic.lg8 Here, t h e answer d o e s broaden Our e x p l a n a t o r y and p r e d i c t i v e h o r i z o n s , f o r w e now know something w e d id n o t know b e f orehand, n m e l y , t h a t any signif i c a n t force e x e r t e d on t h e c o r d is n o t l i k e l y t o m e e t w i t h a n y r e s i s t a n c e . I n s h o r t , t h e "something more" t h a t lower-level p h y s i c a l and men ta l f e a t u r e s u s u a l l y have , and t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s s o o f t e n l a c k , i s a c r e a t u r e o f t h e ep is temology and p r a g m a t i c s o f e x p l a n a t i o n , n o t metaphys ics . T h i s i s sugges ted by t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t whether a p r o p e r t y has t h i s "something more" i s a matter of c o n t e x t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s having e s p e c i a l l y t o do with t h e mind o f t h e i n q u i r e r , bo th w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f h e r why-question and t h e e x t e n t o f h e r background knowledge. T h i s e x p l a i n s why LePore and Loewer f a i l e d t o capture t h e "something more" by means o f their four-pronged c o u n t e r f a c t u a l t e s t : t h e y m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e d t h e "something m o r e " t o be a rne taphys ica l r e l a t i o n ( s u c h t h a t a c e r t a i n effect can be said t o have been caused i n v i r tue o f a g iven p r o p e r t y of t h e c a u s e ) , and a c c o r d i n g l y lg8 My thanks ta John King-Farlow for this example, and for pressing this point generally in John King-Farlow, comrnentary on "Does Anything Break Because It 1s Fragile?" by Paul Raymont (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Ottawa, Ont., June 1998) . f o r m u l a t e d a tes t t h a t would t r a c k t h a t connec t ion ; b u t d i s p o s i t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s are r n e t â p h y s i c a l l y on t h e same f o o t i n g as m e n t a l ( a n d basic physical) f e a t u r e s ; so , n a t u r a l l y enough, d i s p o s i t i o n a l propert ies sa t i s f ied t h e four -pronged tes t . The problem remains even i f w e try to recast t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l test as a test o n l y of an i n t e n s i o n a l r e l a t i o n o f e x p l a n a t o r y r e l e v a n c e , f o r d i s p o s i t i o n s would s t i l l p a s s it a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e "something more" would still e l u d e i t* Thus, w e would s t i l l l a c k a test t h a t c a n be applied i n a l1 c o n t e x t s as a gauge o f t h e sor t o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e t h a t w e t a k e m e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s t o have. 1 9 9 VI1 , Conclusion I n a r e c e n t paper Ned Block objects t o Jaegwon K i m ' s a s s i m i l a t i o n of e f f i c a c i o u s p r o p e r t i e s w i t h p r o j e c t i b l e kinds. 200 According t o Block, p r o j e c t i b i l i t y i s relative, f o r w e must a lways a s k , " P r o j e c t i b l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o what type of p r ~ p e r t ~ ? " ~ ~ ~ Moreover, "Kindhood cornes i n d e g r e e s , "202 fo r it i s based on s i m i l a r i t y , which admits of d e g r e e s . Thus, s i n c e whe the r someth ing i s a k ind d e p e n d s on whe the r i t is 199 Thus, William Child, though he appeals to counterfactuals and supervenience as indicators of causal-explanatory relevance relations, ultirnately gives up trying to fonnulate a set of sufficient conditions for causal-explanatory relevance (Child, Causality, Interpretation and the U n d , 213). 'O0 B l o c k , "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back, " 129. 'O' Block, "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back, " 128. ' O 2 Block , "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back, " 128. p r o j e c t i b l e , kindhood is "relative and graded'r. 'O3 Block poses t h i s a s a problem f o r Kim. After a l l , a s k s Block, "How c o u l d c a u s a l e f f i c a c y be relative and graded?"204 H e con t inues , "Once one a g r e e s t h a t t h e no t ion o f kind i s r e l a t i v e and graded, u n l e s s one is prepared t o see c a u s a t i o n a s r e l a t i v e and graded, k i n d s will be poor c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e key t o c a u ~ a t i o n . " ' ~ ~ T r u e , kinds w i l l be poor c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e key t o c a u s a t i o n , b u t o n l y because a l 1 p r o p e r t i e s a r e , i f by "key t o c a u s a t i o n " w e mean t h a t i n v i r t u e of which c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s o b t a i n . Causa l e f f i c a c y i s a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r , though. I n t h i s passage Bfock, l i k e Cynthia Macdonald and John H e i l , a l 1 t o o e a s i l y s l i d e s from premisses about c a u s a t i o n t o c o n c l u s i o n s about causal e f f i c a c y . While w e can a g r e e t h a t c a u s a t i o n i s no t r e l a t i v e and graded, i t i s n o t a t a l 1 c l e a r t h a t t h e same can be said o f c a u s a l e f f i c a c y . For i f w e are speaking of t h e e f f i c a c y of p r o p e r t i e s (and it i s clear from t h e con tex t t h a t t h i s is w h a t Block has i n mind) , t h e n w e can on ly be speaking o f an i n t e n s i o n a l r e l a t i o n of e x p l a n a t o r y re levance , and t h i s seems a c l e a r c a s e o f something t h a t i s c o n t e x t s e n s i t i v e , and which it is p e r f e c t l y n a t u r a l t o d e s c r i b e as r e l a t i v e and graded. 203 Block, "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back, '' 128. ' O 4 Block, 'Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back," 129. 'Os Block, "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back, " 129. This passage from Block's paper illustrates the current tendency to gfide back and forth between causation and causal relevance (or "efficacy") as though they were one and the same thing. While it may be tempting to do this, we can resist the temptation by keeping clear about the vast difference between the relata that stand in these two relations. Causal relevance is j u s t causal-explanatory relevance, and is thus intensional and context-sensitive. Only properties may enter into this relation. By contrast, only concrete particulars may enter into the natural, extensional relation of causation, and thus enjoy real efficacy. If we grasp the full implications of this difference, we shall see that properties (even basic physical features) are not really efficacious at allThey do not make anything happen. In view of this, the properties of basic physics can be seen not to occupy some privileged position, by alone possessing a strange sort of causal efficacy, by cornparison with which mental (and other) properties appear to be causally deficient. Once we dispense with the belief that properties can enjoy any real efficacy, by somehow making causes cause whatever they cause, we will find in anomalous rnonisrn no cornmitment to any form of epiphenomenalismMore generally, we shall limit the application of such principles as closure and exclusion to concrete particulars only. With this restriction cornes the realisation of a more accommodating pluralism with respect to properties: a property may explain in one context thereby excluding other properties from t a k i n g on an without explanatory relevance as robust as any of e n j o y i n g , proper ty is capable Bibliography Antony, Louise. "The Causal Relevance of the Mental: More on the Mattering of Minds*" Mind and Language 6 (1991) : 295-327. Aristotle. Categories. In Aristotle: Selected Works, translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gerson. Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1982. Armstrong, D ,M. A Theory of Universal S. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1978. Armstrong, D.M. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Baker, Lynne Rudder . Explaining Attitudes. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995. Block, Ned. "Can the Mind Change the World?" In Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, edited by George Boolos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Block, Ned. "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back. " Philosophical Perspeclives 11 (1997) : 107-32. Braddon-Mitchell, David, with Frank Jackson. The Phi1 osophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Broad, COD. The Mind and I t s Place in Nature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1925. Broad, C.D. "Replies." In The Philosophy o f C.D. B r o a d , e d i t e d by Paul A r t h u r S c h i l p p . New York: Tudor P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1959. B r o w n , James Rober t . Commentary on "Does Anyth ing Break Because It Is F r a g i l e ? " by Paul Raymont, paper p r e s e n t e d a t t h e a n n u a l meet ing of t h e O n t a r i o P h i l o s o p h i c a l S o c i e t y , Toronto, O n t . , October , 1997. Burge, Ty le r . " I n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d t h e Mental. " Midwes t S t u d i e s i n Ph i losophy 4 (1979) : 73-121. Burge, Ty le r . " I n d i v i d u a t i o n and Causation i n Psychology." P a c i f i c P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y 70 (1989) : 303-22. Ch i ld , W i l l i a m . C a u s a l i t y , Interpreta t i o n and t h e Mind. Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1994, Chisholm, Roderick. P e r c e i v i n g . I t h a c a , NY: Corne11 U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1957. Cohen, L. Jona than , w i th Mary Hesse, e d s Applications of I n d u c t i v e L o g i c . Oxford: C f arendon Press, 198 0 . Crane, Tim. "The Mental Causa t ion Debate." P r o c e e d i n g s o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society (Suppl. ) 6 9 ( 1 9 9 5 ) : 211-36. Davidson, Donald. "Men ta l Events ." I n E s s a y s on A c t i o n s and Events . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n Lawrence F o s t e r and %W. Swanson, eds., Expe r i ence and Theory (Amherst, MA: The U n i v e r s i t y o f Massachuse t t s P re s s , 1 9 7 0 ) . Davidson, Donald. "Thinking Causes. " In Mental Causa t ion , edited by John Heil and Alfred Mele, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Dretske, Fred. Explaining Behavior: Reasons i n a World of Causes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988. Dretske, Fred. "Reasons and Causes. " Philosophical Perspec t i ves 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) : 1-15 . Edwards, Paul, ed Immortali ty. Aiierst , NY : Prometheus Books, 1997. Ehring, Douglas. "Mental Causation, Determinables and Property Instances." Nous 30 (1996): 461-80. Elliot, Hugh S.R. Modern Sc ience a n d the I l lus ions o f Professor Bergson. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912. Ewing, A . C . Value and R e a l i t y . London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973. Geach, Peter. Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Complexi ty and the Function o f Mind i n Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Hebb, D.O. Essay on Mind. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1980. Heil, John, with Alfred Mele. "Mental Causes." American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Quarterly 28 (1991 ) : 61-71. H e i l , John . The Nature of True 14llndsCambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1992, H e i l , John , with Alfred M e l e , eds. Mental C a u s a t i o n Oxford: C la r endon Press, 1993. H e i l , J ohn Philosophy o f Mind. London: Rou t l edge , 1998. Hess, P e t e r . "Act ions , Reasons, and Humean Causes . " A n a l y s i s XLI (1981) : 77-81. Hesse, Mary, w i t h L. J o n a t h a n Cohen, eds . Applications o f Inductive Log ic . Oxford: C la r endon P r e s s , 1980 H i r s c h , E l i . Dividing R e a l i ty. New York: Oxford University P r e s s , 1993. H o l l i s , M a r t i n . "Ph i lo sophy of S o c i a l S c i e n c e . " I n T h e B l a c k w e l l Cornpanion to P h i 1 osophy, edited by N i c h o l a s Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James. Oxford: B lackwe l l , 1996. Honder ich, T e d . "The Argument f o r Anomalous Monism." A n a l y s i s X L I I ( 1 9 8 2 ) : 59-64. Horgan, Te rence . "Jackson on P h y s i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n a n d Qualia." Philosophical Q u a r t e r l y 3 4 (1984) : 147-53. Horgan, Te rence . "Mental Quausation . " Phi1 osophical Perspectives 3 (1989) : 47-76. Horgan, Te rence . "From Supe rven ience t o Supe rdupe rven ience . " Mind 102 (1993): 555-86. Hornsby, J e n n i f e r . "Agency and C a u s a l E x p l a n a t i o n , " I n Mental Causa t ion , edi ted by John Heil a n d A l f r e d Mele, Oxford: C la r endon Press, 1993, Huxley, T.H. "On the H y p o t h e s i s Tha t Animals Are Automata." I n The Philosophy of Mind, e d i t e d by B r i a n Beakley and P e t e r Ludlow. Cambridge, MA: t h e MIT P r e s s , 1992. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n 1874. Jackson , Frank, w i t h E l i z a b e t h P r i o r a n d Robert P a r g e t t e r . "Three T h e s e s About D i s p o s i t i o n s . " American Philosophical Quarterly 1 9 (1982) : 251-7. Jackson , Frank, w i t h P h i l i p P e t t i t . "Func t i ona l i s rn and Broad Content." Mind 97 ( 1 9 8 8 ) : 381-400. Jackson , Frank, w i t h P h i l i p Pettit . "Program E x p l a n a t i o n : a G e n e r a l Perspective." Analysis 50 ( 1 9 9 0 ) : 107-17. Jackson , Frank. " E s s e n t i a l i s m , Menta l P r o p e r t i e s and Causa t i on . " Proceedings o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y 9 5 (1995) : 253-68. Jackson , Frank. "Mental C a u s a t i o n . " M i n d 105 (1996 ) : 377413 . Jackson , Frank. "The Prirnary Q u a l i t y View of Color . " Philosophical Perspectives 10 ( 1 9 9 6 ) : 199-219. Jackson , Frank, w i t h David Braddon-Mi tche l l . The Philosophy of Mind and Cognit ion. Oxford: B l a c k w e l l P u b l i s h e r s , 1996, Jacob, P i e r r e . Wha t Minds Can Do. Cambridge : Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1997James , Will iam. The P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology . V o l . 1. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890. Janaway, C h r i s t o p h e r . Self and World i n Schopenhaue r ' s K i m , Kim, Kim, K i m , Ph i l o sophyOxford: C la r endon P r e s s , 198 9 Jaegwon. "Concepts of Supe rven i ence . " I n S u p e r v e n i e n c e a n d Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n P h i l o s o p h y a n d Phenomenolog ica l Research 4 5 ( 1 9 8 4 ) : 153-76. Jaegwon. "The Myth of Nonreduc t i ve P h y s i c a l i s m - " I n S u p e r v e n i e n c e and MindCambridge : Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n P r o c e e d i n g s and Addresses o f t h e American P h i l o s o p h i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n 63 (1989) : 31-47, Jaegwon. " E x p l a n a t o r y E x c l u s i o n and the Problem o f M e n t a l C a u s a t i o n . " I n I n f o r m a t i o n , Seman tics and Epistemology, edited by Enr ique V i l l a n u e v a . Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1990. Jaegwon- "Supe rven i ence as a P h i l o s o p h i c a l Concep t . " I n S u p e r v e n i e n c e and M i n d . Cambridge : Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993 . O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n M e t a p h i l o s o p h y 2 1 (1990) : 1-27. Kim, Jaegwon. "Multiple Realisation and the Metaphysics of Reduction. " in Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993. Originally published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 ( 1992) : 1-26. Kim, Jaegwon . Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993. Kim, Jaegwon . P h i 1 csophy of Mind. Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, Inc., 1996. King-Farlow, John. Commentary on 'Does Anything Break Because It 1s Fragile?" by Paul Raymont, paper presentod at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Associatiorr, Ottawa, Ont., June, 1998. Kneale, William C. "Broad on Mental Events and Epiphenomenalism." In The Philosophy of C.D. Broad, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1959. LePore, Ernest, with Barry Loewer. "Mind Matters." The Journal of Philosophy 84 [1987]: 630-42. Lewis, David. "Causal Explanation. " In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Lewis, David. "Events . " In Phi1 osophical Papers, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Lewis, David, "Finkish Dispositions. " The Philosophical Q u a r t e r l y 47 (1997) : 143-58. Loewer, Barry, with Ernest LePore . "Mind Matters . " The J'ournal of Philosophy 84 Cl9871 : 630-42. Macdonald, Cynthia, with Graham Macdonald. "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action." In Mind, Causation and Action, edited by L, Stevenson, R. Squires and J. Haldane. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Macdonald, Cynthia. Mind-Body Identi ty Theories. London : Routledge, 1989. Macdonald, Cynthia, with Graham Macdonald. "How to be Psychologically Relevant. " In Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1 of Debates on Psycholoqical Explanation, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995. Macdonald, Graham, with Cynthia Macdonald. "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action." In Mind, Causation and Action, edited by L. Stevenson, R. Squires and J. Haldane. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Macdonald, Graham, with Cynthia Macdonald. "How to be Psychologically Relevant. " In Philosophy of Psycho1 ogy, Vol. 1 of Debates on Psycholoçical Explanation, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald. Oxford: Basil BlackweIl, 19%. MacDougall, William, with John B. Watson. The B a t t l e o f Behaviorism. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc . , 1929. McLaughlin, B r i a n P. "Type Epiphenomenalisrn, Type Dualism, and t h e Causal P r i o r i t y of the Physical." Philosophical Perspect ives 3 (1Ç89) : 109-35. McLaughlin, Brian P. "On Davidson's Response t o t h e Charge of Epiphenomenalism. " I n Mental Causation, e d i t e d by John Heil and Alfred M e l e . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993 . Marras, Ausonio, "The Causal Relevance of Mental Proper t ies . " Melden, A. 1. Free 1961. Philosophia 25 ( 1 9 9 7 ) : 389-400. Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Mele, Alfred, with John H e i l . "Mental Causes " American Philosophical Q u a r t e r l y 28 (1991) : 01-71 , Mele, Alfred, with John H e i l , eds. Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1993. Moliere. The Imaqinary I n v a l i d (Le malade imaginaire) . I n The Dramatic Works o f Moliere, Vol. 3 , t r a n s l a t e d by Charles Heron Wall. London: George Bell and Sons, 1 9 0 8 . Nagel, Thomas. The View From Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1986. N i e t z s c h e , F r i e d r i c h . Daybreak, t ranslated by R. JO H o l l i n g d a l e , edited by Maudemarie C l a r k and B r i a n L e i t e r . Cambr idge : Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1997. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d i n 1881. Noordhof , P a u l . "Do T r o p e s R e s o l v e t h e P r o b l e m of Mental C a u s a t i o n ? " The Philosophical Quarterly 48 ( 1 9 9 8 ) : 2212 6 , Owens, David. " D i s j u n c t i v e Laws?" Rnalysis 4 9 ( 1 9 8 9 ) : 197202 P a r g e t t e r , R o b e r t , with E l i z a b e t h P r i o r a n d F r a n k J a c k s o n . "Three T h e s e s About D i s p o s i t i o n s . " American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982) : 251-7. P a t t o n , M i c h a e l . Comrnentary o n "Does Anything B r e a k Because I t 1s Fragile?" by P a u l Raymont, paper p r e s e n t e d a t t h e a n n u a l Mid-South C o n f e r e n c e i n P h i l o s o p h y , Memphis, TN, F e b r u a r y , 1 9 9 8 . P e t t i t , P h i l i p , w i t h F r a n k J a c k s o n . " F u n c t i o n a l i s m and Broad Con ten t . " Mind 97 ( 1 9 8 8 ) : 381-400. P e t t i t , P h i l i p , w i t h F rank J a c k s o n . "Prcgram E x p l a n a t i o n : a G e n e r a l P e r s p e c t i v e ." Analysis 50 ( 1 9 9 0 ) : 107-17. P o p p e r , K a r l . " A u t o b i o g r a p h y . " I n T h e Philosophy of Karl Popper, edited by P a u l A r t h u r S c h i l l p . La S a l l e : Open C o u r t , 1 9 7 4 , Prior, Elizabeth, with Robert Pargetter and F r a n k J a c k s o n . "Three Theses About Dispositions. " American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982) : 251-7. Putnam, Hilary. "The Nature of M e n t a l States." In M i n d , Language and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Originally published as "Psychological Predicates, " in W. H. Capitan and D. D, Merrill, eds . , A r t , Mind, and R e l i g i o n (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967) . Putnam, Hilary. "The Meaning of 'Meaningf ." In M i n d , Language and Reali ty. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1975. Originally published in Keith Gunderson, ed., Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1975) . Rey, Georges . Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Oxford : Blackwell Publishers, 1997. Robb, David. "The Properties of Mental Causation." The Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997) : 178-94. Ruben, David-Hillel . Explaining Explanation. London : Routledge, 1990. Santayana, George- "Reason in Common Sense." In The Life of Reason. New York: Charles Scribner' s Sons, 1905. Santayana, George. "The Efficacy of Thought." The Journal of Philosophy 3 (1906) : 410-12, Santayana, George. Realms of Being. New York: Charles Scribnerf s Sons, 1940. Santayana, George. "Apologia Pro Mente Sua . " In The Philosophy of George Santayana, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1940. Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophy of George Santayana. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1940. Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophy of C I D . Broad. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1959. Schillp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle: Open Court, 1974. Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representa lion, translated by E . F . J . Payne. Vol. 2. 1958. Reprint, New York: Dover, 1969. Originally published in 1818. Seager, William. "Disjunctive Laws and Supervenience." Amlysis 51 (1991) : 93-8. Searle, John. In tent ional i ty. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1983. Shoemaker, Sydney. "Causality and Properties . " In T i m e and Cause, edited by Peter van Inwagen. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980. Shoemaker, Sydney. "Properties, Causation, and Projectibility." In Applications of Inductive Logic, e d i t e d by L. Jona than Cohen and M a r y Hesse. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Sosa, E r n e s t . "Mind-Body I n t e r a c t i o n a n d S u p e r v e n i e n t Causation." Midwest Studies i n P h i l o s o p h y 9 (1984) : 271-81. Spencer , Herber t . First P r i n c i p l e s . 6 t h ed. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1900. S t o u t , G.F. A Manual o f Psychology. London: W.B. C l i v e , 1899. S t o u t l a n d , F rede r i ck . "The Causa t i o n of Behavior . " I n E s s a y s on W i t t g e n s t e i n i n Honor o f G.H. von Wright, Acta Phi losophica Fennica, XXVIIL . Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976. S t o u t l a n d , F rede r i ck . Critical no t i ce of C a u s a l i ty, I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and Mind, by Wi l l i am C h i l d . P h i l o s o p h y and Phenomenological Resea rch 58 (1998) : 711-15. Strawson, P . F. "Causa t ion and E x p l a n a t i o n ." I n E s s a y s on Davidson, e d i t e d by Bruce Vemazen and M e r r i l l H in t ikka . Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985. Swinburne, Richard. " P r o p e r t i e s , Causa t ion , and P r o j e c t i b i l i t y : Reply t o Shoemaker. " I n A p p l i c a t i o n s o f I n d u c t i v e Logic, edited L . J o n a t h a n Cohen and Mary Hesse. Oxford: Clarendon P s e s s , 1980 . Swoyer, Chris. "The Nature of N a t u r a l Laws." The Australasian Journal o f Philosophy 60 ( 1 9 8 2 ) : 203-23. Vivas, Eliseo. "From The Life of Reason to The Last Puri tan." In The Philosophy of George Santayana, edited by Paul ZLrthur Schilpp. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1940. Watson, John B., with William MacDougall, The B a t t l e of Behaviorism. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Fnc., 1929. Weber, Max. "Basic Sociological Tems." Original translation by Talcott Parsons (1947) (revised by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) . In Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. Originally published in 1922. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Z e t t e l , translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. "Lectures on Freedom of the Will." From notes taken by Yorick Smythies. In Ludwig Wittgenstein : Philosophical Occasions 191 2-1 951, edited by James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993. Yablo, Stephen. "Mental Causation. " The Philosophical R e v i e w I O 1 (1992) : 245-80.